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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

READING THE 'OTHER' WHERE FANCY IS BRED: DESIGNATING STRANGERS IN SHAKESPEARE

BY

SIMON C. ESTOK

©

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.

DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH

Edmonton, Alberta
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FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled READING THE 'OTHER' WHERE FANCY IS BRED: DESIGNATING STRANGERS IN SHAKESPEARE submitted by SIMON C. ESTOK in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.

Linda Woodbridge (supervisor)

Robert R. Wilson

Jonathan Hart

Carl Urion

Carol Thomas Neely

11 December 1995

IN MEMORIAM

Cut is the branch that might have grown full straight,

And burnèd is Apollo's laurel bough

That sometime grew within this learnèd man.

For David Jacob Reuben with love

ABSTRACT

Confluences among the discourses of sexuality, gender, race/ethnicity, and class in productions of early modern alterities have important theoretical and social implications (historical and contemporary). The body is the medium through which early modern strategies of discipline and silencing work. These strategies collude with discourses of race (Othello, Titus Andronicus, and The Tempest), sexuality (The Expert Midwife, The Merchant of Venice, and woodcuts of Theodore de Brye), gender (The Duchess of Malfi and Titus Andronicus), and class in general (Merchant of Venice). Analyzing how butchery and other exercises of discipline write the early modern body reveals a paradox: the production of alterities is also a silencing of alterities. Chapter 2 shows how, in collusion with specific discourses, silence is a key player in ambivalent productions of Otherness, ambivalent because the silence may represent oppression or resistance--or both, as with the Duchess of Malfi (and even King Lear's Cordelia). Responses to *imposed* silence include cross-dressing (Hic Mulier/Haec Vir and Twelfth Night), the practice of witchcraft (Macbeth), and sometimes suicide (Hamlet)--and often each of these responses (whether they are coping strategies or forms of resistance) are themselves parts of larger formulations of difference. Perhaps the most complicated formulae involve the subject of madness. In discussing how madness is deployed as a means of Othering

and silencing, a New Historicist praxis is useful (if not essential), since it allows for contextual analyses of the ways that discourses producing madness connect with issues of sexuality, gender, class, and race in Renaissance texts. Linked with each of these issues, and often embedded in discourses about madness, are patterns of bestialization. Given the importance bestialization plays in designations of alterity, purely anthropocentric analyses are necessarily incomplete: conceptualizations of the environment are important in productions both of systems of domination and of alterities. Work from geography, post-colonial studies, theories of disgust and rot, and the animal rights movement all become important here. Alterity is rife in the early modern period, and if Otherness can be viewed as the product of inter-disciplinary discourses, then our task is to make visible the connections.

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Introduction: Controlled Intersections

> There is no subject so old that something new cannot be said about it.
>
> (F. Dostoevsky, The Diary of A Writer)

A deeply religious student from Israel once asked me if Shakespeare was anti-Semitic. I did not know how to answer the question. I thought that a Jewish descendant of Holocaust survivors like me might feel differently about a play such as The Merchant of Venice (a known favorite of the Nazis)[1] than other people might. I told the student that I could not say very much, one way or the other, about Shakespeare's personal views but added that the time and place in which Shakespeare wrote was hostile to Jews and that Shakespeare's plays have had many uses. What I might have added is that these many uses should not surprise anyone, since there are many figures of alterity in the drama of Shakespeare and his contemporaries that may be utilized for various ideological purposes. There is the Jew, there are people of color, there are mad people, there are women, there are people with nonprocreative sexualities, there are cross-dressers, there are constructed archetypes of First Nations people, and there is a whole ragtag crowd of poor, disenfranchised, and generally unaccommodated Others. What there isn't is a sustained critique that looks adequately at the confluences among the mechanisms

producing these various alterities. This study attempts to write in that largely uninscribed space.

Writing about former times is often like taking a photograph: it makes what is round seem flat and what moves seem still. New Historicism certainly adds dimensionality to pictures of the past, but we can never hope for much more than a series of frozen *glimpses* of the bustling past, regardless of the perspective(s): no odd collection of provisional readings can ever hope to give the whole picture.[2] In offering glimpses of contexts out of which texts grow and to which they contribute, however, New Historicism encourages a kind of discursive networking. One of the principal aims of New Historicism is to reveal, as H. Aram Veeser has noted, that "everything is logically connected to everything else" (4). I am interested here in discursive *intersections* and in producing a series of analyses of the interconnected *processes* that designate various kinds of alterity in early modern England, and New Historicism is sometimes a useful approach (as we shall see).

In examining the interconnected workings that produce early modern alterities, one is bound to notice what Ania Loomba has called "interlocking . . . structures of oppression" (1). Finding the base of these structures is difficult work, and it is easy enough to fall into the trap of treating, say, "race and gender as interchangeable

functions" (Sharpe 11).[3] One hypothesis that guides this study is Stephen Greenblatt's claim that figures of resistance point directly to "the characteristic modes of desire and fear . . . [of] a given society" (Renaissance Self-Fashioning 209). It is precisely the structures of desire and fear of a given society that will determine both the shapes of alterity and the parameters of resistance to oppressive authority in that society.

To some degree, figures of alterity and resistance are the twin offspring of oppressive structures, and where there is alterity, there is often also resistance. Figures of resistance, however, are not always readily apparent. Sometimes, we have to *read* for them. To do so is not to invest an author with acumen, sensitivity, or prophetic wisdom; it is, rather, to unravel the complicated threads of a tapestry that produces and reproduces "situated knowledges."[4] Privileged epistemologies stage dominant codes and systems of signification and, in the process, oust Other systems of knowledge. But when we watch the way that the world moves in what Donna Haraway calls a "fully textualized and coded . . . matrix" (185), we are also watching productions of epistemological displacement. Resistance may be read in the coded articulations written (sometimes produced, sometimes reproduced) by the very processes that seek to contain the voice of the Other. Caliban, for instance, as I mention in Chapter 1 below, uses

the language that Miranda taught him, but not in the way that she does: he uses it to curse; he uses it to articulate resistance to Prospero; he uses it to express plans for the overthrow of his "master," plans which include fire.[5] We find codes of resistance in the descriptions of early modern sexual dissidence and in muted alterities that speak through multiple encodings. We find resistance in apparel, body, and mind. Decoding the various forms of resistance, however, rarely yields unequivocal results.

At the same time that many texts challenge the orthodoxies about which they write, they also often confirm such orthodoxies.[6] The fact that resistance so often fails to resolve into an easily binaristic "either/or, challenges or supports" dyad means that the texts often achieve a kind of "deconstructive contestation" (Sedgwick, Epistemology 11) of the ways in which boundaries are constructed, transgressed, and maintained.[7] Perhaps one of the greatest ironies of the early modern period, a time of great conceptual map-making and boundary-drawing, is that so many boundaries become so blurred in the moment of their articulation.

In Chapter 1, I discuss the writing of the early modern body. In any consideration of early modern discourses that write the body, it quickly becomes apparent that many readings of such bodies are often *re-memberings*: the early modern body is written less as a unified whole than as a

collection of dismembered parts.[8] The body, as a discrete thing, is blurred in the moment of its articulation, and it is not uncommon to find heads lying around as part of the environment in visual representations of the disciplined body (see p. 34 below, for an example).

Torture, of course, is one of the primary methods of exercising discipline over the perceived or constructed Other, and it is a disciplinary measure that is almost always, in some way, member-specific. In a sense, torture is anatomization. It is not surprising that anatomies proper were also heavily on the rise in the Renaissance (more or less concurrently with cartographies, which I discuss in more detail in Chapter 4). Anatomization fed the interests of a growing scientific discourse, and butchery fed the interests of a hegemony committed to policing its Others. One might also add that butchery fed stomachs. Butchery is a mode of silencing and a part of a dietary activity, and, as we will see below, there are similar things at play and at stake in the production both of butchered animals and people.

Clearly, most people would see the butchering of humans in a completely different ethical and philosophical light than they would the butchering of animals. And the distinction between human and animal is certainly an important one in the early modern period. One of the things I find interesting is the ways that the distinctions

are drawn. The Other is almost always, in some way, bestial. One of the ways that we see the Other reduced to the bestial is through a denial of speech, often, as I show in Chapter 1, through torture.

Chapter 2, therefore, logically picks up where Chapter 1 leaves off--namely, with the question of silence. As with other boundaries, the line between silence and speech is not exactly sacrosanct. As Eve Sedgwick does in her Epistemology of the Closet (1990), I begin with the binary and slowly work away from it. In simple terms, what we will see is that speech is not the only form of communication and that silence is not always containment. The binary deconstructs itself and practically becomes invalid.

Questions about resistance feature importantly in my discussions of silence and speech. If we are to discuss differences that are articulated in the early modern period as the products of voice and power, then logic forces us to address questions about methods of communication that are spoken as well as those that are not. Cross-dressing, various encodings of sexualities, witchcraft, and suicide are among the communicative gestures that appear as responses to strategies of silencing. Each gesture is, in its own way, problematical. Perhaps none is more so than suicide, since it seems to raise important questions about sanity.

The whole issue of madness is a difficult one, and it

is in Chapter 3, more than anywhere else in what follows, that I pursue what might properly be seen as a New Historicist strategy. An absolute picture of early modern madness, however, does *not* miraculously appear. After discussing methodological and definitional approaches, I attempt to give some idea of the discursive framework out of which early modern madnesses are produced. What this entails is a rather lengthy discussion of the pronouncements about madness that early modern legal, clinical, literary, and pulp discourses make. These are the frozen glimpses that I mentioned above. To discuss all of the pronouncements or implications of any of these discourses is simply impossible, and it is naive for any New Historicist to think otherwise. Moreover, the re-presentation of history through the frozen glimpses of (what we see as) "the past" is a provisional one that is always open to revision and/or expansion. One might, for instance, profitably expand my discussion of the discursive milieu that produces early modern madness by analysing the input of theological discourses. My provisional spread of early modern discourses allows at least some contextual analysis of the ways in which constructions of madness interact with issues of sexuality, gender, class, and race in Renaissance texts.

From the very beginning of this study, we can see that the mechanisms marking alterity consistently involve bestialization. From the butchering of people, to the

careful policing and reservation of the category of "Man" as the privileged site of authority and voice, down to the colocation of Jews, people of color, the mad, women, sexual dissidents, cross-dressers, and First Nations people with animals, bestialization plays a role in the making of the Other. Chapter 4 attempts to introduce some of the implications of this fact.

Animals, however, do not seem to be the real meat of the matter; rather, it is a part of a larger set of arrangements in which animals belong--the environment--that a politics of domination expresses itself through. Chapter 4 is an attempt to introduce discussions about environmental ethics, not only to flesh out analyses of early modern alterities, but also as a means of linking some of the concerns raised by various theories of post-colonialism, feminist geography, and disgust. The ground on which the various Others of the early modern period is set is, ultimately, both fearful and desirable, fetishized and feared, but certainly, one way or the other, fancied.

Notes

[1]In "Shylock and the Pressures of History," James Bulman explains that

> the Third Reich exploited [The Merchant of Venice] as comic propaganda against Jews who--hook-nosed devils all, intent on bringing Germany to financial ruin--were being herded toward the Final Solution. (143)

[2]Lynn Hunt makes a similar point in her critique of the fields of social and cultural history, which move, she notes, "from one group to another (workers, women, children, ethnic groups, the old, the young) without developing much sense of cohesion or interaction between topics" (9).

[3]In a discussion about the position of women in colonial texts in her Allegories of Empire (1993), Jenny Sharpe rightly warns against such reductionist readings, and it is a warning that might well extend beyond the axes of gender, class, and race that Sharpe examines. Sites of alterity are obviously not confined to the magic trilogy of "gender, class, and race," though neither Sharpe nor Ania Loomba--see her Gender, Race, Renaissance Drama (1989)--move much beyond the magic threesome. Questions about sexualities are best not subsumed under the topic of gender, and colonialism is not just about people: it is also about land. Clearly, questions about environment must, at some point, be raised. And with questions about the

environment, though not subsumed by them, the question of human/animal relations must be discussed.

[4]This term comes from Donna Haraway's Simian's, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (1991), chapter 9.

[5]As I mention below in a discussion about Caliban (see Chapter 1, n.4, page 15), fire represents one method of resistance to Caribbean slave-owners.

[6]Many theorists (of post-colonialism, New Historicism, cultural materialism, carnivalesque, feminism, and hybrid variations of these fields) have noted the ambivalence of the assorted challenges to authority that diverse texts make.

[7]I borrow the term "deconstructive contestation" from Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's Epistemology of the Closet (1990). She uses the term in reference to a series of binarisms that she sets up mostly, as she explains, for definitional convenience (11, n.19).

[8]I have only been able to formulate these ideas because of the extraordinarily original and lucid arguments Carol J. Adams makes about "re-membering" in her discussion of "Frankenstein's Vegetarian Monster," Chapter 6 of her The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory (1991) 108-19.

Chapter 1

Difference and Discipline: Early Modern Discourses that Write and Police the Body

> In defence of property and the established social order the Elizabethan and Jacobean crown killed huge numbers of the people of England. . . . Men, women and children in 'Shakespeare's England' were strung up on permanent or makeshift gallows by a hempen noose. Sometimes the spinal chord was snapped at once; or they hung by their necks until they suffocated or drowned; until their brains died of hypoxeia, or until the shock killed them. Pissing and shitting themselves. Bleeding from their eyes. Thinking.
>
> (Francis Barker, The Culture of Violence)

> . . . exchanges of power are anything but disembodied acts.
>
> (Jonathan Goldberg, Queering the Renaissance)

Depictions of the sadistic realities attending power lie scattered among the textual traces of the early modern period. The "arsenal of horrors" Foucault describes (Discipline and Punish 32) in his history of the French

penal system has its counterpart in the history of the English--but the penal system is only a small part of a set of discursive practices that anatomized the Renaissance body. The woodcuts of dismemberments, food for cannibals; the diaries, log-books, and narrative accounts, British and continental, of encounters between the Old and New Worlds; the pamphlets, the conduct books, and the literature--all of these texts write the early modern body. This chapter, then, investigates the dual function--both of designating ultimately silenced alterities and of writing the controlled body--that a variety of broadly divergent early modern texts perform.

Torture is perhaps the most extreme manifestation of control over the body. It acts out what Elaine Scarry calls a "wholly convincing spectacle of power" (27), and, as many theorists have observed, torture requires the Other. It is a power dynamic where the victim, as Michel de Certeau argues, "can only be the other, the enemy" (41). The argument here is similar to the one Jean-Paul Sartre makes concerning the functions of torture: "the main thing is to make the prisoner feel that he does not belong to the same species" as the torturer (16). It is a position that Page du Bois echoes: "All those tortured are 'othered,' made slaves to the torturer-master" (153). Similarly, Foucault locates the condemned at the opposite end of the continuum than that at which the king is located. Both figures

inhabit a specific corporeal space, with ceremonies and rituals, but "in the darkest region of the political field the condemned man represents the symmetrical, inverted image of the king" (Discipline 29). Whether the stated goal of torture is to punish or to instruct, the production of an Other is always one effect. And torture is always about the expression of power over that Other.

In Titus Andronicus, Aaron, Saturninus, and Lucius use torture to demonstrate their power. For Aaron, sociopathic and sadistic, torture is one of the tools of the trade. As the surgeon uses the scalpel, so does Aaron wish to use torture. He explains to Lucius:

> If there be devils, would I were a devil,
> To live and burn in everlasting fire,
> So I might have your company in hell,
> But to torment you with my bitter tongue!
>
> (5.1.147-50)

But he has already done his work and cut into civility with barbarity, leaving cuts that, Lucius explains, "should make so deep a wound/ And yet detested life not shrink thereat" (3.1.246-7). Death would be better than the plots Aaron hatches. Lavinia begs for a merciful death (2.3.173) in place of the "worse than killing lust" (2.3.175) that Aaron counsels Chiron and Demetrius to inflict on her: "he that wounded her," Titus later mourns, "Hath hurt me more than he had kill'd me dead" (3.1.92-3).[1] It is, of course, not

their lust but their power (though the two are not mutually exclusive) that Chiron and Demetrius enjoy through Lavinia's tortured and dismembered body. It is power that Saturninus enjoys when he bids the attendants drag Quintus and Martius "unto the prison" where they are to remain until he has "devis'd/ Some never-heard-of torturing pain for them" (2.3.283-5). And it is power that Lucius enjoys in sentencing Aaron: "Set him breast-deep in the earth," Lucius commands, "and famish him;/ There let him stand, and rave, and cry for food" (5.3.179-80).

The point here, I would add, is not merely that a person uses techniques of torture and punishment as "ways of exercising power" (Discipline 23) over the body but that he uses the body to maintain power over power, to keep intact the relationships that subordinate the victims, to preserve the structures of abuse through the tortured body. Thus, it is necessary that Lucius assert his control over Aaron's body in order to regain control of the body politic. There is a kind of tit-for-tat logic here. It is through the torture of Aaron's body that Lucius can repair the body politic and "knit again/ This scatter'd corn into one mutual sheaf,/ These broken limbs again into one body" (5.3.70-2). The perception here is that the body stabilizes unstable power relationships.[2]

When Caliban enters in The Tempest, for instance, Prospero immediately re-affirms the parameters of the power

relationship: Prospero has the upper hand and re-affirms his power by threatening a disciplinary assault on Caliban's body:

> For this, be sure, to-night thou shalt have
> cramps,
> Side-stitches that shall pen thy breath up;
> urchins
> Shall, for that vast of night that they may work,
> All exercise on thee; thou shalt be pinch'd
> As thick as honeycomb, each pinch more stinging
> Than bees that made'em. (1.2.327-332)

The method of torture threatened here is physical; the aim, to silence.

The Tempest is an early British allegory of empire, whether or not this was Shakespeare's intent,[3] and Prospero is ontologically imperialist Europe. His claim for that which is not rightfully his is contestable--as he well knows. Elaine Scarry argues in The Body in Pain (1985) that "it is, of course, precisely because the reality of [a torturing regime's] power is so highly contestable, the regime so unstable, that torture is being used" (27). This is certainly the case in The Tempest. Prospero's power can be burned away easily enough: books and magic mantles burn[4] --and Caliban uses his voice to implore Stephano to burn Prospero's books (3.2.93). Miranda taught Caliban language, but Prospero threatens to destroy that language

and reduce Caliban to a babbling, ranting, roaring monster: "I'll rack thee with old cramps,/ Fill all thy bones with aches, make thee roar,/ That beasts shall tremble at thy din" (1.2.371-3). Prospero would rather hear "din" than resistance poetry, would rather inflict torture than take responsibility for his actions,[5] and would rather talk than listen. His strategy of silencing works because, as Scarry argues,

> intense pain is . . . language destroying: as the content of one's world disintegrates, so the content of one's language disintegrates; as the self disintegrates, so that which would express and project the self is robbed of its source and subject. (35)

When Prospero commands spirits in the shape of dogs to grind the joints of Caliban and his drunken masters "with dry convulsions; [to] shorten up their sinews/ With aged cramps," and to pinch them until they are more spotted than a leopard (4.1.258-61), the pain he inflicts works to empty and destroy the interiority of Caliban. But, as Frantz Fanon explains,

> colonialism is not merely satisfied with holding a people in its grip and emptying the native's head of all form and content. By a kind of perverted logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed . . . and distorts, disfigures and destroys it. (169)

This would explain why Prospero gets so angry at Caliban--after all, the moment Caliban enters, he tries to set his history straight for Prospero. Caliban can undo Prospero, but Prospero can torture Caliban.

Torture, of course, need not act upon the body in order to discipline it.[6] In John Webster's The Duchess of Malfi, for example, Ferdinand preserves the structures of power and abuse (a preservation that Prospero achieves with Caliban) through the torture he inflicts on the Duchess, even though this torture is emotional. Ferdinand tortures her emotionally, first giving her what he says is the hand of Antonio's corpse, then showing her dead bodies (which in fact are only presentations framed in wax). As happens earlier in the play, the characters are stunned at Ferdinand's excessiveness: "Why do you do this," Bosola asks (4.1.116). "To bring her to despair," Ferdinand replies. Then he goes on to torture her by bringing in all the mad people and idiots and subjecting her to their howling. But in the midst of it all, she maintains her status as subject capable of self-affirmation: "I am Duchess of Malfi still" (4.2.142), she asserts. Her dignity and volition are intact when she tells the executioners how to do their job: "Pull, and pull strongly," she tells them (4.2.230). They kill her. They kill her because they cannot control the way that she uses her body.

The torturer uses the victim to maintain or control his

power and, at the same time, uses that power to maintain control over the victim, mind and body. The reason that Ferdinand is so excessive in his anger is that his sister is failing to use her body the way he wants her to. In this play, as in any other instance, the annihilation of the body is also an annihilation of the will. The murder here, though, is also the production of a radical and disorderly Other and the subsequent destruction of that Other. The murder is the apotheosis of silencing, and it is the means "whereby one acquires one's victim's power"[7] and voice.

It is, not surprisingly, often a woman's voice that is silenced. Control of the female body, Marion Wynne-Davies argues, was "paramount to determining a direct patrilineal descent, and when this exercise of power failed and women determined their own sexual appetites regardless of procreation, the social structure was threatened with collapse" (136).[8] The female body is the corridor in which wrestling, entangled discourses and contestations for power are played out, and if "the female body is the site of discourses that manage women . . . [discourses that are] continually working out sexual difference on and through the body" (Newman, Fashioning Femininity 4-5), then the mapping of the female body must be germane.

We find frightening correspondences between early modern images of dismemberment and contemporary ones, and one practice instancing these dismemberments is the mappings

of the female body. I will not dispute here Woodbridge's argument about the tropological and metaphorical ways "in which the body and the body politic are beleaguered and protected, metaphorically and magically" in the early modern period (The Scythe of Saturn 46); I do not refer here so much to the recent scholarship about metaphorical cartographies[9] as I do to the kinds of maps that hang in butcher shops--the ones that map out the boundaries of the rump, the loin, the chuck, the rib, the round, and so on. The same kinds of terms that map out the choice cuts in butcher shops appear in culture, contemporary and early modern, visually and discursively.

Item #1: a beach towel, circa 1969, illustrates a naked woman divided into sections, each named, as we find with depictions of cows in butcher shops. The woman, on her knees and with her back to us, is looking over her shoulder seductively, and at the level of her mouth is the question "What's your cut?"[10]

Item #2: a sermon, circa 1623, claims, as Newman summarizes, that a "woman is a series of prosthetic parts" (Fashioning 9), and the body onto whom she is "fastened" is the husband. The sermonist says that

> the *Woman* that beareth the *Name*, and standeth in the *roome* of *a Wife*, but doth not the *office* and *dutie* of *a Wife*, is but as *an eye of glasse*, or *a silver nose*, or *an ivorie tooth*, or *an iron hand*,

> or *a wooden leg*, that occupieth the *place* indeed, and beareth the *Name* of *a limbe* or *a member*, but is not truly or properly any *part* of that *bodie* whereunto it is fastened.[11]

A failure to comply with "dutie" seems at least to imply some kind of punitive discursive dismemberment here.

Item #3: conduct books, from Thomas Becon's Workes (1564) to William Whately's A Bride-Bush (1623), explain what compliance to duty consists of: women must obey "with the head, eies, tong, lippes, the hands, the feete, or with any other parts of the body," according to Becon. According to Whately, the "parts of her body, the eye, the brow, the nostrils, the hands, the feete, the shoulders, [must] be kept in so good order."[12] Whately goes on to explain that a wife who fails to carry herself and her body according to prescribed rules "may justly challenge blowes," which would, of course, be punitive and disciplinary blows.[13]

Item #4: a 1993 case of the Supreme Court of Canada (Regina v. Litchfield, November 18, 1993), suggests that it is the duty of a woman to offer her body for anatomization by the judicial system. This anatomization would ostensibly allow punitive action, if necessary, against a man (the accused). The man in this case is Dr. Litchfield, charged with 14 counts of sexual assault. The argument that the chambers judge (Justice McDonald) makes, in short, is that "the law should be interpreted in a fashion that would parcel women

into body parts:"[14]

> The chambers judge . . . ordered that there be three different trials depending on the part of the complainants' body that was involved in the assault. Thus, there was to be one trial for allegations involving the complainants' genitalia, a second trial for allegations concerning the complainants' breasts, and a third trial for any other matters.[15]

The Supreme Court allowed an appeal on the following grounds:

> . . . the message that a division and severance order in a sexual assault case based on the complainant's body parts sends to women is that the complainant's physical attributes are more important than her experience as a whole person.[16]

However we cut it, though, and even if we do not cut it, the female body in this case remains the middle term through which discourses about male conduct pass.

Item #5: an image of the correlation between meat and misogyny in the anti-pornography film Not a Love Story, which shows a picture from Hustler magazine of a woman disappearing head first into a meat grinder. Presumably intended to sell an image of women as meat, this magazine offers a picture of a woman--her buttocks and legs in the air and head and arms in a meat grinder--who has been

transformed into a "piece of ass" ready to be consumed by a desiring heterosexual male public.

The correlations between depictions of the bodies of animals and women is important, both in contemporary times and in the early modern period. In the same way that "animals are made absent through language that renames dead bodies before consumers participate in eating them" (Adams 40), so too are the women designated as "the bunnies, the bitches, the beavers, the squirrels, the chicks, the pussycats, the cows, the nags, the foxy ladies, the old bats and biddies"[17] made absent, debased to the level of non-human animals, with the implication that they are to be accorded a certain kind of treatment. In the early modern period, Keith Thomas argues, women--like the Irish, the First Nations, the poor, the black, and the mad--"were also near the animal state" (43). Thomas's argument is important: "Once perceived as beasts," he maintains,

> people were liable to be treated accordingly. The ethic of human domination removed animals from the sphere of human concern. But it also legitimized the ill-treatment of those humans who were in a supposedly animal condition. (44)

In the early modern period, the woman is always already locked in a dangerously liminal zone, which is to say that the woman is always a figure bipedal but never quite human, and certainly often bestial.[18]

In Titus Andronicus, a play vitally concerned with the body, women are, from first to last, excluded from full-fledged Roman selfhood. The first description presents "Lavinia, Rome's rich ornament" (1.1.52); the last is of "that heinous tiger, Tamora" (5.3.195)--and in between are all sorts of assaults on the body: "murthers, rapes, and massacres,/ Acts of black night, abominable deeds" (5.1.63-4). This play presents butchery, and it all seems to grow from "the 'others' of Roman imperial patriarchy."[19] Indeed, as Francis Barker argues, "the othering structure of [the play's] categorial and topographical anthropology of civility and barbarism locates significant violence in another time, in another place, among other people"[20]--and, in this play, civility is determined by Roman men for Roman men.

Initially, Titus Andronicus offers a re-membering of the body politic through men: Titus will be the "head on headless Rome" (1.1.186). As Marion Wynne-Davies perceptively observes, the dismembered body here is "envisaged as . . . feminine" (139): Titus humbly declines the offer to be emperor, saying that "A better head her glorious body fits/ Than his that shakes for age and feebleness" (1.1.187-8--emphasis added). This metaphorical dismembered female body is a preview of what is to follow.

The rape and dismemberment of Lavinia seem a logical climax of Demetrius's general attitude toward women.

Lavinia has done nothing to him--but her mere being (specifically, her being a woman) is offence enough to Demetrius and Chiron. Demetrius compares Lavinia to a doe (2.1.93-4), and Aaron, quick to perceive this weakness for dehumanizing metaphors, advises the two brothers to go in for the kill, so to speak. Aaron says that

> The forest walks are wide and spacious,
> And many unfrequented plots there are
> Fitted by kind for rape and villainy:
> Single you thither, then, this dainty doe,
> And strike her home by force. (2.1.114-18)

Demetrius perceives Lavinia as a game animal and accords her a different kind of treatment than one would an equal human being. He hopes "to pluck a dainty doe to ground" (2.2.27). Lavinia is the central object of the predatorial gaze in this play. Other bodies are hacked up, including Titus's, but the text lingers longer on Lavinia's body than on any other. It seems that written into the text are a kind of fascinated horror and an ambivalent voyeuristic pleasure in the rape and the suffering--else it would be difficult to explain the presence of Marcus's odd rhetorical flourishes:

> Alas! A crimson river of warm blood,
> Like to a bubbling fountain stirr'd with wind,
> Doth rise and fall between thy rosed lips,
> Coming and going with thy honey breath. (2.4.22-5)

One thing is certain here: Lavinia is measured out. Marcus

portions her out as "a bubbling fountain," as "rosed lips," and as "honey breath"; Chiron and Demetrius "revel in Lavinia's treasury" (2.1.131); Titus names her "map of woe" (3.2.12)--everyone takes his cut of her subjectivity.

Clearly, then, Lavinia is an Other to the Roman imperial patriarchy.[21] But Aaron and Tamora are more so. Not surprisingly, the text exerts strategies on them similar to the strategies it deploys in othering Lavinia. The most obvious of these are the textual efforts that blur the human/beast border. Aaron and Tamora are both tigers (5.3.5; 5.3.195, respectively); Aaron is an adder (2.3.35) for his vengeful nature, a "hellish dog" (4.2.78) for his miscegenatory (and, according to the times, monstrous) relationship, and is "like a black dog, as the saying is" (5.1.122) for his hellish deeds; Tamora, his confederate, a "most insatiate, luxurious woman" (5.1.88), presumably because of her sexual relationship with a black man, is barbarous, the beastly "dam" (2.3.142) of inhuman monsters--in short, Titus Andronicus is redolent with what Francis Barker calls "a language of monstrousness and bestiality" (The Culture of Violence 148).

We find a similar discursive process bestializing the Others in Othello. Iago begins it all by colocating images of women and blacks with images of animals: "Even now, now, very now," he says with great urgency, "an old black ram/ Is tupping your white ewe" (1.1.96-7) and adds later: "you'll

have/ your daughter covered with a Barbary horse" (1.1.123-4). The play does little to refute Iago's racism and, in fact, implicitly endorses his claim that "the Moor . . . will as tenderly be led by the nose/ As asses are" (1.3.417-20). According to K.W. Evans, it was an early modern commonplace that blacks had "an astonishing credulity" (124). Othello certainly fits the stereotype perfectly. He is, in effect, a stupid ass, an inferior body begging to be whipped into shape. In his "here is my butt" (5.2.314) speech,[22] he melodramatically begs for but does not receive corporal discipline: "Whip me, ye devils,/ . . . / Blow me about in winds! roast me in sulphur!/ Wash me in steep-down gulfs of liquid fire" (5.2.324-7), he effuses with great histrionics. He makes one last self-dehumanizing gesture--"I took by the throat the circumcised dog/ And smote him--thus" (5.2.409-10)--and kills himself.

I am interested in the comparison Othello draws between himself and the "turbaned Turk" (1.408) whom he took by the throat. The throttling here seems important, as do both the animal imagery and the phallicism in Othello's language. Othello stabs himself, but why the comparison to the throttled dog? Perhaps the logic of his predicament strangles him? It is clear enough, at any rate, that he must at least <u>think</u> of throats and hypoxeiated heads when he kills himself--and a psychoanalytic critic could argue that Othello's language might also suggest some anxiety about the

head of the penis, some castration or circumcision anxiety. It is also clear that when Othello smothers Desdemona, he kills her by cutting off the flow of oxygen to her head. In both cases (and perhaps also in the case of the Turk's penis), there is a symbolic decapitation, either enacted or envisioned, not noteworthy in itself, but interesting in light of the way that Othello wooed Desdemona: he told her stories about men without heads, or, more accurately, about "men whose heads do grow beneath their shoulders" (1.3.160-1).[23] There is an implicit symbolic disciplinary dismemberment that results from Othello and Desdemona's love. But the most vivid images of dismemberment that we find in this play are Othello's raving threats of how he will discipline that supposedly hungry "white ewe" of his. At one point, he says "I'll tear her all to pieces" (3.3.483), and at another, he screams: "I will chop her into messes . . . lest her body and her beauty unprovide my mind again" (4.1.215-21). It is her body that will unprovide him; it is her body that he disciplines. He sees her as an animal[24] and treats her like an animal.

Clearly, though, analysing cultural equalizations of Shakespearean Others with the bestial is insufficient if we are to understand how the polyvalent structures of discipline work in the early modern period. There is a lot more going on. Elizabeth Hanson identifies two important early modern phenomena that led to an epistemic shift, to a

FIGURE 1: "Men whose heads do grow beneath their shoulders"

Hartmann Schedel, *Liber chronicarum* (Nuremberg, 1493), fo. 108o.

Adapted from: Daston and Park (38)

—*Monstrum acephalon.* From Aldrovandi, 1642 (*p.* 189)

Adapted from: Wittkower (178b)

—Herold, *Heydenwelt*, 1554 (*p.* 184)

Adapted from: Wittkower (184b)

—Headless Man. From Bulwer, 1653 (*p.* 192)

Shoulders. And before the

Adapted from: Wittkower (178b)

new way of organizing both the apprehension and the discursive representations of the world: "the epistemology underlying this discourse [which Hanson calls "discovery"] . . . was manifested [firstly] in encounters between Europe and the New World and its inhabitants, and [secondly] in specific practices such as the anatomy lesson" (54). Both the nascent discourse of colonialism and the Renaissance interest in "anatomies" are concerned with writing the body.

NEW WORLD EMBODIMENTS

Old World representations of the New are obsessed with the body.[25] We find a whole range of visual representations. We find scenes of dismemberment: the German broadsheet, circa 1505, entitled "The People of the Islands Recently Discovered," bears the text which describes the people and their dietary habits:

> The people are thus naked, handsome, brown, well-formed in body, their heads, necks, arms, privy parts, feet of women and men are slightly covered with feathers. The men also have many precious stones in their faces and breasts. No one owns anything but all things are in common. And the men have as wives those that please them, be they mothers, sisters or friends, therein they make no difference. They also fight with each other. They also eat each other even those who are slain, and hang the flesh of them in smoke. They live

> one hundred and fifty years. And have no government.[26]

The woodcut shows four men, four women, and three children, all within a space, according to my calculations, twelve feet by ten. There are parts of a twelfth and thirteenth person--parts being eaten, parts being cut, parts being cooked, and parts just hanging. A child is suckling, two men are fighting, and a man and a woman are kissing. In the distance are two ships on an otherwise lone and level sea. Stephen Orgel's response to the visual and discursive texts I've just described seems to me a good starting point for discussion: "Cannibalism, Utopia, and free love reappear throughout the century as defining elements of New World societies" (40), Orgel comments and goes on to discuss images of cannibals, Caliban, and the anxieties of empire. I think, though, that the almost pornographic fascination with the body of the Other requires some attention.

Here we have a visual representation of the New World that captures Europe's repulsion from and attraction to America, a repugnance and fascination, focussing on the body, that <u>defines</u> the colonialist text, whether visual or written. This is Utopia, where people's heads and hams are hanging from halters? If this is Paradise or Utopia, it is one where the representational lack of discipline draws the New World people clearly <u>outside</u> of the human community: as Peter Hulme argues, "human beings who eat other human beings

have always been placed on the very borders of humanity" (Colonial Encounters 14).

FIGURE 2: *The People of the Islands Recently Discovered . . .*, c.1505. German, probably Augsburg or Nuremberg
Adapted from: Honour (12)

The woodcut (or, more accurately, the attending text) depicts two kinds of cannibalism: the first I would call an erotic anthropophagy (a sexual appetite that a man satisfies using his own family as sexual fodder: incest), and the second I would describe as a more literal viandic anthropophagy (with people eating people).

The sexualizing of America, captured graphically in Jan van der Straet's "America" and discursively in innumerable accounts,[27] certainly does promiscuate the New World and its inhabitants--but it is not so much "free love" as comparisons to and accusations of bestiality that are often

represented. Such sentiments underlie Peter Martyr's claims about New World indigenes. Writing in 1515 about, among other things, the sexual practices of people in the New World, Martyr claims that "there is no sense of justice among them . . . They are bestial and vaunt their abominable vices."[28] Concurrent with representations of sexual disciplinary latitude that putatively constitutes the New World are equally vehement representations across a generic spectrum in which colonialist discipline is being exerted to control the subjects of empire.

Discourse 1--Literary: a fictional/dramatic representation of imperial control of colonial sexualities: case, The Tempest. As Paul Brown observes,

> the proof of Prospero's power to order and supervise his little colony is manifested in his capacity to control not his, but his subjects' sexuality, particularly that of his slave and his daughter. (51)

The bodies of Prospero's subjects are the locus of Prospero's power.

Discourse 2--Historical Narrative: accounts of Spanish-American history from Pietro Martire d'Anghiera (Peter Martyr): case, the slaughter of alleged sodomites. Martyr describes (in the passive voice) how the Indians were

> hewed . . . in pieces as butchers doo flesshe . . ., from one an arme, from an other a legge,

> from hym a buttocke, from an other a shulder, and from sume the necke from the bodye at one stroke. Thus, fyve hundreth of them with theyr kynge, were slayne lyke brute beastes. (d'Anghiera 89v)

In addition to Martyr's lack of criticism about the carnage is an explicit participation in perceiving and depicting the victims as animals.

Discourse 3--Aesthetic: a woodcut by Theodore de Bry, 1594: case, dogs devouring Indians accused of sodomy (see Figure 3). The drawing of a parallel between the native and the beast occurs on several levels here. The woodcut shows two groups of men: the supine and mostly naked Indians (plus two severed heads) in the foreground and the standing, fully-dressed Spanish in the background. The natives are on the same physical level (or even underneath) the dogs; the Spanish men rise above the bestial scene. The natives are dog chow; the Spanish are the masters who feed their pets. The natives are also victims, apparently, of a gang-rape by the dogs;[29] the Spanish are voyeurs, as, perhaps, is the audience that this text constructs. The representation of native bodies as naked and supine and as food for both the viandic and the sexual appetites of dogs, bodies clearly at the mercy of the Spanish who orchestrate and watch the scene, is the representation of a powerfully hateful enactment of discipline over the body of the Other.

At the same time that we find representations of native

FIGURE 3



Adapted from: Goldberg (Sodometries 176-7)

Plate XXII of Theodore de Bry,

Americae, Pars Quatra (1594)

disciplinary latitude and imperial disciplinary control, both represented discursively and visually through the body, we also find that "back home," attempts to control the disorderly body is in high gear with "anatomies."

ANATOMICAL INSCRIPTIONS

In many ways, "the world becomes an anatomical theatre"[30] for a Europe that was becoming increasingly obsessed with marking boundaries and with what Foucault calls "the great disciplinary functions of distribution and classification" (Discipline 192). And nowhere is this obsession more marked than with the body.

Devon Hodges argues in Renaissance Fictions of Anatomy (1985) that "anatomies" became something of a fad in sixteenth-century England. These anatomies took several forms. There were spiritual ones, and scientific ones; there was an "Anatomie of Abuses," and an "Anatomie of the Minde," an "Anatomie of the bodie of man," and an "Anatomie of Absurdity"--at least twenty anatomies between 1548 and 1609.[31] Certainly the term signified more than simply the dissected human body. The term had certainly moved to the level of metaphor. If the anatomist "cuts, dissects, flays, tears, and rips the body apart in order to know it" (Hodges 5),[32] then the conceptual alliance between signifier and signified obviously deserves attention.

Edward Dudley and Maximillian Novak, in their introduction to The Wild Man Within (1972), use the

metaphorical signification of the term "anatomy" to argue that the life of the New World Other is "not so much a mirror for Western civilization as a fluoroscope, revealing the organs and bones beneath the clothing and flesh" (x). Stephen Orgel echoes this position: "In the New World, Europe could see its own past, itself in embryo" (44). Both metaphors seem to me valid descriptions of Europe's anatomizing gaze. As Elizabeth Hanson explains, "in the crossing of the seas or the parting of the flesh, the mask is stripped away, making knowledge and sight seem equivalent" (54--emphasis added)--but what Mary Douglas calls "primitive cosmologies" are mere figurations, fantasies colored by ideology: "primitive cosmologies," she argues, "cannot rightly be pinned out for display like exotic lepidoptera, without distortion to the nature of a primitive culture" (91). Metaphors carry violence. The violence that the anatomy lesson performs on the body is strategically allied to the violence involved in early modern productions of alterity.

Always with a view to keeping things within accepted and acceptable bounds, the anatomy lesson--with the authority of a burgeoning new scientific discourse--becomes a powerful mechanism for regulating the production both of bodies and of bodies of "truth". The anatomy lesson is a kind of experiment in deconstruction, a "method that turns bodies into parts" (Hodges 17) undertaken in a "passionate

effort to get back at a solid unified truth" (15). If the anatomy lesson is about truth, it is also about power. It is about the power to define the limits of the human[33]; it is about the power to define the limits of border-crossing; it is about the power to designate alterities. As Mary Douglas explains, "it is only by exaggerating the difference between within and without, above and below, male and female, with and against, that a semblance of order is created" (4). It is hardly surprising that monsters take on such importance in the early modern period.

CONCEIVING MONSTROUS BODIES

Monsters are border-crossers. As Katharine Park and Lorraine Daston explain, monsters are "aberrations in the natural order" (22), and their importance in the conceptual mapping of the world is significant:

> monstrous races--men with a single giant foot, or huge ears, or their faces on their chests--had played a part in the descriptions of Africa and Asia since antiquity and still figured in Renaissance cosmography. (37)

Borders may be dangerous,[34] but border-crossers are worse. Borders just sit waiting to be crossed, or erased; border-crossers must be dealt with. Keith Thomas argues that "one of the reasons that monstrous births caused such horror was that they threatened the firm dividing-line between men and animals" (39). Othello threatens that line, too. He is,

in Karen Newman's terms,

> a monster in the Renaissance sense of the word, a deformed creature like the hermaphrodites and other strange spectacles so fascinating to the early modern period. ("'Wash the Ethiop'" 153)

The discipline that the text exerts on the dangerous Othello is one of excision--he is cut off of the body politic, like a wart from a foot. The text kills him, but what is important--perhaps most important--about this play is that the excision is tragic.

Othello is an ambivalent figure, at one and the same time in the heart of and outside of--under the foot of--the Venetian power structure. The tragic dimensions of the play are possible only to the extent that Othello is humanized. It would be a mistake, though, to argue, as Eldred Jones does, that what we see in Othello is the "complete humanization of a type of character" (109). I would, in fact, argue the opposite, since the conceptual linking of women and blacks with animals is an implicit debasement from human to animal status, a dehumanization, in other words. Two feminist critics recently summarized a thesis[35] concerning the production of human bodies in the following way: "the body is properly human only when it is culturally acceptable" (Currie and Raoul 18). Othello is not culturally acceptable. For one thing, he is black, and for another, Desdemona isn't.[36]

The text certainly suggests possibilities for a fully-integrated Othello, but, perhaps, only because he is a good soldier, and, as such, he is a good asset to the state. His military prowess can be used. When benefits outweigh deficits, many things can be overlooked. But even if Othello were properly human, even if his color weren't a problem, even if blacks were not "associated in the popular imagination with monsters" (Aubrey 221-2), and even if Desdemona's color didn't matter--which is to say, even if Emily Bartels is correct in arguing that race is irrelevant in Othello[37]--the play still presents the body of the Moor.

In Iago's racist opinion, a body is all that Othello can be to Desdemona. Iago reasons that "when she is sated/ with his body, she will find the error of her choice" (1.3.372-3). The play seems partially to confirm Iago's position. Obviously Desdemona has made a fatal error in choosing "against all rules of nature" (1.3.113). Yet this error, the text suggests, is made possible by the very fact that Desdemona does not see Othello primarily as a body. She loves him in spite of his body. As Othello explains, "she had eyes, and chose me" (3.3.214), and, no doubt, she chose him, as he explains earlier, because "she loved [him] for the dangers [he] had passed" (1.3.183). Her failure to identify Othello in the way Iago does stands in stark contrast both to Iago's perceptions and to the ideology of the text itself.

The synecdochal identifications of Othello as "thick-lips" (1.1.70); the focus in general on the materiality of his black body, his "sooty bosom" (1.2.85), and his "gross clasps" (1.1.140); the discursive working out of a fantasy of a magnificently strong and exotic and therefore potentially threatening body that seems properly trained and tamed to fight the right wars for the right side, yet remains a monstrosity of Venetian society in its absolute disregard for the boundaries of the color bar in place for early modern bodies; the dramatic realization of the threat of the black beast, culminating first in a slap and then in the murder of a white woman[38]--each gesture the play makes here is powerfully disciplinary and constitutes the terms of Othello's engagement with the fictional world. In the world of the play, Othello is a threatening body. At one point, Brabantio orders that "if he do resist,/ Subdue him at his peril" (1.2.95-6), and certainly the implicit image of nasal mutilation in Iago's comparison of Othello to asses "tenderly . . . led by the nose" (1.3.419) suggests a disciplinary imperative that works through the body (in this case, the nose). But it is the very constitution of Othello <u>as</u> body that functions most perniciously as a disciplinary maneuver against the black other in this play. Elaine Scarry puts the case well:

> to have no body is to have no limits on one's extension out into the world; conversely, to have

> a body, a body made emphatic by being continually altered through various forms of creation, instruction (e.g., bodily cleansing), and wounding, is to have one's sphere of extension contracted down to the small circle of one's immediate physical presence. Consequently, to be intensely embodied is the equivalent of being unrepresented and . . . is almost always the condition of those without power. (207)

The principle here is similar to one Jane Gallop discusses, where, "by giving up their bodies, men gain power--the power to theorize, to represent themselves, to exchange women" (67). Othello is the black Other who is embodied, disempowered, and set outside of the community of men.

But what makes a man in this play?[39] While there are several possible routes to answering this question, I will look primarily at the ways that Othello deals with issues of male sexuality (black and white) and with the way that the play attempts to distinguish the human from the monstrous.

Othello crosses between the human and the monstrous--or, more accurately, the human and the monstrous are marked out through him. His military successes and prowess mark him out as a virile man. His skin pigmentation marks him as a "lascivious" (1.1.140) beast who clasps and tups a white woman, in the process implicitly making her a beast as well.[40] His assumed status as cuckold unmans him: Coppélia

Kahn argues that, "mocked with horns for his deficient virility, deprived of honor, the butt of ridicule, he is unmanned, a monster" (145). While Cassio also has a progess between the human and the bestial marked out on him --Iago describes him as "now a sensible man, by-and-by a fool, and presently a beast" (2.3.309-10)--with no one but Othello is membership both in the human community and the community of men so sharply questioned. Much of this questioning comes from, of all people, Iago.

Iago is hardly a reliable source for a definition of manhood, though he offers two definitions. The first is an insane tautology: "men are men" (2.3.245). The other excludes him: "men should be what they seem" (3.3.148).[41] Nevertheless, he challenges Othello's manhood, demanding "Are you a man!" (3.3. 421). Iago plays on Othello's insecurities, and in the very act of trying to prove that he is a man, Othello becomes a monster. It is a no-win scenario.

Interestingly, Othello becomes, like Iago, not what he is. As Desdemona explains, "my lord is not my lord" (3.4.140). In a sense, one might argue, as indeed James Aubrey does, that Othello carries the morally monstrous offspring of Iago. Iago does, after all, promise to "bring this monstrous birth to the world's light" (1.3.422); he does (as Aubrey--and Coppélia Kahn before him--so aptly explains) impregnate Othello through the ear (Aubrey 236;

Kahn 144); and Iago does ultimately engender monstrosity in Othello. Because of his body (specifically, because of the color of his body), Othello functions as the unstable terrain on which competing definitions of humanity are staked out. While his sexuality is never overtly questioned, questions about acts of sex do come up. The body is always at the fore in this play. Iago's crooked talk about straight sex, with his animal imagery and all the implied racism, reminds us in a way that few other texts do about the sex that the two lovers have. This only goes to show that "racism is obsessed with . . . the body" (Read 1258--emphasis added), especially when there are two bodies of different colors making sexual contact. But what is even more interesting to me is the queer sex (and how it leads to the monstrous) in the play.

I have already mentioned the implicit and symbolic male-female (yet obviously same-sex) relationship between Iago and Othello. But what about the alleged dream and behaviour of Cassio? Kahn argues that

> like the microdrama of the whole play, [Iago's telling of Cassio's alleged erotic dream] confounds heterosexual intercourse, as Cassio dreams he is making love to Desdemona, with homosexual intercourse, as he suggestively embraces Iago at the same time. (145)

Othello's reaction? "O monstrous! monstrous!" (3.3.477).

The imagined sodomy is a monstrous thought. Sodomy, whatever it was taken to mean, was so anathema to the legislators of bodily conduct that it is hard to imagine Othello not reacting with some vehemence.

As with the other forms of alterity I have been discussing that pass, are constituted, and are policed through the body, so is sexual dissidence. James Brundage discusses late medieval European exercises of power over sexually dissident bodies, punishments that include "castration for male homosexuals, followed (three days later) by hanging by the legs until death"; elsewhere, the offender was to hang "by the virile members" (Brundage 473). The continental medieval climate seems quite bloodthirsty--certainly more so than the climate in Renaissance England, according to some. B.R. Burg claims, for instance, that "homosexuality was greeted with little hostility or opprobrium in . . . early seventeenth-century [England]" (69) and that "severe penalties were imposed only when public figures were involved and political motives were present" (77). He speaks unproblematically of "accusations of homosexuality" (75) and conflates terms such as "buggery," "sodomy," and "homosexuality." This is sloppy scholarship at best; it is historically dishonest and misleading at worst. As most critics since Michel Foucault would agree, there were no homosexuals in the Renaissance. There were catamites, sodomites, *hic muliers* and *haec virs*.

There were perverts and fiends, monsters and deviants, Ganymedes and ingles, but homosexuals came to be in the late nineteenth century. As Alan Bray explains, "to talk of an individual in this period as being or not being 'a homosexual' is an anachronism and ruinously misleading" (Homosexuality in Renaissance England 16). What we have in this period is less an issue of gay or lesbian or bisexual identities than of bodies performing acts, ill-defined though these acts may at times seem in the early modern period.[42]

ACTING BODIES AND BODILY ACTS

What the early modern queers do is less a concern for me than how they are used rhetorically, yet definitional points here need comment, since silence about bodily acts historically permits deadly judgments. The confusion of the category of "sodomy," as both Michel Foucault and Jonathan Goldberg have argued, is an ideological weapon. Sodomy, Goldberg argues, is a concept without a specific material content, a free floating signifier that can be mobilized precisely because of its confusion. The argument seems valid to me, both in terms of the early modern period and in terms of the contemporary Western legal scene. The collocation of terms (and the frequent conceptual conflation of each with the other) in early modern English statutes (as in Edward Coke's Book of Entries and his Institutes) finds what is to me a frightening resonance in the infamous 1986

United States Supreme Court Case, Bowers v. Hardwick.

As Janet Halley has persuasively argued, sodomy in this case

> functions not as a legal term of art open to a range of concrete applications, not as a signifier with construable signifieds, but as a signifier that is identical and coterminous with, that is undifferentiatable from, its signified. Only in this way is the Court able to represent sodomy as identical to its meanings contemporaneously and across time. (24)

As far as I can tell by the mass of information that spills out from this case and from writings about the early modern period, the courts (twentieth-century American and early modern English) use the term "sodomy" to cover what they want it to cover. As Goldberg explains, "any sexual act . . . that does not promote the aim of married procreative sex (anal intercourse, fellatio, masturbation, bestiality)" may be termed "sodomy" (Sodometries 19). It is a term that was also used in the Renaissance for "those who threatened social stability--heretics, spies, traitors, Catholics" (17). John Boswell has argued that the word "sodomy" has been used to connote "in various times and places everything from ordinary heterosexual intercourse in an atypical position to oral sexual contact with animals" (93, n.2). With considerable erudition, Anne B. Goldstein argues that

sodomy sometimes includes a specific act and sometimes specifically excludes such an act.[43] She argues, moreover, that Michael Hardwick was charged with committing sodomy, of "committing that act with another man,"[44] and yet that act (having another man's penis in his mouth) is not legally covered by the term "sodomy." Goldstein argues that the "statutes did not apply to oral-genital contact" (1085).

Without going any further into the morass of discursive legalities, I think that one can easily see that what is under trial in Hardwick is a lifestyle; but the object of scrutiny is a bodily act. One might see the same kind of thing going on in Othello, which legislates against a choice of lifestyle (inter-racial marriage) and fixes a gaze upon an act (a black ram tupping a white ewe) to define that lifestyle.

What early modern queers do, as I have said, does not really concern me as much as does what their opponents have them do. When Peter Martyr argues in 1515 that the native new world inhabitants are "given to sodomy" [*passim*], he is arguing about behaviour, not about identity. He is not arguing about who "they" are but about what "they" do: that "they" are not "us" is sufficient enough a discussion of identity, and "sodomy" is the evidence. In effect, though, the act here (whatever it is) defines the identity. When James Rueff argues in The Expert Midwife (1551--translated into English in 1637) that we may perceive part of the cause

of the "mishapen Monster" born in 1587 in Cracovia (see Figure 4) as "the detestable sinne of Sodomie" (Rueff, Bk.5, Ch.3, 157-8), he is arguing about the effects of *bodily* acts. Again, while "sodomy" clearly refers to a bodily act, there is a considerable lack of specificity about *what* that act is. Rueff is clearly concerned with discussing the effects of sexual contacts between humans and animals (evident in the half dozen animal heads of the Cracovia monster). Both Martyr and Rueff are concerned with acting bodies who distinguish themselves as Other by those acts. Martyr associates this Other with America; Rueff, with Africa (Bk.5, Ch.3, 158).

FIGURE 4: "Mishapen Monster"
Adapted from: Rueff (Bk. 5, Ch.3, 157

There are clear relationships between the early modern discourses that write "foreign-ness" and those that elaborate categories of sexual monstrosity. In The Merchant of Venice, for example, Shylock and Antonio both lose out to Portia: Shylock is forced to give up his money and religion, Antonio his Bassanio. It is surely significant that Portia/Balthasar leaves Antonio and Shylock each devoid of what they most love: Jonathan Goldberg maintains that

> [Portia's] power as boy is directed against and serves

> to police Antonio and Bassanio and to separate them . . . [and that] when s/he saves Antonio and defeats Shylock, the two acts form a single gesture--unleashing energies that are racist and homophobic.
>
> (Sodometries 142).

The drawing of Shylock as "foreigner" and of Antonio as some kind of sexual other, a "tainted wether of the flock," that "weakest kind of fruit" (4.1.117 and 118) offers a glimpse of the confluence of an anti-Semitic discourse with a homophobic one. John Boswell, although he tends to read the past myopically in terms of the present, has noted historical similarities between the treatments of Jews and sexual dissidents: as he explains in Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality (1980),

> the fate of Jews and gay people has been almost identical throughout European history . . . [and] the same laws which oppressed Jews oppressed gay people; the same groups bent on eliminating Jews tried to wipe out homosexuality; the same periods of European history which could not make room for Jewish distinctiveness reacted violently against sexual nonconformity . . . and even the same methods of propaganda were used against Jews and gay people--picturing them as animals bent on the destruction of the children of the majority.
>
> (15-6)

Certainly, bestialization is as central to the process designating alterity in The Merchant of Venice as it is in Othello. Shylock is compelled to remain radically Other, perhaps almost, but, as Seymour Kleinburg comments, "not quite human" (121).

There are over three dozen references in the text that compare Shylock to dogs. He is a "cutthroat dog" (1.3.111) to Antonio; he is "the dog Jew" (2.8.14), "the most impenetrable cur/ That ever kept with men" (3.3.18-9), according to Solanio; he is a "damned, inexecrable dog" (4.1.131) with a "currish spirit" (136) whose "desires/ Are wolvish, bloody, starved, and ravenous" (140-1), in the eyes of Gratiano. He is "an alien"[45] and a beast. He accepts both positions. There is no question that he is "an alien," and Shylock himself confirms his status of dog: "since I am a dog," he warns, "beware my fangs" (3.3.8). He would sink these fangs into the flesh of that "wether" (4.1.117) Antonio if he could.

Shylock is downright excluded from, is alien to, Venetian society; Antonio is merely marginalized. Antonio is a figure of difference who lives his same-sex love on the margins of what is human; yet, he is human, which is perhaps the reason for the poignancy of the threat he poses.[46] He is in direct competition with Portia for Bassanio's love and, consequently, is a threat to her--if not to the entire heterosexual orthodoxy that the play (with its three

marriages) tries so valiantly to stabilize. And the disorderly must be disciplined: "Why then, thus it is;/ You must," Portia tells him, "prepare your bosom for Shylock's knife" (4.1.250-1). And his bosom lies bare.

The feminized male body is held up for view and, possibly, for sacrifice. Antonio, like Othello, is embodied and disempowered; like Lavinia, he is a body waiting for the knife; like the women in the Regina v. Litchfield case, he is a body through which patriarchal legal discourses pass. By the end of the play, the audience knows that there will be no more trouble from this wether. Antonio has been disciplined and silenced, as has Shylock. With the fear of death in him, Antonio beseeches Bassanio to "say how I loved you" (4.1.284), but when Antonio gets a reprieve from his transvestite opponent, Bassanio may hold his tongue. The love that dare not speak its name now need not speak its name.

Ultimately, questions about discipline and silence pass through the early modern body. It is through the body that the voice and movement of the Other are regulated, and it is through the body that the hegemony demonstrates its power. As Jonathan Goldberg has argued, "exchanges of power are anything but disembodied acts" (Queering 6). The many early modern instances of allocations and enactments of power--the woodcuts of dismemberments, the diaries, the logbooks, the narrative accounts between the Old and New

Worlds, the drama, the pamphlets, the conduct books, and so on--all of these texts write discipline and alterity through the early modern body.

Notes

[1]It is odd that the Roman men here are so sympathetic. After Chiron and Demetrius rape Lavinia, a whole arena of masculine discourse opens up: the rape gives the men something to talk about. I think that Carolyn D. Williams is correct in arguing that in this play, "the violated, female body [serves] as a middle term in a transaction between men" (94). Williams is building on Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's concept of "homosocial desire"--a desire between men that passes through women as objects of exchange. See also Sedgwick's Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire (New York: Columbia UP, 1985), especially 1-20.

[2]As Robert Wilson explains, however, "the body-as-text is [potentially] every bit as open, as unstable, as any other kind of writing" (Personal correspondence, 20 April 1995).

[3]The question of intentionality seems to plague the topic of colonialist discourse, especially in regard to The Tempest. Ever since Meredith Skura's "Discourse and the Individual: The Case of Colonialism in The Tempest" (1989), there has been some debate about whether or not The Tempest is, indeed, "colonialist." Part of the problem here resides in the uncertainties of the article itself. Skura at once claims that the play should be seen as "the first English example of fictional colonialist discourse" (69) and

that if it is so, then "it must be seen as 'prophetic' rather than descriptive" (58). Skura assumes that there must be a one-to-one correspondence between the practice of and the discourse of colonialism. When, for example, Skura claims that the play "primarily . . . ignores Indians" (53), one must remember that ignoring the interiority of New World Others is constitutive of colonialist discourse. Indeed, colonialist discourse is about writing fictions, but Skura seems to want to argue that it is about mimesis. Whether or not Shakespeare attempted to ape the New World in The Tempest is a question in field of play for a different kind of critic than I. The position I am arguing is very similar to that which Francis Barker and Peter Hulme argue in "Nymphs and Reapers Heavily Vanish: The Discursive Con-texts of The Tempest" (1985). They argue strongly for the need to look closely at discursive con-texts. They argue that

> intertextuality, or con-textualization, differs most importantly from source criticism when it establishes the necessity of reading The Tempest alongside congruent texts, irrespective of Shakespeare's putative knowledge of them, and when it holds that such congruency will become apparent from the constitution of discursive networks to be traced independently of authorial 'intentionality.' (196)

By the time of The Tempest, the sixteenth century had come and gone and was a text that Shakespeare had access to. As Tzvetan Todorov reminds us, "the sixteenth century perpetrated the greatest genocide in human history" (5). It was a part of the colonial conquest. There is no question that The Tempest is colonialist discourse, regardless of Skura's reservations. See also Ronald Wright's Stolen Continents: The "New World" Through Indian Eyes (Toronto: Penguin, 1993).

[4]It is worth mentioning here that resistance to plantation and slave-owners in the Caribbean frequently took the form of the burning of manors and fields, as we see in Jane Eyre, and, more poignantly, in The Wide Sargasso Sea.

[5]The final evasive manuever, of course, occurs when Prospero claims Caliban's body: "this thing of darkness I/ Acknowledge mine" (5.1.275-6). As Paul Brown has argued, Prospero's comment "powerfully designates the monster as his property, an object for his own utility" (68)--and though Prospero may, as Brown goes on to argue, "rescue self-knowledge" from Caliban, and though there may be "an ironic identification with the other here as both become interstitial" (68), I think that Prospero's parting shot hits the mark. It is the final ambivalent annihilation or domestication of the Other. Irony and ambivalence are central to this play. Part of what we see here is the paradoxical nature of colonialist discourse, where the

ambivalent drive to deal with the silence of the Other runs up against the drive to produce the Other, to give the Other a voice. It is the drive both to domesticate and to maintain alterities, to erase the Other and to produce the Other.

[6]Foucault certainly thinks otherwise and speaks of a specific moment marking the "entry of the soul on to the scene" (24) of the French penal system. Similarly, Darius M. Rejali discusses the attempts to "cripple the prisoner's 'soul'" (14) as peculiarly modern features of torture in Iran.

[7]I draw my wording here from Kate Millet's analysis of D.H. Lawrence's "The Woman Who Rode Away," quoted in Carol J. Adams's The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory (New York: Continuum, 1991) 59. In every designation of alterity, there is obviously an implicit recognition of the potential power of the Other, the "power," as Mary Douglas argues, "in the inarticulate area, margins, confused lines, and beyond the external boundaries" (Douglas 98).

[8]Wynne-Davies is building on Foucault's discussion of sanguinous power relations. Foucault's account of the early modern period offers a view of a culture steeped in blood, as it were, with blood constituting "one of the fundamental values" and blood relations constituting "an important element in the mechanisms of power" (History of

Sexuality, I 147).

[9]That is, I do not refer here to the ways that the "woman's body could be both symbolic map of the 'civilized' and the dangerous terrain that had to be colonized" (Stallybrass, "Patriarchal Territories" 133), though there has been interesting work done along this line recently--Linda Woodbridge, The Scythe of Saturn: Shakespeare and Magical Thinking (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1994) 45-85; Rhonda Sanford, "A Room Not One's Own: Male Exploration of Feminine Geography in Shakespeare's Cymbeline" (Paper delivered at the RMMRA Annual Conference in Jackson, Wyoming, May 1994).

[10]The illustration appears on the front cover of Carol J. Adams's The Sexual Politics of Meat (1991).

[11]Thomas Gataker, "A Wife Indeed," quoted in Karen Newman, Fashioning Femininity and English Renaissance Drama (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991) 8. Newman points out that the woman here has been broken down into commodities--silver, hardwood, and ivory (12). Questions about the discursive merchandizing of women lead into some very interesting discussions about the politics of representation, one of which Nancy Vickers pursues in "'The blazon of sweet beauty's best': Shakespeare's Lucrece" (1985). Vickers applies Eve Sedgwick's concept of homosocial desire (see n.1 above) to an analysis of Shakespeare's Sonnet 21 and Lucrece. Vickers discusses the

rhetorical strategies, "shaped predominantly by the male imagination for the male imagination" (96), of each poem.

[12]Thomas Becon, Workes and William Whately, A Bride-Bush, respectively quoted in Newman 9.

[13]We will also remember that before Othello falls into his fit, he mentions that the capital offences (I use the word "capital" with a mind to its origins: fr. L. capitalis = head) of Desdemona's body occur at capital thresholds: "noses, ears and lips" (4.1.50). As Peter Stallybrass comments, "those parts of the body are all related to the thresholds of the enclosed body" ("Patriarchal Territories" 138). While discussions about liminality are important to my argument, I am, for the moment, interested simply in observing Othello's discursive dismemberment of Desdemona.

[14]I am indebted to Ronni Abraham for bringing this case to my attention and to Michigan lawyer R. Pilling-Johnson for succinctly articulating the terms of the law to me.

[15]Regina v. Litchfield, 4--86 C.C.C. (3d), 97h. One might pause to note here Rudolf Wittkower's observation that in the early modern period, scientists would group monstrosities "according to the parts in which the irregularity occurs. Head, breast, arms, hands, etc., follow each other in long-winded chapters" (189).

[16]Regina v. Litchfield, 4--86 C.C.C. (3d), 115c.

[17]The list is from Mary Daly's Gyn/Ecology: The Meta-ethics of Radical Feminism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978) 7.

[18]Woodbridge offers a synthesis of the arguments presented along this trajectory in Scythe 76-80.

[19]My phrasing here comes from Loomba 46.

[20]Barker goes on to argue that the play occludes the cultural pervasiveness of violence: Titus Andronicus "seeks to locate safely 'out there' the violence which it codes as barbarism but which may in fact belong dangerously 'in here'" (Culture 191). Barker cites the sentencing of the Clown to death (4.4.39-48) as his main evidence for the cultural nonchalance toward violence: "the episode is a marginalised 'representation' which but barely represents, an articulation which disarticulates, leaving everything unsaid" (191-2).

[21]Marion Wynne-Davies makes an important observation about the relationship of Lavinia and Tamora to the text, arguing that both "fulfil equivalent functions: Tamora as the conquered Queen of the Goths, a slave 'brought to yoke', and Lavinia as an imperial treasure to be disputed over by rivals for the imperial throne" (141).

[22]I identify Othello's speech here as the "here is my butt" speech with some humor, of course, and do not think or mean to imply that the word "butt" in Othello's speech denotes his buttocks. Nor do I mean to suggest that Othello has a masochistic desire for punishment or that he wants to be beaten, whipped, or burned. Nevertheless, he does call attention to his body by repudiating it, and in his speech

he participates in what Julia Kristeva might call his process of self-abjection. Paradoxically, his boastful grandiosity fails to glorify him; it defiles him. To borrow from Kristeva, we might say that through his speech, Othello is "abominated as ab-ject, as abjection, filth" (65).

[23]Certainly, the pictorial representations of "men whose heads do grow beneath their shoulders" show what appears to be at least a kind of headlessness. (See Figure 1).

[24]One can't help but think how like a dog Desdemona is to Othello, especially when he discusses her obedience:

> Sir, she can turn, and turn, and yet go on,
> And turn again; and she can weep, sir, weep;
> And she's obedient; as you say, obedient,
> Very obedient. (4.1.279-82)

[25]A number of critics--significantly Jonathan Goldberg (1994) and Stephen Orgel (1985)--have done important work with the Old World representations of New World bodies. I am indebted to Daphne Read for the general idea that "racism is obsessed with . . . the body" (1258). Seeing the New World through the eyes of the Old (specifically, in some of the woodcuts and other visual representations from the early modern period) certainly supports Read's argument.

[26]Cited in Hugh Honour, The New Golden Land: European Images of America from the Discoveries to the Present Time (New York: Pantheon, 1975) 12. (See Figure 2).

[27]For a fuller treatment of this issue, see, for example, Annette Kolodny, The Lay of the Land: Metaphor as Experience and History in American Life and Letters (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), especially chapter 1, 10-26; Peter Stallybrass, "Patriarchal Territories: The Body Enclosed," Rewriting the Renaissance: the Discourses of Sexual Difference in Early Modern Europe, Eds. Margaret W. Ferguson *et al* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1986) 123-42; and Linda Woodbridge, The Scythe of Saturn: Shakespeare and Magical Thinking (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1994), especially chapter 1, 45-85.

[28]Peter Martyr, Decades, *passim*, cited in Hugh Honour 58--emphasis added.

[29]Jonathan Goldberg seems also to see this and notes that "the usual confusion of sodomy with bestiality is also suggested by the ways in which the slaughter of so-called sodomites in this image looks like rape" (Sodometries 280, n.7). I would only add here that of the four victims, two (one in the right hand corner, one in the centre) are in what look like langourously erotic/ vulnerable (pornography equates the two) positions, and the other two (on the left side of the woodcut) are, it appears, being kissed by the dogs--with some relish. The victim appearing in the lower left seems to be dead; the victim slightly above in the picture has his left arm around the dog's neck in what, in a

different context, might be a lover's embrace. The two victims on the left (the lower one seeming, as I have mentioned, dead) each have one canine rapist/predator to fight against, while the other two victims each have two dogs on them--the one in the centre is being held by the paws and mouth of one dog and is vulnerable to the other dog's nosing around his buttocks. The victim on the far right is similarly out-numbered, held, vulnerable and exposed.

[30]I borrow my wording here from Devon L. Hodges, Renaissance Anatomies of Fiction (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1985) 88. Hodges is discussing King Lear and metaphysical truths, and I have used the happy locution totally out of its intended context.

[31]See Hodges 6, n.13 for a listing of these anatomies.

[32]Hodges acknowledges here that he is building on the Foucauldian argument that

> to know a body . . . is often to dominate, conquer, master, discipline, and punish it. The science of investigation and surveillance . . . makes the body an object of knowledge by placing it within a controlled order and separating it into individual elements. (Hodges 5, n.12)

See also Foucault (Discipline, especially 170-228).

[33]I draw my wording here from Leslie Fiedler's The Stranger in Shakespeare (1972), which addresses questions

about "that borderline figure, who defines the limits of the human" (15). That borderline figure--"the stranger"--takes several forms in Fielder's analyses: the woman, the Jew, the Moor, the "New World savage," and the witch are some of these forms. The scope of the book is impressive, but the methodology is, at times, simplistic, and there are moments when the author's racism and heterosexism work against the implicit aims of the book.

[34]Mary Douglas argues in various ways that "danger lies in transitional states" (96), in the margins and the liminal spaces.

[35]Dawn H. Currie and Valerie Raoul are here summarizing Anthony Synnott's unpublished "The Two Bodies: The Social Construction of Self and Society."

[36]It seems relevant here to mention that it is not only Desdemona who is strangled: a kind of relationship is also strangled.

[37]Emily Bartels argues that Shakespeare "invokes the stereotype of the Moor as a means of subverting it" (447) and goes on to claim that

> Iago's attempts to demonise and disempower Othello respond . . . not to racial or social difference that proves the Moor an inferior outsider but to a political status that makes him the authorising insider and that threatens to keep Iago in the margins of power. (451)

The arguments seem a bit misguided to me. Othello is black, and the treatment he receives from other characters in the play is racist--hence, such epithets as "the sooty bosom" (1.2.85), "the thick-lips" (1.1.70), and "an old black ram" (1.1.96). And Desdemona is certainly a party to the prejudicial treatment Othello receives. K. W. Evans, I think, is correct in observing that "Desdemona idealises her 'noble savage'" (132) when she says "my noble Moor/ Is true of mind, and made of no such baseness/ As jealous creatures are" (3.4.25-7). The construction of the black as "noble savage" is as much a racist gesture as the construction of the black as "wild man." Race, clearly, is a central concern in the play, and what we have to look at are, first, the possibilities and permissibilites of self-inscriptive resistance, and second, all of the ambivalences such resistance entails.

[38]Clearly, the early modern racist fascination with this kind of case continues today, evinced in the extraordinary responses of the media to the O.J. Simpson double murder trial. The omission of Ron Goldman in the early perceptions and presentations of the case is interesting.

[39]The question here is one Terence Hawkes asks in regard to The Tempest, which he argues is "an arena for the sifting of the immense issue: what makes a man?" (29). That we can so easily see Othello working through such a

question is reasonable, since the process of Othering so often deploys strategies of emasculation, as I shall explain in greater detail below.

[40]Iago explains the situation to Brabantio: "Your daughter and the Moor," he says, "are now making the beast with two backs" (1.1.129-30). Desdemona and Othello become one in their beastliness.

[41]We will perhaps do well to remember here that Iago fails to be not only what he seems but, by his own mouth, he is not even what he is: "I am not what I am" (1.1.69), he boasts.

[42]Given both the plethora of terms that name the variety of early modern sexual dissidents and the fact that no one term properly covers all of these dissident players, I will use the inclusive term "queer" as necessary from here on.

[43]See Anne B. Goldstein, "History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick," Yale Law Journal 97.6 (May 1988) 1073-1104.

[44]Hardwick v. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188, 106 S. Ct. at 2842; emphasis added, as cited by Halley 20, n.28.

[45]Portia explains that

> It is enacted in the laws of Venice,
> If it be proved against an alien
> That by direct or indirect attempts

> He seeks the life of any citizen,
> The party 'gainst which he doth contrive
> Shall seize half his goods; the other half
> Comes to the privy coffer of the state;
> And the offender's life lies in the mercy
> Of the Duke. (4.1.361-9)

It is because Shylock is an alien that he is treated with such contemptuous discrimination.

[46]Although most audiences will probably remember Portia or Shylock before Antonio, it is important to remember from whom the play takes its title: Antonio is the "Merchant of Venice." He is central, at least symbolically, to this play. As Barbara Babcock has argued, "what is socially peripheral is often symbolically central" [Babcock, quoted in Jonathan Dollimore, Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology, and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and his Contemporaries (Durham: Duke UP, 1993) xxvi].

Chapter 2

Silence in Early Modern Productions of Alterity

> Literary history and the present are dark with silences. (Tillie Olsen, Silences)

> . . . her silence,
> Methinks, expresseth more than if she spake.
> (John Webster, The Duchess of Malfi)

> At times, the election of silence is a sign not of pain or weakness but of a kind of perverse strength.
> (Marjorie Garber, Coming of Age in Shakespeare)

Silence has many voices, many purposes, and many effects in early modern England. Many times, it is an ideal; at other times, it is an enigmatic horror; many times, it is imposed; sometimes, it is chosen freely--but silence almost always says something about alterity. Questions about voice link up with questions about representation, and it is not surprising to find linkages between the discursive representations of race or ethnicity and textual productions of silences in the early modern period.[1] We also find that issues attending voice often

link up with those about gender and sexuality in various Renaissance discourses.

To address these issues, a productive discussion of early modern silence might profitably confront questions 1) about available forms of self-expression (among them suicide), 2) about available--albeit, gender-specific--social identities and roles (witchcraft and chastity, for instance), 3) about vestmentary codes and their implications (one of which is the destabilization both of gender and sexual identities), and 4) about the very complex interplay among not only literary texts but among legal, theological, and clinical discourses, and we profit by looking at these issues with an eye to understanding both how they influence the literature and how they construct and regulate realities for real people in early modern England. Time and again, the conclusion we will reach is that issues of voice, power, and alterity are always linked.

DEFINING AND THEORIZING SILENCE

There are many ways to look at the question of silence. Some approaches sink comfortably into relaxed positions of plot summarizing and add little new to our understanding of the theoretical implications of silence, tending more to reflect what we already know. Harvey Rovine's provocatively entitled Silence in Shakespeare: Drama, Power, and Gender (1987) argues that the silence of many women in Shakespeare reflects the gender distinctions of Elizabethan

society. This kind of argument is nothing new, and one is left asking what the exact parameters of the term "silence" are for Rovine.

If we are seeking a definition of "silence," then Deborah Tannen is one critic to listen to. Tannen defines silence in simple and accessible terms as the thing that occurs "when expected talk is absent" (xv). Tannen's scrupulous research and her many publications offer crisp insights about gender relations, primarily through paradigms that work on the psychological and conversational levels. This kind of research, while clearly useful in some fields, however, is a bit limited for our purposes here, since it makes very little contact with the material world, has little concern with analysing the influence of the specific ideological configurations that constitute the terms of silence, and, like most psychological models, addresses a universal psychology that somehow transcends cross-cultural differences.[2]

Another approach to silence, one related to Tannen's but, like Rovine's, applied specifically to the Shakespeare *oevre*, is Philip McGuire's Speechless Dialect: Shakespeare's Open Silences (1985), which discusses the dramatic significance of on-stage silences. Again, this is important work,[3] but it is not really the kind of research that delves very far into theorizing about the importance of silence in power-relationships.

Catherine Belsey's approach draws us closer to questions of power. In essence, Belsey looks at silence in terms of subject positions and argues that the "right to speak [is the right] to subjectivity, to a position from which to protest" (171). Belsey's argument is compelling: "to speak," she claims, "is to possess meaning, to have access to the language which defines, delimits and locates power" (191). Belsey, among many insightful critics,[4] enumerates the seemingly innumerable early modern tracts that argue for silence among women. It is not my intention to restitch this critical quilt, but there is a pattern here that I would like to follow.

The many early modern conduct books espousing women's silence say a lot about the male elite who are in control of the production of knowledge. The work done with these early modern texts is relatively silent, curiously, about the ways in which silence works, the ways in which silence characterizes modes of alterity, the ways in which silence itself is more often more threatening than more voluble kinds of discourse, the ways in which silence may be appropriated AS voice.[5] In an essay about silence among the Igbo of Nigeria, Gregory Nwoye argues that there is something "potential and unfathomable" (191) in silence. Valerie Wayne suggests that silence is as much a text "producing history" as less ephemeral discourses are (174); even Catherine Belsey advances the position that silence,

like speech, is "a signifying practice" (188). It seems a mistake, therefore, when later in the same essay she argues that "enjoined to silence, women have no position from which to define their own being" (190). Indeed, silence is the very core of resistance in many early modern (and modern) situations; silence is a kind of strength (though why Marjorie Garber should call it "perverse" is vaguely troubling); silence is, ultimately, the final boundary between self and Other, "us" and "them."

SILENCE AND RACE

Stephen Greenblatt's introduction to Learning to Curse (1992) silently raises questions that I would like to address here. Discussing the New World and its inhabitants, he states that "the unfamiliarity of their speech is a recurrent motif in the early accounts of the New World's inhabitants, and it is paraded forth in the company of all their other strange and often repellent qualities" (18). This "recurrent motif" suggests to me an anxiety, and this anxiety suggests that what Greenblatt calls "linguistic colonialism" might be an attempt to domesticate the Other, to make it speak English, to banish the exoticism of linguistic difference, to contain the Other.

Greenblatt quotes a long and horrifying passage that describes the torture and killing of a Chinese goldsmith suspected of robbery. The alleged culprit not only would not speak English but would not speak at all. He "would put

his tongue between his teeth and strike his chin upon his knees to bite it off" (12). Surely this is important as colonial resistance? Greenblatt seems more interested in judging whether or not the text is fiction or reality, but surely such a judgment is undecidable and less important than what the words (whether fact or fiction) say about perceived or imagined relationships between silence and power? Silence is resistance. Silence characterizes alterity. A little silence is a dangerous thing with disruptive potential. Greenblatt does not adequately discuss the subversive potentials of silence. The alleged culprit refuses to speak, and we have to ask what happens when people refuse to speak, and why the Englishmen in this case get so angry.

Perhaps one issue here is that the Englishmen have no real power (via knowledge) over the Chinese man: he will not speak; he will not allow himself to be known through speech; he will not give himself away. If, as Ben Jonson claims, "language most shows a man" (Timber 45),[6] then a refusal to speak is a protective containment of the self, a resistance to what I would call semiotic colonialism (what Greenblatt imprecisely calls "linguistic colonialism").[7] The Chinese man in the text is most infuriating when he flatly refuses to play by the rules, flatly refuses to offer any kind of access to his opponent, flatly offers nothing but the silent treatment.

Had Greenblatt actually said any of this, then the implications would have resonated into all sorts of I think important questions, especially given the bulk of very serious attention directed toward maintaining silence and containing speech in communities imagined potentially subversive. Given the efforts made to keeping domesticated potentially subversive voices, it seems very odd that the self-same instrument of control should be so volatile a thing, so potentially threatening that even today, relatively few have ventured to discuss it in terms of alterity.

If we take as a starting point some of the metaphors in the very language I am playing into here, then we can easily see that the attempt to "domesticate" is an attempt to contain.[8] Peter Stallybrass argues that "silence and chastity are . . . homologous to a woman's enclosure within the house" ("Patriarchal Territories" 127). In a sense, the house becomes a prison,[9] and a person who can safely be kept at home is one who will not be disruptive. But, as I have been arguing, it is not only voice that is disruptive; silence too can be disruptive.

In many ways, silence and voice are each an attempt to resist containment. At the end of Othello, Iago chooses silence: "Demand of me nothing. What you know, you know./ From this time forth I will never speak word" (5.2.352-3). It was through speech that Iago had a kind of toxic power

that he used to poison Othello's ear (2.3.358). What happens when Iago gives up his speech seems, as Philip McGuire has argued, to be a "renouncing [of] the power . . . that enabled him to destroy Othello" (xvii). Perhaps, but I would argue the opposite: there is more going on here than a "renunciation of power" theory can accommodate. Iago's very silence is very disturbing for the very reason that it is not a renunciation of power. His silent resistance in effect forces him outside of discursive control and containment. By refusing to yield to the rules of the dominant discourse, Iago in effect demonizes himself. As Marjorie Garber argues in Coming of Age in Shakespeare (1981), "those who voluntarily abandon speech effectively dehumanize themselves by denying the linguistic bond among men" (82).

Clearly, Iago has options that Othello does not have. Iago can opt to speak or not to speak; Othello, even though he is a general, is black, and being black means being "damned" (1.2.78).[10] Being black means that the kinds of communication open to Othello are different than for, say, Cassio, and all that Othello does--we may be sure--is closely watched. He does not enjoy equality in Venice. That Othello could have wooed Desdemona is initially unthinkable to the Venetian ruling elite, and he is--general or not--a "foul thief" who steals and stows Brabantio's daughter (1.2.76-7).

Brabantio's comments bristle with points of searing racism, burning hatred, and undisguised disregard for Othello's rank. John Gillies has recently argued that Othello's military rank is "represented (at least in part) as a circumstantial anomaly, enabling a bizarre exception to the rule rather than legitimising miscegenation *per se*" (26). Certainly rank is less the issue than color is. That Desdemona should run "to the sooty bosom/ Of such a thing as [Othello]" (1.2.85-6) is loathsome for the Venetians to consider. Brabantio immediately assumes that Othello is guilty--and, as Dorothea Kehler observes, "no one demurs" (126). Brabantio makes the hasty assumption because he does not expect eloquence from a black man. To be sure, Othello does speak, but the expectations, traditions, and conventions of the white Venetian hegemony are against notions that would accord a black man--general or not--a voice. Othello may talk, make noises, and so on, but a voice implies a selfhood, and selfhood is not among the things that Othello is allowed to participate in.[11] Perhaps this is the reason why Othello's discourse is so deferential, why he says he is "rude" in speech "and little blessed with the soft phrase of peace" (1.3.92-3). Of course, the humility *topos* is common enough in the early modern period, but Othello's humility takes on a different hue, added significance, and not a little ominousness. He is clearly transgressing in so boldly defending himself.[12]

Humility is too mild a description for the sycophantic obeisance he displays when he says, "little shall I grace my cause/ In speaking for myself" (1.3.99-100). He is, in effect, pleading if not for his life, then for his freedom. The Duke has, by this point, already directed the officers, if Othello "do resist [to]/ Subdue him at his peril" (1.2.95-6). I would be scared for my life if I were Othello, but Othello is a brave general.

Clearly the duke must be surprised by Othello's eloquence: he makes an about face from his view of Othello as a thief to his acceptance of Othello's philandering eloquence and confesses "I think this tale would win my daughter too" (1.3.187). Brabantio's sudden apparent acceptance of miscegenation tells us that Venice does not expect a black man to have a voice. Derek Cohen argues that the duke's comment "is lip-service of a supersubtle kind which plays into as it acknowledges the existence of a complex racial politics of dominance and submission" (324). Indeed, Othello is enjoined to silence, and ultimately the only way to read his final actions and his suicide is as attempts at communication, attempts at affirming his status as a speaking subject. The idea is not, by any means, a new one, and it is an idea that Catherine Belsey articulates nicely: "suicide," she says, re-establishes the sovereign subject . . . as the crowning affirmation of the supremacy of the self" (124).[13] But suicide works in another, less

affirming way: it is one of the means by which Others are created in Shakespearean drama.

SELF-ASSERTION VS. SELF-DESTRUCTION

Suicide is a huge and complex topic, on which reams have been written. Both literary and actual early modern suicide have received considerable attention. The literary approaches have tended toward historical and discursive myopticism, while the sociological approaches have largely ignored the cultural importance and influence of literary texts, at times focussing unrealistically on statistics[14] and at other times merely cataloguing questionable data[15] without comment.

Rowland Wymer's Suicide and Despair in the Jacobean Drama (1986) takes a literary approach and offers an excellent catalogue of suicidal literary types, figures, and examples, but the historical grounding is poor, and Wymer only consults, discusses, or mentions elite literature (ignoring, for instance, street and broadside ballads and coroner's reports). The result is that he is not able to develop adequate discussions of the cultural milieu in which the texts are enmeshed. Moreover, Wymer's treatment of "suicide as a dramatic convention" (156) ultimately fails to define suicide, preferring instead to avoid distinctions among the classes of suicide--for example, distinctions between the institutional[16] and the personal, the "honorable" and the "dishonorable," the literal and the

metaphorical, and so on. Since not all suicides are the same, either in artistic representations or in real life, it seems ill-advised to treat them in a monolithic way.

Michael MacDonald's and Terence Murphy's sociological study, Sleepless Souls (1990), takes a similarly monolithic definitional approach but also offers a well-contextualized historical account of suicide. The gist of their argument is that

> the rigour with which the law against suicide was enforced in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries distinguishes this period from the centuries before and afterwards. (16)

Clearly, suicide is an issue in seventeenth-century England.

Shakespeare is preoccupied with suicide, the topic appearing in fourteen of his plays. In the tragedies, these suicides, although they differ greatly from each other, share some commonalities. We can say that suicide in Shakespeare's tragedies is often a gesture that at once radically designates alterity and ambivalently positions the sacrificial victim within the human community.[17] Yet, while there are, as Juliette Marie Cunico argues, "a cluster of remarkably similar patterns" (2560A) with the suicides in the tragedies, we do well to avoid universalist statements about the suicides and to point out how the different types are imagined.[18] Hamlet's suicidal impulse, for instance, is radically different from Othello's or Ophelia's.

Hamlet is a troubled and troubling character, but he is less so than Ophelia. Though he gives perhaps the most famous soliloquy to be found about suicide, he ultimately does not kill himself, neither metaphorically nor literally, neither by neglect nor by direct action.[19] Like Ophelia, Hamlet is, as Belsey describes him, a "discontinuous" (41) figure whose subjectivity is threatened. We might say that both Ophelia and Hamlet are subjects under siege by what Lagretta Lenker calls "the incredibly destructive power of silence" (Lenker, "Introduction" 9). The difference between them is that Hamlet *does* have a means of expression not open to Ophelia: "he assumes the traditionally masculine role of aggression" (Lenker, "Suicide and the Dialectic" 100). But the initial suicidal impulse is the same for Hamlet and Ophelia: both seek self-expression. Ophelia takes the only solution she sees--namely, control over her body. The problem with Lenker's argument is that it does not acknowledge the importance of Ophelia's action and, in effect, participates in the same dynamics that ignore and silence Ophelia within the play. One has a voice, after all, only when one has an audience. Lenker ignores (or refuses to identify) Ophelia's "aggressive action," preferring to locate Ophelia within a sphere of otherness by claiming that she is "reduced to madness" (96). Such a comment diminishes the importance of Ophelia's suicide as a volitional (if desperate) gesture at communication.

It is important to identify Ophelia's action as aggressive: it is as aggressive as Hamlet's, and it is as communicative. The difference is that this aggression is directed inward. It is not that aggression, *per se*, then, is gendered in the Renaissance--which is what Lenker's argument presupposes. No, but aggression toward other people is gendered: such aggression is the prerogative of men.

If aggression toward other people is the traditional prerogative of men in the world of Hamlet, Shakespeare offers a different perspective in Macbeth. As James Greene has astutely pointed out, Macbeth explores "the implications of defining the male and female principles in their traditionally defined aggressive vs. passive roles" (175)--and, significantly, what we see is a world from which escape by suicide seems at some points the only viable alternative.

Macbeth's speculations about suicide suggest a kind of selfish escapism rather than the kind of desperate self-annihilating self-voicing that we see behind both Othello's and Ophelia's suicides. Macbeth, from beginning to end, has a voice which he is not in danger of losing. Indeed, it is the very plenitude of voice that sets Macbeth off from the rest of humanity. Absence and excess of voice each, in their own way, figure into equations that add to productions of alterity. Macbeth is too much of his own voice, and Kirsch is certainly right in arguing that "Macbeth is the

most self-centered of Shakespeare's tragic heroes" (269). Suicide, then, is not a mode of communication for Macbeth; it is a means to the end of his life and nothing more. His "torture of the mind" (3.2.21), the product of his bloody deeds, is so great that he thinks it would be "better [to] be with the dead" (3.2.19). He wants to escape "the affliction of . . . terrible dreams" (3.2.18). He echoes Lady Macbeth's sentiments that "'Tis safer to be that which we destroy/ Than by destruction dwell in doubtful joy" (3.2.6-7). But Macbeth does not end up killing himself, regardless of Arthur Kirsch's argument that because Macbeth thinks about suicide, his death at Macduff's hand must ultimately be regarded as a kind of suicide.[20] Lady Macbeth, on the other hand, does find that she cannot tolerate herself.

Catherine Belsey argues that Lady Macbeth and other female characters (including Cleopatra) "speak with voices which are not their own [and] are unfixed, inconstant, unable to personate masculine virtue through to the end" (183). It seems to me a mistake to lump Cleopatra and Lady Macbeth into the same category. Cleopatra, for instance, does say "I have nothing/ Of woman in me" (5.2.237-8), but she is not saying that she is a man or that she speaks male voices and masculine virtues! In fact, she explicitly denies that she is a part of the human (male or female) schema: "Now from head to foot/ I am marble constant; now

the fleeting moon/ No planet is of mine" (5.2.238-40). Belsey's comment seems suspiciously essentialist[21] and androcentric, yet her basic conclusion that Cleopatra "becomes the agent of her own destiny, the absolute subject of suicide" (184) seems an accurate enough assessment, one that would apply to Lady Macbeth as well. But while Belsey may be misled about Cleopatra, her point about gender inversions is certainly applicable to Lady Macbeth.

Lady Macbeth asks spirits to "unsex" her (1.4.42), but she is the agent of her own unsexing. Her transgression of gender boundaries differs significantly from the kind of gender inversion personified in the witches. Lady Macbeth's is a kind of gender suicide: it seems wilfully unnatural for a parent to say that she "would dash the brains out" (1.7.58) of her own child.[22] She wills away what she sees as defining features of being a woman. And her death moves from metaphor to reality: she becomes mad and dies of her own torment. In effect, her prolixity as a subject--indeed, her very voice--casts her into a volatile Otherness whose only trajectory is death. Her voice, disquieting and unruly, is a willing away her life.

With the witches, on the other hand, while they mock gender boundaries (it is in their nature and in their faces to do so), there is no hint of lethality in their transgressions. They are, though, essentially and almost comically Other. Their physiognomies reveal their

essential natures: "You should be women," Banquo says, concluding "and yet your beards forbid me to interpret/ That you are so" (1.3.45-7). A.C. Bradley is certainly wrong in asserting that "there is not a syllable in Macbeth to imply that the witches are anything but women" (341). Banquo's syllables cited above are a fair enough example, especially considering the importance of physiognomies in the early modern period.[23] There can be no doubt that a reading like Terry Eagleton's here is accurate and that the witches "mock rigorous boundaries and make sport of fixed positions" (3), and clearly gender boundaries are a part of what they mock. Again, then, voice is linked with alterity. The witches are Other because of the uses to which they put their voices.

Witches, Belsey explains, "were women who broke silence and found an unauthorized voice, but the social body required that they paid a high price for the privilege of being heard" (191). Their unauthorized speech in Macbeth is "imperfect" (1.3.70). Witches "were assumed to interfere with elements and the climate to achieve especially hurtful or unseasonable reversals" (Clark 120), as we can certainly see with the atmospheric chaos and riddling language[24] at the start of the play. Their transgressive natures and their disruptive potentials are threats, since, as Natalie Zemon Davis notes with cross-dressers, "inversion lead[s] to criticism of social

hierarchy" (132). And there are important links among issues of voice, witchcraft, sex, and vestmentary codes in the early modern period.

SILENCE AND GENDER

There are links (some implied, some explicit) in early modern literature between female sexuality and female voice. Both are threatening to the early modern English patriarchy and are consequently reviled. Female voice and sexuality fuel the flames of anti-feminist discourses that construct alterities. Lisa Jardine draws the connection between voice and sexuality in the following way:

> . . . the topological similarities [between the tongue and the penis] are apparently irresistibly suggestive--two fleshy protuberances, one the source of male power, one of female. Throughout the literature of the period we find a willingness to slide provocatively from one sense to another: scolding active use of the female tongue = female sexuality = female penis. (121)

There is certainly some evidence for this kind of argument: in The Duchess of Malfi, for instance, Ferdinand says that "women like that part which, like the lamprey,/ Hath ne'er a bone in't" (1.1.336-7), and it is clear enough that he is referring to the penis. When the Duchess exclaims moral disapprobation, he promptly explains, "Nay, I mean the tongue" (1.1.338).[25] Of course, the Duchess does not

express any disapproval at this statement, even though it is a direct insult. The insult is that women like to talk. (The image of a woman wanting a penis in her mouth also lurks, subtly unspoken here, as Jardine seems aware of.)

The connection Jardine notes between representations of voracious sexualities and representations of female voice in early modern literature is significant not only because it enables a perspective on the reviling of female self-expression, but also, perhaps, because it says something about dietary behaviour and alterity. Perhaps the reason that perceived or imagined voracity in women is so abhorrent is that it subverts the order of consumption. The lamb does not, after all, eat the tiger, except in a world of carnivalesque. It is the nature of the Other to be disempowered. To eat is to empower, and to be eaten, obviously, is to be disempowered. Emilia seems cognizant of this in Othello and complains that "[Men] are all but stomachs, and we [women] all but food;/ They eat us hungerly, and when they are full,/ They belch us" (3.4.117-9).

If the connection Jardine notes between voice and sexuality is useful in discussions about the designation of alterity, the very model making the connection, however, resonates with its own marginalizing assumptions. The model is decidely phallocentric: if voice equals penis, then (within the binaristic logic of the paradigm) silence equals

vagina. And it is fairly commonplace knowledge that the word "nothing" is Elizabethan slang for female genitalia,[26] or, as Luce Irigaray puts it, women's sexual organs have historically been represented as "the horror of having nothing to see" (101).[27] So, absence of speech equals silence, and absence of penis equals nothing; therefore, absence of speech should be metaphorically equivalent to the vagina. And it is--most of the time. As Peter Stallybrass has noted, "silence, the closed mouth, is made a sign of chastity" ("Patriarchal Territories" 127). Karen Newman argues that "an open mouth and immodest speech are tantamount to open genitals and immodest acts" (Fashioning 11).[28]

Why is it, then, that Cordelia's silence, her response of "Nothing, my lord" should so displease her father? Perhaps one answer is that the old man is insane, but this is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. Cordelia's refusal to speak is less an abjuration of her own voice than an avowal of it. She refuses to voice Lear and his expectations, though ironically through her "silence," she allows that voicing to be heard louder and clearer. But by no means is she silent: she says more than either Goneril or Regan say. One of the things she says is that actions speak louder than words: parenthetically, she says "I want that glib and oily art/ To speak and purpose not, since what I well intend,/ I'll do't before I speak" (1.1.23-5).

Cordelia's silence on certain issues is more communicative than not. The problem for Lear, then, is that Cordelia expresses herself by refusing to parrot what he wants to hear. Lear clearly recognizes that Cordelia, though silent to his question, is threatening because of her "voice" and her autonomy of thought, both of which are subversive of and Other to patriarchal control.

Lear, of course, is a hopeless fool. He just doesn't understand what goes on in his world. His final understanding of Cordelia is that "her voice was ever soft,/ Gentle and low, an excellent thing in woman" (5.3.271-2). His final appreciation is the same as his initial appreciation: in both cases, it is the *sound* rather than the *content* that he is interested in. Marshall McLuhan does not fare much better than Lear in his understanding of Cordelia. McLuhan's understanding is that "Cordelia is a coward" (13): he seems to understand only words, not silence. McLuhan and Lear, of course, are not alone in their inability to understand both Cordelia's voice and her silence. Ann Thompson points out in "Are There Any Women In King Lear?" that the critical tendency is to ignore Cordelia, and the unfortunate irony is that Thompson too is largely silent on Cordelia's silence. While Kathleen McLuskie's argument is assuredly sound advice that "feminist criticism need not restrict itself to privileging the woman's part or to special pleading on behalf of female

characters" (106), it is certainly wrong to diminish, through critical neglect, the most privileged action of the play, the action that initiates the drama that follows. Cordelia's silence and her voice are important, though, not only for their dramatic significance but, more significantly (within a New Historicist framework), for what they say about the perception and construction of the place of women in the English Renaissance.

When Marlowe's Dr. Faustus advises the scholarly entourage to "Be silent then, for in danger is words" (5.1.25), he might just as well have been advising Cordelia. Of course, her silence is also dangerous. The danger in both cases--silence or words--is one that attends self-expression for women of the English Renaissance. Cordelia can no more openly speak her mind than expressly hold her silence without expecting reprisals. Not in the English Renaissance. The many conduct books from the period suggest that while silence may be golden, communicative silence is of a much baser ore. Deborah Tannen observes in "Silence: Anything But" that very often "silence can be a matter of saying nothing and meaning something" (97), which is an argument that I have, in various ways, been making here. It is an argument that early modern writers of conduct books were clearly well aware of also. William Gouge, for example, wrote in 1622 that not all silence is desirable in women, that "silence, as it is opposed to

speech, would imply stoutnesse of stomacke, and stubbornnesse of heart, which is an extreme contrairie to loquacitie" (282). Bosola says very much the same thing in reference to the Duchess of Malfi: "her silence,/ Methinks, expresseth more than if she spake" (4.1.9-10).

The question, then, is less about speech and silence than about communication. Catherine Belsey argues at two separate points in The Subject of Tragedy that Renaissance women are "enjoined to silence" (149 & 190), but such an argument is clearly inaccurate. Women are enjoined to positions of non-communication. It is in the nature of patriarchal power systems to Other women through a denial of access to communication (which very often means a denial of access to language, voice, and other technologies of representation).

Historically, cross-dressing (of various kinds) has been another solution (silence being one solution in itself) to this problem. Like silence, cross-dressing as a means of resistance and communication is a solution that is attended by many of its own problems and implications.

SILENCE AND CROSS-DRESSING

Very often, what we find in the early modern period are female characters

> pass[ing] through the state of being men in order to become women. Shakespearean women are in this sense the representation of Shakespearean men, the

> projected mirror images of masculine self-differentiation.
>
> (Greenblatt, "Fiction and Friction" 51)

Greenblatt's comment here seems at least partially accurate, but if we accept his metaphor wholly, then we will have to allow for the fact that the "mirror images" can carry significant distortions. Linda Woodbridge, identifying such distortions, advances the argument, for instance, that "Shakespeare's transvestite heroines do not approach any nearer to true manhood than do the fraudulent 'mannish cowards'" (Women 154). Of course, one of the problems here is that defining what would be "true manhood" in the early modern period is, at best, difficult.

The terms "man" and "woman" are each under investigation in a lot of Renaissance literature, often positing as Other those who do not qualify as "men." For the moment, I will work with the essentialist vestmentary codes that define men and women in early modern literature.

In Twelfth Night, Viola cross-dresses, and in so doing gains access to the Duke, the very heart of power, which she would presumably not otherwise have had access to. And while she is too blithe to intend a politically committed subversion of gender orthodoxies, Viola is, however, a destabilizing presence. What s/he puts into question is clearly not "the notion of fixed sexual difference," as Jean Howard claims (430); and I propose that the whole notion of

androgyny peppering the analyses of a great number of critics (see, for instance, Heilbrun 36-7; Kimbrough 28-32; Rackin 37-8; and Slights 327-48) is, in fact, largely inapplicable to Viola/Cesario.[29]

When Janet Adelman argues that Viola's disguise "enacts on the most literal surface of the play the fantasy that one person can be both sexes" (89), she forgets that on the Renaissance stage, Viola's appearance is always already as a cross-dressed figure--a figure not of "both sexes" but rather of one sex and potential genders; as a male-imagined boy playing a girl playing a boy scenario, Viola, on stage, cannot be simply a dual-sexed creature.

It is not, then, the notion of fixed sexual difference that is made to discohere.[30] Rather, the presence of Viola (doubly) cross-dressed on stage primarily jiggles and blurs the causal lines between sex and gender. As Judith Butler proposes in Gender Trouble (1990), "the substantive effect of gender is performatively produced and compelled by the regulatory practices of gender coherence" (24). Gender is not the expression of some essential identity; as Butler argues in a later essay, "there are no direct expressive or causal lines between sex [and] gender" ("Imitation and Gender" 25), but instead "gender is *performative* in the sense that it constitutes as an effect the very subject it appears to express" (24). The subject mimes previous performances of, thus enacting, gender.

When Viola dons masculine garb, she mimes what she sees and is told is "masculine." Orsino, for instance, tells her to "Be clamorous and leap all civil bounds" (1.4.21), and much later in the play, she finds that it is her brother Sebastian whom she mimes:

> I my brother know
> Yet living in my glass. Even such and so
> In favor was my brother, and he went
> Still in this fashion, color, ornament,
> For him I imitate. (3.4.391-5)

When Phyllis Rackin says that Viola's cross-dressing provides "for a wonderfully complicated plot" (38), I think she is right, but I also think that she is totally oblivious to how wonderfully complicated the plot in fact is.

There are two glaring problems with Rackin's reading. Firstly, she is determined to read Viola/Cesario as "the unitary figure of the androgyne" (38), and secondly, her interpretive scope is limited by a heterosexism, which results in a naïve reading. Rackin finds it unusual that Orsino should care about Viola's apparel. Orsino tells Viola/Cesario, "Give me thy hand/ And let me see thee in thy woman's weeds" (5.1.273-4). Rackin finds this "a curious statement, which seems to make their marriage contingent on her change of costume" (38). Of course it is! For one thing, Viola is by no means the "unitary figure" Rackin describes. Rather, Viola is a "dissonant juxtaposition"

(Butler, Gender Trouble 123)[31] of signifiers (sex and gender) that necessarily both resists and reifies dominant (hetero)sexual norms and expectations. And for another thing, Viola/Cesario does not recover her women's weeds. Stephen Orgel makes the argument that "for Viola to become a woman requires, in short, a new play with Malvolio at its centre" (27), since, as Orgel argues, Malvolio would release the sea captain who is the only person capable of finding Viola's weeds (new or borrowed clothes not seeming to be an option).[32]

One of the ironies about the need for Viola's change of attire is that the play problematizes the very vestmentary essentialism that it endorses. Appearances matter (which is why Orsino wants Viola to change her clothes), but one of the central themes of the play is that though "the glass seems true" (5.1.265), little store is to be set on outward appearances. And, clearly, Viola can't remain cross-dressed: if Phillip Stubbes is any indication, early modern England did not like female cross-dressers. They are Other, at best; at worst, they are, in Stubbes' words, "Monsters of bothe kinds, half women, half men" (Stubbes 73). Clearly, if cross-dressing is pursued as a way out of alterity and silence, then it is a bit of a bootless errand, a dangerous little jaunt across the border from one country of alterity to another.

Early modern dramatic uses of female cross-dressers say

a number of things about voice and alterity. Belsey argues that "in the seventeenth century . . . to speak may be to adopt the voice of a man" (180). In other words, women only have a voice if they look, act, and sound like men--hardly a satisfying solution, since women as women still don't really have a voice in this set-up. Fitz laments that

> the one unsatisfying feature of the otherwise stimulating transvestite movement of this period is that it had to be transvestite: that Renaissance women so far accepted the masculine rules of the game that they felt they had to adopt the clothing and external attributes of the male sex in order to be 'free.' (17)

Certainly, the desire to <u>be</u> a man is one held by many of the imagined women of the early modern period.[33] In Thomas Middleton and William Rowley's <u>The Changeling</u> (1622), for instance, Beatrice-Joanna well understands the advantages of maleness (and the disadvantages of femaleness) in her society:

> Would creation--
> . . . Had form'd me man!
> . . . Oh, 'tis the soul of freedom!
> I should not then be forced to marry one
> I hate beyond all depths; I should have power
> Then to oppose my loathings, nay, remove 'em

For ever from my sight. (2.2.107-113)

Lady Macbeth asks to be unsexed; Beatrice, in Much Ado About Nothing, twice exclaims "Oh that I were a man" (4.1.303 and 1.306); the Duchess of Malfi tells Bosola, "Were I a man/ I'd beat that counterfeit face into thy other" (3.5.117-8); in The White Devil, Isabella tells her brother Francisco de Medici,

> O that I were a man, or that I had power
> To execute my apprehended wishes,
> I would whip some [women] with scorpions.
> (2.1.243-5);

in Love's Cure, Clara wishes she were the man she is cross-dressed as (1.3.37-8); Moll thrives in The Roaring Girl because she is cross-dressed and, as she tells Alexander, is "as good a man as [Alexander's] son" (5.2.152-3); Portia in The Merchant of Venice sees women as lacking something that men have and says that she can mimic men better than men can be men (3.4.63-80); Rosalind in As You Like It sports a man's attire which affords her greater discursive access to men, and she does not want to "disgrace . . . man's apparel" with tears (1.4.4-5)--and the list goes on, but the point here is surely clear: men writing in the early modern period are aware that women's access to language and power is limited, and the fantasy is that cross-dressing is a way around the problem.

Recognition of women's discursive marginality is one

thing, but subversion is another, and containment yet another. According to Jonathan Dollimore, "cross-dressing spelt 'confusion' in the far-reaching, devastating, religious sense of the word" (Radical Tragedy xxxv), and

> intense anxieties about social change and its unsettling of gender and class hierarchies were punitively displaced in dramatic as well as non-dramatic literature, on to the issue of dress violation, especially women dressing in men's clothes. (xxxv-vi)

Ultimately, though, the transvestite woman, the *hic mulier*, or mannish woman, or whatever we will call the woman who breaks with the established modes of femininity is less a threat to men, according to Lisa Jardine (1989), than a woman who uses her tongue to express herself: Jardine argues that

> the threat of the scold is local and domestic; that of the Amazon/virago is generalized 'rejection of her sex,' a strangeness which travesties nature. The scold is a disturbingly persuasive possibility; the man-woman, an outsider and a sensationalised freak. (105)

Nevertheless, some of the early modern texts that deal with cross-dressing do address the question of women's access to language without retreating into a position of successful ideological containment. The Hic-Mulier/ Haec-Vir pamphlets

are a good example. As Woodbridge observes,

> despite the eventual collapse of Haec-Vir into orthodoxy, the first half of the dialogue falls very little short of being a flaming manifesto of liberty for women. (Women 148)

For instance, the *hic-mulier* in the second pamphlet responds to *haec-vir*'s charge of unnaturalness in a way that is clearly radically subversive of the mores of the patriarchal hegemony, out of which *haec-vir* speaks: "I was created free, born free, and live free" (B[V]-B2[R]), *hic-mulier* says. She later adds that

> we are as free-born as men, have as free election, and as free spirits, we are compounded of like parts, and may with like liberty make benefit of our creations: my countenance shall smile on the worthy, and frown on the ignoble. (B3[R])

Hic-mulier clearly argues for the right of women to resist marginalization and to speak. *Hic-mulier* herself speaks longer and more logically than *haec-vir*: he is not responding to her argument but is arbitrarily defining sin, baseness, wanton behaviour, and so on in an argument that is replete with *non sequiturs* and nonsense. *Hic-mulier*'s argument is six pages long, while *haec-vir*'s is a mere two. Yet, after her rhetorical and logical *tour de force*, the only response she gives to his logical fallacies is that *haec-vir* is as guilty of the "evill" of cross-dressing as

she is (B4[R]). The conclusion of the argument is, at best, forced and unsatisfying: in effect, *hic-mulier* has won the argument, even though she hands the victory to *haec-vir*. The masculine putatively triumphs over the Othered feminine, and the power differential remains essentially intact.

The construction of masculinity is the construction of a power grid that generates "forms of knowledge and forms of subjectivity" (de Lauretis, Technologies 35).[34] If we can assume, as Foucault does, that power relations depend "on a multiplicity of points of resistance . . . present everywhere in the power network" (History 95), then the conclusion de Lauretis draws that both "power and resistance . . . operate concurrently" (Technologies 35) seems valid. Indeed, it is precisely the concurrent operation of power and resistance that is so problematically evinced in many Renaissance texts. The theatricalization of cross-dressing at once insists on a heterosexual ontology (usually by a climactic series of marriages), and at the same time comes "to seem the privileged locus of what gets called homosexuality in Renaissance drama" (Goldberg, Sodometries 115).

QUEER SILENCES

Far from being voices from the margins of culture, representations of unstable gender configurations and of implied or overt sexual dissidence are a central and defining feature of much of the drama in early modern

English society. Yet, while we can see in the texts a heavy preponderance of various alternative "sexualities" creatively fashioned as sites of cultural resistance,[35] we are left at something of a loss to define accurately the nature of those sexualities. Indeed, Renaissance texts register the resistance without voicing properly or in a duly fair and representative manner the actual voices of resistance. In effect, the "presumptively hetero-sexual"[36] hegemony both asks and answers, voices and silences resistance. Can, as Spivak asks, the dis-enfranchised be said to speak? In other words, can the subaltern speak without having access to the technologies of self-representation? Can the subaltern speak without having a voice?

A simple "no" here is misleading and inaccurate. If we take as a general working hypothesis the stand that cross-dressing in the Renaissance is more than a simple destabilization of gender categories, that it is a threat to sexual orthodoxies, to an orderly heterosexual binarism, to the assurances of family and microsocial continuity, indeed, ultimately, to the stability of the State, then the transvestite debate that rages in the Renaissance can be understood as a part of a larger discursive encoding that is produced at various sites in various documents. The question then becomes one of identifying the coding itself.

Numerous critics have recently attempted this task.

Gregory Bredbeck, for example, looks at castles and pubs, courtiers and servant-boys, and he charts the discursive encoding of "sodomy" in documents ranging from the legal, to the poetic, to the pornographic broadsides, and so on. Like Alan Bray before him, Bredbeck is critical of the veracity of legal tracts--which are paradoxes in articulation, since these texts seem as interested in condemning as in displaying (9-10). Bredbeck is, however, critical of Bray's insistence that the eighteenth century saw a "new" tension. Bray argues that

> there was now a tension that had not existed before. Alongside the old forms of society in which homosexuality had appeared, new meanings were now being attached to homosexuality: it was more than a sexual act.
>
> (Homosexuality in Renaissance 88)

According to Bray, "effeminacy and transvestism with specifically homosexual connotations were a crucial part of what gave the molly houses their identity" (88).[37] An argument of Bredbeck's book, then, is that there is a long and varied genealogy for this tension that Bray sees as new, and Bredbeck traces this genealogy. Bredbeck essentially argues that the homosexual subculture which Bray locates as part of the eighteenth century was, in fact, around much earlier.

Bredbeck discusses the lack of specificity that attends

the term "sodomy" and claims that the term is "a way to encompass a multitude of sins with a minimum of signs" (13), but he also argues that there was a "process of discursive complication and specification of homoeroticism during the Renaissance" (16). He draws some interesting conclusions about idiom: "Ganymede" = lover, "catamite" = hustler, "ingle" = kept boy. The first item of each dyad represents the Renaissance idiom, the second the modern gay idiomatic equivalent.

A general conclusion we can draw, even at this early stage in the application of queer theory to the Renaissance, is that the queer silences of the period (and, indeed, of much of history) are in fact voices that are coded into what Ed Cohen would call "socially legitimated forms of visibility and intelligibility" (169).[38] The question is not whether or not there was "homosexuality" antecedent to the 1869 coinage of the term,[39] and the question is not whether or not Shakespeare himself (or anyone else, for that matter) was queer;[40] the question is more about the production and maintenance of minorities and silences, of which, as we see in Twelfth Night, the controversy of the cross-dresser is an integral part.

TWELFTH NIGHT: POSSIBILITIES AND IMPLICATIONS

It is significant that in Twelfth Night, Viola remains a "man," and that although the play threatens to reify a heterosexual patriarchal orthodoxy through a heterosexual

marriage (the same reactive containment that we find in The Merchant of Venice), the marriage, in fact, does not happen (at least, not on stage). What does happen is that the cross-dresser in this play clearly becomes a bouncing board for ideas about community membership, about competing definitions of sexualities and genders, and about the conventions of friendship.

Certainly, the potentially monstrously Other *hic-mulier* here, the cross-dressed Viola, opens interesting possibilities, particularly if we consider the Olivia/Viola relationship (even though what homoeroticism there is occurs unwittingly, since Olivia thinks Viola a gentleman). What I find more interesting is the Orsino/Viola relationship, because Orsino clearly has no doubts that Viola is, in fact, Cesario--a boy. Alan Bray argues that "the image of the masculine friend was an image of intimacy between men [that stood] in stark contrast to the forbidden intimacy of homosexuality" ("Homosexuality and the Signs" 42), and that the language describing early modern male friendship is a "ubiquitous convention" (44). He argues that while

> the signs of the [sodomite] were indeed sometimes also signs of the [male friend], . . . the conventions of friendship were set a world away from the wild sin of Sodom by the placid orderliness of the relationships they expressed. (47)

Perhaps, but the fact that there is so often a question of

power--"the common bed shared in the public eye was only one expression of this" (43)--involved in these "eminently proper" (51) male friendships suggests something. If conventions of male friendship deliberately de-sexualize same-sex relationships, while power and privilege continue to be channelled through bodies at play, then there seems to be a certain inauthenticity to the unsexing of these very clearly sexed relationships. Granted, eroticism is not the goal of the relationships that Bray describes, but neither can these relationships logically be viewed as platonic. As Jonathan Goldberg has so eloquently put it in Queering the Renaissance, "it is always the case [in the kinds of relationships Bray describes] that exchanges of power are anything but disembodied acts" (Queering 6). When political or social power is translated into bodily acts between men, when sexed bodies are used to express desire (regardless of the kind of desire), and when there is such a lack of clarity about same-sex erotic relationships as there is in the Renaissance, an argument like the one Bray makes can only be inadequate; though, why Bray would want to foist and force his argument is clear enough: it would be foolish to flat-out conflate male friendship and male queerness. The two are not the same, but the distinctions aren't as easy as Bray suggests. Homosexuality is not a speaking identity in the early modern period; it is a muted alterity that speaks through a multiplicity of encodings.

The two same-sex relationships and their implications in Twelfth Night are worth some consideration. In the first relationship, Olivia falls in love with a maiden, and, as William Slights points out (329), the comedy derives from this "homosexual" attraction. Of course, Slights might have been more careful with his terms: the term "homosexual" does not really apply to the early modern period,[41] and the attraction of Oliva to Cesario (Viola) is a heterosexual attraction, one predicated on a false perception of Viola's anatomy and gender. What we have with Olivia and Viola is, then, at best, a potentially same-sex attraction.

We can certainly argue firmly, however, that the text compels the audience to spectacularize the potentially queer. Our gaze is Othering.[42] But if the audience here is implicated in the process by which the text designates alterity in the figure of the queer and in the dynamic of a possibly homoerotic attraction (the Orsino/Viola relationship), then the audience participates (through oblique recognition) in a much more potentially subversive expression of same-sex appreciation (potentially erotic). Orsino, (wrongly) not doubting the anatomical maleness of Viola/Cesario, praises Cesario's beauty at great length. But at the very moment of its expression, this potentially disruptive gesture contains itself: all the beauty Orsino sees "is semblative of a woman's part" (1.4.34). Regardless, this scene must count for something within the

context of the rest of the play, just as the play must in the context of the history of sexuality in which it participates.

On stage, neither the Olivia/Viola nor the Orsino/ Cesario relationships can be properly called anything more than potentially queer, since in both cases, Viola/Cesario is not what s/he appears to be. Antonio's love for Sebastian, on the other hand, is unambiguous, and it may be perfectly valid for Janet Adelman to claim that this love "is the strongest and most direct expression of homoerotic feeling in Shakespeare's plays" (88). Indeed, there are sustained tones of homosocial and homoerotic codings in this play that seem largely unique in the Shakespearean canon, and the promise (or, rather, threat) of marriage, as I referred to it before, is, perhaps, what is behind the persistently heterosexist readings that the play has engendered.

The threat of marriage is a defensive heterosexuality's response to the threat posed by Antonio, who, "for three months before/ No int'rim, not a minute's vacancy,/ Both day and night did . . . keep company" (5.1.94-6) with Sebastian. As Leslie Fiedler sensitively notes, we are offered an empathetic view of "the small daily tortures" (93) of this loving male relationship, which is more than we are offered in any of the other plays or even in the sonnets. Same-sex relationships are absolutely central to this play. If

Linda Woodbridge finds that "the homosexual motif is ill integrated into the love story *qua* love story" ("'Fire in Your Heart'" 287), the problem could be the paradigm in which "homosexuality [is] a form of concupiscent excess" (*ibid*). If what we are getting here is, in fact, a "homosexual" relationship, then it does not seem to me that this motif is ill integrated. If any motif is ill integrated here, then it would have to be the motif of heterosexuality. Antonio is left in limbo (and with nothing), like his namesake in The Merchant of Venice, and for very similar reasons--specifically, because of the text's compulsive insistence on the return of the heterosexual. The sexual Other is left, to use Fiedler's term, "mute," burdened by a silence that is unresolvable--a silence made possible, paradoxically, by that transvestite monster (as Stubbes would say), who, significantly, is accorded a voice.

MAKING MEN and OTHERS

Part of what the whole controversy about cross-dressing reveals is an instability of terms, and a key term under threat here is manhood. Terms are important here, since those who do not qualify as men tend to qualify as Others. If gender is a thing performed and rehearsed, then confusion over roles that people play in the fictive universe of drama becomes socially important. Such confusion is evident in Macbeth.

As James Greene sees it, there is a "profound confusion over the roles of men and women in the nightmare world ruled by Macbeth and his Lady" (156). He goes on to argue that

> the text of Macbeth suggests a tension between the received views of maleness, as equated with aggression, and the obliquely subversive undermining of that view in a variety of ways. (170)

The play seems to construct manhood on militaristic values, and the celebration of valor, bravery, blood, fighting, and manly death is reiterated throughout. Malcolm praises the manly--albeit, traitorous--Cawdor:

> very frankly he confessed his treasons,
> Implored your Highness' pardon and set forth
> A deep repentance: nothing in his life
> Became him like the leaving it. (1.4.5-8)

Malcolm himself is later prompted by Macduff to "hold fast the mortal sword [with him]" (4.3.3). And the play endorses a muscular manhood right to the very end, when "unrough youths . . ./ Protest their first of manhood" through war (5.2.9-10), and Ross, speaking of his own son, proudly tells Malcolm that "like a man he died" (5.8.43).

Macbeth, however, is insecure in his conception of masculinity, confused over his role, uncertain about where violence is appropriate in a society that condones the violence of war (presumably because such violence seeks to

preserve the basis of social order). His dearest partner of undaunted mettle voices her opinion about all of this: real men, in her view, aren't "full o'th' milk of human kindness" (1.5.18). She implies that Macbeth is "a coward" (1.7.43). She asks him if he is a man (3.4.59) or if he has been "quite unmanned in folly" (3.4.74). She rebukes him for having a troubled conscience, insinuating that he is more a woman than a man:

> O, these flaws and starts.
> Imposters to true fear would well become
> A woman's story at a winter's fire,
> Authorized by her grandam. Shame itself!
>
> (3.4.64-7)

She attacks him on his weakest point: his notions of manhood. To play the woman's part in Macbeth's world is to submit to a position of relative disempowerment, silence, and alterity. No one here wants to play the woman's part: not Lady Macbeth, who unsexes herself; not Macduff, who is afraid of "play[ing] the woman with [his] eyes" (4.3.230); not Malcolm, who urges Macduff to "dispute [his grief] like a man" (4.3.220); not Ross, who argues that "it would be [his] disgrace" (4.2.28) to play the woman with his eyes--in short, to be a woman is to be worthless in the world of Macebth. Yet, there is something almost touching when Lady Macbeth calls Macbeth her "dearest partner of greatness" (1.5.12). The two seem equal. The only way that they can

be equal partners, though, is either for Lady Macbeth to unsex herself or for Macbeth to unsex himself. Indeed, the two are far from equal: Lady Macbeth's efforts to voice herself in this culture can only achieve the opposite result: she demonizes herself, she becomes mad, she effaces herself. In effect, her voice is ultimately silenced by the play. Her voice is unnatural. The play constantly invalidates her right to speak, especially with the kind of voice she has.

Peter Stallybrass argues that the play "mobilizes the fear of unsubordinated woman" (205). I would take this a bit further. Macbeth, I have been arguing, registers a fear not only of "unsubordinated" and voluble women but of all women and on at least some level seems to suggest that a world without women would be the best kind of world. Lady Macbeth should "bring forth men-children only / . . . Nothing but males" (1.7.72-4), and, as Coppélia Kahn argues, "in Macbeth's sexually confused fantasy world, . . . only a violent and unnatural separation from woman can make a man whole" (172-3). Bother, then, that men come from women. In such a world, what makes a man?

In Beaumont and Fletcher's The Captain, Jacamo (the Captain) insists on a strict separatism and on equating masculinity with war:

> Shall we never live to see
> Men looke like men againe, upon a march?

> This cold dull rusty peace makes us appeare
> Like empty Pictures, onely the faint shadowes
> Of what we should be. (2.1.6-10)

He justifies war on the basis that what people enjoy in a peaceful society are things that other people have had to fight for: "they are masters of/ Nothing but what we fight for: their faire women/ Lye playing in their armes, whilst we like Lares/ Defend their pleasures" (2.1.250-3). This may, in fact, be a powerful argument against exploitation of soldiers by the comfortable and affluent (one thinks of poor blacks fighting in Vietnam), but Jacamo makes a case neither for war nor for equating masculinity with violence. Yet, he does feel emasculated--and disempowered--by things more domestic than war. Clora notes that love emasculates him (3.3.88-90).[43] And he is fairly clear about his feelings regarding what constitutes the nature of women: "any thing/ That is too idle for a man to thinke of" (2.1.13-4). He is a man after Angilo's heart, in this regard: "Oh that all women were thus silent ever,/ What fine things they were" (3.4.55-6). Silence and passivity are the ideals here from which a woman like Lelia might stray;[44] clamour and violence are the defining ideals of masculinity. Of course, the whole set-up is unstable, and the play does as much to wobble it as to reinforce it. The Captain, presumably a paragon of manhood, fails to come off as such. Emasculation Others him, and there is a kind of madness and

insobriety about Jacamo that detracts from his masculinity, as we shall see in the following chapter.

The author of Hic Mulier (1620) articulates his conception/construction of masculinity in terms similar to Jacamo's: manhood means aptness to anger, action, and revenge, rudeness, and a proclivity for using and carrying weapons (B2[V]). And, as in The Captain, the construction and maintenance of this ontology is contingent on keeping women quiet and separated from the rights and privileges that men enjoy. Being a man means having a voice; being a monster (or a beast) means appropriating a voice reserved for men.

Similarly, in Beaumont and Fletcher's Love's Cure, Lucio is most manly when he fights. Though this play insists less on the kind of separatism that other early modern texts urge, it is interesting for its interrogation of the nature/nurture (essentialist/constructionist) debate. The play resolves that regardless of upbringing, men and women have essential natures that will overcome upbringing. But like *hic-mulier*'s renunciation of her voice to *haec-vir* in Haec-Vir, Clara's capitulation--"I forgot my sex, and knew not/ Whether my body female were, or male" (5.3.92-3)--is a forced and unsatisfactory resolution to serious questions that the text has raised.

Clearly, defining manhood is an important aspect of many early modern texts, and it is a definitional *process*

that enables many designations of alterity. Terence Hawkes has suggested that one reason for the Renaissance interest in defining men is primarily

> the impingement on the popular consciousness of the adventures of various groups of settlers on the American continent, particularly their encounter with Indian cultures. (27)

Indeed, as Michael Neill points out in an article about Othello, the historical period we are talking about here is one "in which something we can now identify as a racialist ideology was beginning to evolve under the pressures of nascent imperialism" (394). The efforts are to construct white men--the others do not qualify and are stifled, since their voices represent a threat. Someone like Caliban knows the importance of voice and language: he knows that Prospero's power lies in his access to the technologies of communication--one of which is books. Caliban knows that the route to empowerment is "First to possess his books; for without them/ He's but a sot" (3.2.90-1).

While colonialism is, of course, one reason for early modern obsessions with the making of men, another reason must have something to do with the fact that a woman was running the country. Much of what I have been discussing in this chapter is an "anxious masculinity"[45] that seeks to clear a discursive space for men while reducing such a space for women.

Questions about voice and silence are clearly central to the ways in which power and privilege are maintained through early modern discourses, though I have only touched on a very small portion of the issue here. A few general conclusions are possible at this point: 1] voice is power, in that it enables discursive production of the self, but silence is also power insofar as it is a kind of resistance, a refusal to give voice to externally imposed expectations; 2] when silence is resistance--as it is with the Chinese goldsmith Greenblatt discusses, as it is with Iago, and as it is with the women of stout stomachs and stubborn hearts William Gouge fears--the silence characterizes an alterity so abhorrent that it must be made to speak (and the attempt is invariably made through torture or punishment, of one kind or another); 3] oddly, one of the more potent forms of self-assertion is self-destruction, both in the Renaissance and today; 4] as we have seen in Macbeth, female voice and sexual monstrosity (any kind of sexuality for women in the early modern period seems monstrous) is linked, sometimes moving toward an equation of the woman to the witch; 5] since gender and sexuality are clearly central to questions about voice, it is hardly surprising that cross-dressing is one route open for early modern women to voice themselves, but this road opens onto all sorts of problems and considerations: cross-dressing is not really a solution if women have to become men to have voices and to shed that

voice when they shed the clothes, and cross-dressing raises some problematical issues around the question of sexuality; 6] certainly we have seen that sexual dissidents are, in a way, silent in the Renaissance, yet there is a lot of coding of various sexualities in early modern discourses--so while the voices of queer sexualities are perhaps more muted than silenced, these voices also resonate heavily with other voices, since any coding carries its own ideological whispers and mutterings; 7] because the central figure of power in the Renaissance, the one with the voice, is the fairly elite white, heterosexual, sane, man, understanding what makes this man is a key to understanding what makes his Others; and, lastly, 8] there is, obviously, a lot of work yet to be done with silence and alterity. With this in mind, we can now move on to look at issues such as madness and deformity, which fall under the rubric of silencing strategies, and at how these things fit to questions about the designation of alterity in the early modern period.

Notes

[1]I favor a term like "discursive representations" here over terms like "literature" and "history," since it is difficult to speak about boundaries between "history" and "literature." The difficulty arises because history consists of a sum of events transformed into documents. History is always representation. Of course, there would be problems, as Elizabeth Fox-Genovese observes, if we were to treat "history" and "literature" as undifferentiated (216-7). The two are not the same; but given this point, the fact remains that many historical documents "are as deeply imbricated by the same cultural assumptions as Shakespeare's plays" (Hall 31), for instance. I am interested in discussing relationships between history and representation.

[2]In all fairness, Tannen does express genuine concern about addressing "cross-cultural differences," but she shows little concern about what constitutes such differences and how and assumes that they are somehow magically just there.

[3]I would like to be clear that while I am not pursuing discussions about the dramatic significance of silence, neither do I wish to downplay the importance of such discussions. I think that Jill Levenson best articulates the importance of on-stage silences in drama:

> Silence in drama can create, disappoint, compel, and absorb as vigorously as the most eloquent

> musical pause. And this profound similarity exists because the dramatist and the composer share the power to create silence. . . . [and] for the makers of drama and music, silence itself furnishes means to express, invoke, even define other kinds of reality. (215)

[4]See, for example, Suzanne W. Hull, Chaste, Silent, and Obedient: English Books for Women, 1475-1640 (San Marino: Huntington Library, 1982); Lisa Jardine, Still Harping on Daughter's: Women and Drama in the Age of Shakespeare (Sussex: Harvester, 1983), especially chapter 4, 103-40; Ruth Kelso, Doctrine for the Lady of the Renaissance (Urbana, Chicago, and London: U of Illinois P, 1978); and Karen Newman, Fashioning Femininity and English Renaissance Drama (Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 1991), especially chapter 1, 1-12.

[5]Perhaps one should not be surprised by this, since, as one critic recently observed, "silence as a valid form of expression is . . . often overlooked by Eurocentric critics, who tend to equate verbal assertiveness (and Western culture) with power" (Aguilar-San Juan 25).

[6]The sentence continues: ". . . speak that I may see thee." Behind Jonson's statement here is the assumption that what is spoken will be understood. When the Bishop of Avila says to Queen Isabella of Castille in 1492 that "language is the perfect instrument of empire" (Hulme,

Colonial Encounters 1), the intention of insuring a uniformity of language and control is blatantly evident.

[7]See Stephen Greenblatt, "Learning to Curse: Aspects of Linguistic Colonialism in the Sixteenth Century," First Images of America: The Impact of the New World on the Old, Ed. Fred Chiappelli (Berkeley: U of California P, 1976) 561-80.

[8]Indeed, the word "domesticate" comes from the medieval Latin root "domesticare," which means "to bring into the house." The definition in the OED--"[to] make fond of home life"--is in keeping with the etymological roots of the word.

[9]I would argue that the house is so readily maintained as a prison because it is the most immediate dual conceptualization of the body and the world. As Bernd Jager argues, "to enter and finally come to inhabit a house or a city means to assume a certain stance . . . to redraw the limits of our bodily existence to include it, to come to incorporate it" (55-6). Elaine Scarry takes the argument further by suggesting that it is

> the human being's impulse to project himself out into a space beyond the boundaries of the body in acts of making, either physical or verbal, that once multiplied, collected, and shared are called civilisation. (39)

Scarry goes on to argue that the torturer reduces the world

"to a single room or set of rooms" (40). The argument, essentially, is that the victim, naturally predisposed toward valuing "the house," will suffer the loss of that intimate and reliable resource and will be compelled to comply with a different exterior reality--namely, that of the gaoler.

[10]Clearly, the only reason that Brabantio might have here to say to Othello "Damned as thou art" is Othello's blackness.

[11]I would have to agree with Marguerite Waller's argument that Iago is Othello's hope for moving away from social and emotional peripherality and alterity. Waller argues that

> Iago offers Othello the opportunity to participate actively and passionately in the emotions, jealousies, and vengeances of full-fledged Venetian male selfhood. (18)

[12]Othello's bold transgression, however, is entirely within character: he is a brave general, an indispensable and highly-esteemed military asset.

[13]Margaret Higonnet also makes a fairly lucid case that suicide is essentially an attempt at or a mode of communication. She makes the important observation, in a discussion about Titus Andronicus that "a woman may choose death after defilement, not to confirm her status as property, but to reaffirm her autonomy" (74).

[14]See Anderson (1987); Zell (1986); and Stevenson (1987). MacDonald and Murphy discuss some of the problems that confront statistical historians (Sleepless Souls 360-6).

[15]Determining cause (let alone motive) of death was not an easy matter. Moreover, as we might expect, not all suicides were reported.

[16]Henry Romilly Fedden puts suttee and hara-kiri in this category (47).

[17]On the one hand, the victim finally separates him or herself from the community of living people; on the other hand, the act of suicide--often itself a last desperate bid at communication--can only grow out of human reasoning (or failings). Intentional suicide is a uniquely human thing. Lemmings may rush headlong into the sea, or moths into the flame; whales may beach themselves, or horses may run into burning barns--but I see no evidence anywhere in the domain of animals to suggest that self-annihilation is a socially symbolic act of communication for any species but humans. To commit suicide is both to join and separate oneself from the human community.

[18]The central weakness of Cunico's approach is that questions about the relationship between suicide and voice (and, by implication, any serious discussion about alterity) are absent, though such a problem is, perhaps, symptomatic of the reader-response approach.

[19]I use the definition Fedden offers for suicide: "in its broadest definition, [suicide is] any action or abstention from action which causes death and which was undertaken with the knowledge that death would probably ensue" (28).

[20]See Arthur Kirsch. "Macbeth's Suicide." English Literary History 51. 2 (Summer 1984): 269-96.

[21]Belsey's argument is essentialist because it assumes some sort of neat, pat distinction between "masculine" and "feminine" discourses--and there may well be one, but if there is, then it would be nice to know what the terms are. Diana Fuss argues that "essentialism underwrites claims for the autonomy of a female voice and the potentiality of a feminine language" (2), and while I wish neither to get into the essentialist/ constructionist debate nor to condemn or endorse Belsey, I do want to point out that her argument is essentialist.

[22]Clearly, my argument here is essentializing, but, like Fuss, there are times when I feel that "it is difficult to see how constructionism can be constructionism without a fundamental dependency on essentialism" (4).

[23]Macbeth is particularly full of physiognomic imagery and commentary.

[24]Deciphering the meaning of comments like "When the hurlyburly's done/ When the battle's lost and won" (1.1.3-4), for example, is difficult. The witches disrupt

discursive order.

[25]Nor is he the only one in Renaissance to draw the connection between the penis and the tongue: Robert Cleaver calls the tongue "that glibbery member" (94) in A Godlie Forme of Householde Government (1612), the term "member" resonating with sexual connotations.

[26]Elaine Showalter points this out in "Representing Ophelia" (1985), as do numerous other critics.

[27]The anonymous author of Hic Mulier, or, the Man-Woman (1620) echoes the misogynist disgust for female genitalia and argues that a woman should lock away her sexuality and not expose her body. The author genders Nature female and argues that women should "imitate nature," that as the earth hides things necessary for human sustenance, so women should hide things that men feel they need--in both cases, things that meet felt needs should be "loct up close in hidden caverns" (B3[v]) and kept unseen.

[28]Of course, linking sexuality to speech in women is by no means a novel idea created by twentieth-century critics: early modern educators themselves make the link quite explicit. Juan Vives, who, according to Deborah Greenhut, "set the standard for the Tudor conduct books" (43), is one among legions of early modern writers who insist on drawing the link. As Greenhut observes, these conduct books maintain that "for a woman to speak is for her to assert her sexuality and, consequently, to forego her chastity" (44).

[29]Yet, we cannot rule out of hand the issue of androgyny, certainly not if we consider the dramatic identities Viola/Cesario performs: at least in terms of the genders s/he performs, Viola/Cesario is an androgyne, as evinced by his/her comment

> As I am a man,
> My state is desperate for my master's love.
> As I am a woman (now alas the day!),
> What thriftless sighs shall poor Olivia breathe?
> (2.2.36-9).

[30]The text produces discursive destabilizations of a kind that Dollimore would call "discoherence." Dollimore explains his coinage:

> In highlighting the contingency of the social, the critique of ideology may also intensify its internal instabilities, doing so in part by disarticulating or disaligning existing ideological configurations . . . [T]he dislocation which the critique aims for is not so much an incoherence as a *disc*oherence--an incongruity verging on meaningful contradiction. In the process of being made to discohere, meanings are returned to circulation, thereby becoming the more vulnerable to appropriation, transformation, and reincorporation in new configurations. Such in part are the processes whereby the social is

> unmade and remade, disarticulated and rearticulated. (Sexual Dissidence 87)

[31]I am indebted to Heather Zwicker for calling my attention to Butler's phrase.

[32]Orgel's reading is supported by the sudden revelations of the final act. Viola will marry the Duke, but not in her "masculine usurped attire" (5.1.250), and she tells the Duke "Do not embrace me till each circumstance/ Of place, time, fortune do cohere and jump/ That I am Viola" (11.251-3). The Duke asks "let me see thee in thy woman's weeds" (1.273), and she explains that

> The captain that did bring me first on shore
> Hath my maid's garments. He upon some action
> Is now in durance, at Malvolio's suit,
> A gentleman, and a follower of my lady's.
>
> (11.274-7)

The only person capable of finding her clothes is imprisoned by the "most notoriously abused" (1.381) Malvolio, who, at the end of the play, seems unlikely to be helpful to anyone, his last words being that "I'll be revenged on the whole pack of you!" (1.380).

[33]It is difficult to speak unproblematically of the "women" of male-authored, early modern plays. I'd venture that mostly what we have are fantasies of womanhood, but this kind of statement is connotatively misleading, so I will stick with my phrase "imagined women." See also

Woodbridge (Women 154).

[34]I have taken Teresa de Lauretis' words out of context: she is not talking about "masculinity," but her comments about power and the constitution of fields of knowledge are applicable to my discussion about the causal relationship that constructions of masculinity have with disenfranchisement, silencing, and alterity.

[35]I am building here on the argument Teresa de Lauretis makes that homosexualities "may be reconceptualized as social and cultural forms in their own right . . . [and] may be understood and imagined as forms of resistance to cultural homogenization" ("Queer Theory" iii).

[36]I borrow this phrase for its precision from Goldberg (Sodometries 109).

[37]Molly houses were eighteenth-century gay bars where, Bray explains,

> sex was the root of the matter, but it was as likely to be expressed in drinking together, in flirting and gossip and in a circle of friends as in actual liaisons. Surrounded as the molly houses were by intense disapproval and at least partly hidden, they must have seemed like any ghetto, at times claustrophobic and oppressive, at others warm and reassuring. It was a place to take off the mask. (84)

[38]I would go a bit further and apply an argument that Robert Goss makes in a discussion about late 19th and early twentieth-century homophobic medical/psychiatric discourses. He proposes that

> Far from silencing gay/lesbian sexual discourse, homophobic power produced its articulation. It generated a rebellious public discourse with specific forms, particular behaviours, and definite cultural sensibilities. (Goss 27)

The specific encodings that begin to develop in early modern England are, in fact, a result of the repressive workings of homophobic power.

[39]To the guardians of the English Literary Canon (I will use the acronym ELC from here on where appropriate), "of course, heterosexuality has always existed" (Sedgwick, Epistemology 52). This kind of logical inconsistency, bland stupidity at its worst, effaces difference, dismisses (as Sedgwick argues) the very possibility for serious discussion about histories of sexuality.

[40]Again, this is an issue that is important to the keepers of the ELC. I question the merits, however, of biographical criticism. Who can say, with any assurance, what Shakespeare did? Until we are offered DNA tests (clearly an impossibility here), one argument is as valid as the next in my view. Even in terms of affirmative gay identity politics, making claims about homosexualities is as

presumptuous and silly as heterosexist claims always are. What is important here is what Shakespeare said, how his words reflect and contribute to ideologies out of which he writes, and how those ideologies contribute to larger discursive histories.

[41]The term "homosexual" is inaccurate here because it suggests a lifestyle, a sub-culture, and a set of social practices that locate and bind a community within a definable identity. Acts do not constitute identities. There is no "homosexual" *identity* that Olivia (even if she were attracted to women) could call herself a part of.

[42]I recently saw Beeban Kidron's To Wong Foo, Thanks for Everything! Julie Newmar (1995) and left the theatre stunned by the film's normalizing of the queer as spectacle. The audience's laughter was directed at the three gay men like bullets. The theatre was packed. The racist marketing ploy of the title (a good one-third of the audience was Asian in a city where the Asian population is much below one-third) was matched by the subtle representation of racist hierarchies in the film itself. The film's authority and queen of drag is the white Vida Boheme (Patrick Swayze); the African-American Noxeema Jackson (Wesley Snipes) is the rising queen, educated in queenly etiquette by the white queen; the Hispanic-American, Chi Chi Rodriguez (John Leguizamo), is the lowest in the hierarchy and goes along to Hollywood only on the beneficence of his white superior

(black Noxeema being mostly against the kind of largesse white Vita shows). The film stands as only the latest example of the confluence of the discourses that normalize racism and homophobia.

[43]Perhaps this emasculation is something that men need to get over, an unhappy hurdle that men must jump as they travel the early modern road of love to marriage and connubial bliss; but the emasculation here seems less a question of defenceless against love than impotence against women, of disempowerment and unmanly helplessness before what is perceived as a woman's power to seduce a man's will. In Act 3, scene 1 of the play, Angilo and Julio discuss this issue at some length, Angilo confessing that he is "fraile" (3.1.58) before what he sees as the woman's power to seduce men. Of course, in such a schema, the man's emotional immaturity and subsequent feelings of disempowerment and emasculation become the woman's fault. It is less an matter of love that men have to deal with than it is a need for control and emotional autonomy.

[44]Lelia is (according to the list of characters) "wanton and cunning." She has a voice, but it is not a good one--at one point, she says that she would make love to her father: "I have turn'd the reverence of a childe/ Into the hot affection of a Lover" (4.4.167-8), she says, presumably still believing her father to be a suitor, even though he has, by this point, already revealed himself. So

disagreeable is her voice that Angilo wants to silence her and her waiting woman by force, to "bind'em, and then gag'em, and then throw 'em/ Into a coach" (4.4.272-3).

[45]I am indebted to Mark Breitenberg for this phrase, though he uses the term more to describe sexual jealousy than gender anxieties.

Chapter 3

Making the Other Mad: Early Modern Discourses that Write the Mad Other

> . . . to define true madness, what is't but to be nothing else but mad? (Hamlet, 2.2.93-4)

> To read madness sanely is to miss the point; to read madness madly is to have one's point be missed.
> (Carol Thomas Neely, "Reading Madness and Gender")

It is almost too obvious to comment that madness and alterity are linked. Not so obvious are what madness means, how it is deployed as an instrument of disenfranchisement, and why it functions so effectively in collaboration with the gratuitous racism, sexism, and homophobia that hang fetid in the pores of so much early modern material. Unfortunately, madness is not an easy issue to discuss. The problems here are methodological: how is one to define, read, or discuss early modern madness, firstly as a term, and secondly as a participant in multi-faceted social processes that designate alterity?

Defining (and reading) madness has always been a tricky business. Any definition of madness is always three things: 1) it is arbitrary, 2) it is historically

contingent[1], and 3) it is committed to defining kinds of alterity (variously physical, psychological, or spiritual). To label someone mad is to draw borders between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour; it is the expulsion of a person into an Otherness from which there is little or no possibility for discursive redress; it is an exclusion or confinement from the presumably defining features of humanity. In theoretical terms, we are on fairly solid ground so far, but as soon as we begin to consider how it is that real men's and women's lives are regulated by competing definitions of madness and sanity (either in the early modern period or today), then our grounding becomes less stable. Moreover, in the many early modern constructions of madness, the discourses of race, sexuality, gender, and class bump into and collaborate with each other in designating varied levels of alterity. Finding the discursive collisions and following the collusions is difficult and painstaking work. Legal, theological, clinical, literary, and pulp discourses communicate and collaborate amongst themselves, inter-textualizing madness and making definitional ontologies difficult--but they must be addressed. First, though, we need to look at some of the methodological failures that plague the field in order that we may avoid them.

METHODOLOGIES

Separating fact from fiction, of course, is a problem.

Both in the early modern period and today, there is literary madness and there is real madness, and the line separating these categories is blurred or, at times, indecipherable.[2] Both categories are important to my discussions here, since they are in dialogue with each other.

Yet, there are many conscientious scholars in the field who have either not been able or have not wanted to analyse the links among the many cultural artifacts that construct early modern madness. This failure has resulted in what we might call discursively unifocal readings. In her in many ways scrupulous and broad-scoped Madness and Literature (1980), Lillian Feder, for instance, argues for a discursively unifocal literary approach. She claims that "for an examination of madness in King Lear, most sixteenth-century theoretical studies of madness have only a peripheral interest" (113). Have only peripheral interest? For whom is it peripheral and why? Naïve discussions about early modern madness are, of course, nothing new among literary scholars.

Henry Somerville's ahistorical Madness in Shakespearean Tragedy (1929) is similarly naïve. As Wyndham Lewis explains with praise in the Preface, Somerville "treats the characters of Shakespeare as though they were living persons in our midst" (1). Firstly, they are not real people, and secondly these fictional people are not from our time (or Somerville's). Edgar Allison Peers in Elizabethan Drama

and Its Mad Folk (1914) at least discusses the historical and cultural milieu produced by and producing early modern drama, but Peers does not discuss any causal links or relationships. Robert Rentoul Reed's Bedlam on the Jacobean Stage (1970) is promisingly contextual but methodologically ridiculous. Reed observes but is not terribly concerned about the dearth of actual clinical material from Jacobean England and suggests that we can "judge the psychopathic ancestors by their descendants" (7)--the assumption here is that madness is a universal, a definition of being that is a constant, that transcends both time and place. Reed then seems to suggest that there is no real difference between drama and history by arguing that "we must then turn to the Jacobean dramatic representations of Bedlamites and interpret the original through the copy" (6)--this kind of argument, of course, erroneously collapses clinical and cultural terms without adequately defining either.

Indeed, not a lot of work has been done in terms of addressing the ways that early modern madness is a construct enmeshed in specific social institutions, economic practices, and cultural regulatory mechanisms. For the most part, critics studying madness in literature ignore the psychiatric history (or histories) of early modern madness, and numerous critics have recently noted this: Neely, in a discussion about the lack of research in the field, says that "the Renaissance is a black hole" ("Recent Work" 779);[3]

in a critique of Foucault's Madness and Civilizat-ion, H.C. Erik Midelfort argues that "as for the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the waters [of the history of madness] are largely uncharted" (252); Roy Porter reminds us that the period is "curiously ill-researched as a whole" (viii) but does not remedy the problem--his book begins with Restoration madness and moves to the Regency; and Michael MacDonald argues that "both the unfortunates who actually suffered from mental afflictions and the men and women who tried to help them still inhabit *terra incognita*" (1-2). MacDonald's book is perhaps the most thorough and impressive work in the field, and it addresses both the cultural constructions of insanity and the clinical practices.

My approach here will be 1) of necessity, to work toward a definition of madness through early modern legal, clinical, literary, and pulp texts (with reference to theoretical issues recently under discussion among a circle of French intellectuals), and 2) to discuss the ways in which discourses of madness function (often in collaboration with other marginalizing discourses) in specific literary texts to create what Leslie Fiedler calls "the borderline figure who defines the limits of the human" (15).

TOWARD DEFINITIONS

If we are to understand the confluent discourses and histories that produce madnesses and alterities in literature, then we need to recognize first that different

discourses use different terms for madness, both in the early modern period and today. Early modern legal discourses use the term "lunacy." The discourses of clinical[4] psychology have two branches: theoretical and applied. Theoretical clinical psychology, for the most part, uses the term "melancholy," while applied clinical psychology uses a varied set of adjectivals (discussed below). Pulp discourses use any of a variety of terms, and often associate madness with with drunkenness, despair, or suicide. Literary discourses also run the gamut of phrases and, unlike legal discourses, for example, use no specialized or single term to describe madness.

A brief look now at the parameters that the various early modern discourses draw for madness will help give us an understanding of conceptions of early modern madness.

i. Legal discourses--While English law prior to the nineteenth century does *relatively* little to define madness, by the time of Elizabeth, "the law divided those of unsound mind into two classes--the idiot and the lunatic" (Holdsworth I; 474). Citing statutory sources, Sir William Holdsworth defines the "idiot" as one who is born *non compos mentis* and "hath had no understanding from his nativity," while the "lunatic" is "one who hath had understanding, but . . . hath lost the use of his reason" (I; 474, n.2). Early modern English legal discourses formally offer little more than what these two definitions offer, but there are

implied definitions in the conceptual linkages in questions about the guardianship of "infants, lunatics, and idiots" (X; 356); about land ownership rights of "infants, lunatics, and *femes covert* [married women]" (XI; 590); and about the boundaries of enfranchisement in general--for instance, "the wardship of the lands and person of those of unsound mind" went either to a lord or to the crown (I; 473). Clearly, there is a correlation between alterity and questions of property ownership: the Other has no landholding rights. Children cannot own property. Married women cannot. Jews cannot.[5] People deemed mad cannot.

It is significant that of the fairly sparse legal material extant dealing with madness in the Renaissance (of which I have given only a representative sampling), the emphasis is clearly economic. The Other is defined legally through statutory disenfranchisement.

ii. Clinical discourses: Theoretical and Applied

a] Theoretical--The clinical theories that attempt to define and delineate madness in the early modern period are expansive, embracing both English scholarship and continental theories in translation. Perhaps the period's most comprehensive compendium, one unquestionably deserving far more attention than I can possibly give it here, is Robert Burton's The Anatomy of Melancholy (1621). It enjoyed great popularity, going through five editions during Burton's lifetime. It theorizes causes of mental disorders

that range from the strictly clinical (fear and grief in particular) to the strictly medical (an abundance of black bile). More entertaining at times than instructive, with its great digressions and wild speculations about sometimes entirely tangential issues, The Anatomy of Melancholy is, nevertheless, an important document that locates (and participates in maintaining) a confluence among issues of sexuality, gender, and madness.

Apologue 1--c.February 1973

> *We are told, from the time that we first recognize our homosexual feelings, that our love for other human beings is sick, childish, and subject to "cure." We are told that we are emotional cripples, forever condemned to an emotional status below that of the "whole" people who run the world. The result of this in many cases is to contribute to a self-image that often lowers the sights we set for ourselves in life, and many of us asked ourselves, "How could anybody love me?" or "How can I love somebody who must be just as sick as I am?" (reproduced in Bayer 119, from a memo to the American Psychiatric Association)*

Until December 15, 1973, The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)--the bible of definitions for the American Psychiatric Association--diagnosed

homosexuality as a "sociopathic personality disturbance" (Goss 45). Any act "not usually associated with coitus" (DSM-II 44) qualified (or could qualify) as a "sexual deviation" and, ipso facto, as a "mental disorder."

Changes in the DSM (specifically the removal of homosexuality as a mental disorder), however, do not necessarily mean changes in the perceptions about gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. As recently as June 12, 1995, the ultra-conservative Alberta Report, in two overtly homophobic articles about gay rights, dig up a psychologist who believes that "homosexuality is a personality disorder and a symptom of a fragile identity" (Sillars 31) and a sociologist who argues about the "pathological nature of homosexuality" (Woodard 30).

In partition 3, section 2, member 1, subsection 2 of The Anatomy of Melancholy, Robert Burton discusses non-procreative male sexuality as apparently both a form and a cause of melancholy (but Burton does not make the distinction between cause and form very clear in this section). Burton's disquisition is otherwise remarkably explicit, discussing, among other things, intercourse among men, male orificial pleasures, masturbation, and so on. The love that dare not speak its name, or what Burton calls "a nastiness and abomination even to speak of" (653), is spoken of here--but not in English. The section was

originally set off in Latin.

Winfried Schleiner has recently argued that Burton's use of Latin for a disquisition about sodomy becomes particularly important when we consider that "few women of the period would have had the Latin to read it," and he suggests that "a twelve-year-old grammar school student in the early seventeenth century [would] have [had] enough Latin to read" it (173).[6] Effectively, this chapter is a homophobic warning directed more or less exclusively at an audience of educated men and boys that can read it, even though much of the chapter also discusses female sexualities. In addition to discussions of "those wanton-loined womanlings, Tribadas," Burton discusses numerous classical examples of bestiality, necrophilia, Pygmalionism, and so on--clearly, while the intended audience is male, the title ("How Love tyrannizeth over men") is somewhat misleading. All kinds of non-procreative sex are touched on--and, significantly, most of the actors are foreign (like the language in which the tales and examples are told).

Burton very clearly and unmistakably identifies same-sex desire with foreigners: of sodomy, Burton claims that "this vice was customary in old times with the Orientals, the Greeks without question, the Italians, Africans, Asiaticks" (651). Burton also clearly and unmistakably locates same-sex desire not so much with bestiality (though he does that too) as with bestialism: "this tyrant Love

rageth with brute beasts" (650). Bestiality is merely a manifestation of bestialism. It is more the acting like an animal than with one that seems to be foregrounded, and the comparisons of the Other with the bestial that obtain both in Burton and in other early modern works (discussed in more detail below) would seem to support this claim.

For Burton, then, same-sex desire is (and leads to) a form of madness that is strongly influenced by racial factors. We witness here the collusion of two discourses: one homophobic, the other racist, both Othering.

In Burton's Anatomy, melancholy comes off as an almost fashionable ailment that afflicts men of letters; women, however, are also afflicted, but the causes are less intellectual and more corporeal. In partition 1, section 3, member 2, subsection 4, Burton pontificates on maids, nuns, and widows. He claims that "heart and brain [are] offended by those vicious vapours which come from menstrual blood" (353). (Incidently, the most heated debate for the editors of the DSM-IV [1994] was whether or not to include "Pre-Menstrual Syndrome" as a mental disorder.)[7] Burton's linking of personality issues and reproductive organs in women is, of course, part of a larger set of anti-feminist medical preoccupations in the early modern period concerned with defining hysteria.

Hysteria, generally defined in early modern England "as a disease caused by the woman's uterous which floats about

her body attacking her . . . usually [signifying] some aberration in the woman's sexual constitution" (Little 20), is on a par with witchcraft, and, in fact, "the symptoms of bewitchment and hysteria are identical" (Neely, "'Documents'" 320). Edward Jorden delineates his clinical theory in A Briefe Discovrse of a Disease Called the Suffocation of the Mother (1603), where he attempts to distinguish between bewitchment and hysteria. He cites two main causes of the disease: internal and external. The "internall causes may be anything contained within the bodie, as spirit, blood, humors, excrements, &c" (F3[V]).[8] Jorden identifies the primary external causes as "meate and drinke" (G2[R]).

Sources of early modern theoretical clinical commentary about madness are abundant (and I have only taken a very meagre sampling here),[9] but even in this small selection, we can see relationships between discursive productions of madness and issues about homosexuality, gender, bestiality, ethnicity, and race. Of the actual clinical practices in early modern England geared to curing madness, relatively little factual data is available, but some *myths* have grown around applied clinical practices (particularly of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital).

b] Applied--The two most visible clinical practices about which much is known are those of the Reverend Richard Napier and of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital (also known variously as Bethlem Hospital, Bethlem, or Bedlam).

Michael MacDonald offers a review and analysis of Richard Napier's practice in Mystical Bedlam (1981), a synthesis of "more than two thousand descriptions of insane and troubled people" (13). Even this is a small fraction of Napier's actual clientele. During his practice, which began in 1597 and lasted thirty-seven years, it is conceivable that some "sixty thousand people journeyed to . . . consult him" (MacDonald 26)--but his patients, who came from all walks of life, came with all sorts of complaints, mental ailments being only one type.

While MacDonald is careful to point out that Napier's mental patients came from all rungs of the social ladder, he also notes that 99 out of 767 clients in one region "complained about economic misfortunes" and that "debt was by far the greatest single source of anxiety" (67). The implications for servants are important. MacDonald notes that "service was a childlike, dependent status, which deprived adults of their dignity and autonomy" (86). The master/slave dialectic is an important one not only as it relates to madness and alterity but as it is, apart from madness, an Othering dialectic in itself. One has only to consider the abused Caliban.

The servant is, to be sure, often a part of the early modern household and family. According to MacDonald, however, "many households in early modern England harbored a Caliban, a 'servant-monster,' partly adult, partly child,

partly domestic beast of burden" (85), and only slightly above the status of a slave, with little or no freedom to choose partners or lifestyles.[10] In compiling Napier's studies, MacDonald finds that the stresses from abrogated liberties are a major cause of madness in early modern England. Other causes he notes are unhappy marriages, grief, and anxiety.[11] The many detailed lists and tables MacDonald offers are testaments both to his scholarship and to Napier's scrupulous note-taking skills.

If Napier's work is an unambiguously documented example of a clinical practice, Bedlam is, in many ways, the locus of confusion between those discourses that are fictional and those that have historical veracity. The early modern stage is teeming with references to Bedlam, Bedlamites, and Tom O'Bedlams, but, as Patricia Allderidge wryly comments in a persuasive discussion about the fictionalized accounts of Bethlem Hospital, "the best-known facts about Bethlem will stand up to very little examination" ("Bedlam" 24). In particular, Allderidge is concerned with correcting commonly held misconceptions about treatment in Bethlem. One conclusion she makes is that although there was inhumane treatment of the mentally afflicted, standard procedure at the hospital was not brutality, and

> at least some of the inhumane treatment stemmed as much from the total inadequacy of everyone concerned when faced with the very real fact of

> violent and dangerous patients, as from any deeply held belief in the nature of insanity or the animality of the insane. (27)

The mad are radically Other.[12] Andrew Scull argues in Museums of Madness (1979) that

> in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century practice, the madman in confinement was treated no better than a beast; for that was precisely what, according to the prevailing paradigm of insanity, he was. (64)

Scull is surely mistaken in making this kind of blanket statement: the mad are not always treated like animals. But there is certainly considerable support for the general view linking the mad with the bestial.[13] I think that what is more important for us to note here, though, is the unspoken (and uncriticized) ideology in the "animal treatment" concept. Cruelty is implied. If we treat someone like an animal, then we are being cruel. This is as true in the Renaissance as it is today. We uncritically and unreflectively accept the position that to be treated like an animal means to have one's rights ignored. And to be called an animal is to have one's rights to decent treatment jeopardized.

Of course, advocates for animals' rights will quickly contend that it is unfair to label people with animal names for vices that are human. As Samuel Taylor Coleridge

Tom O'Bedlam
Adapted from: O'Donoghue (134b)

Indian Torchbearer, 1613. Inigo Jones
Adapted from: Honour (94)

FIGURE 1[14]

SIMILARITIES IN THE VISUAL REPRESENTATION
OF OLD AND NEW WORLD OTHERS

suggested, "to call human vices 'bestial' was to libel the animals" (Thomas 41). Certainly as more feminist geography courses, environmental ethics studies, and research and theorizing of cartographies develop (not to mention increasingly alarming ozone alerts), perhaps more serious attention will be spent on the ridiculed question of "animal rights."

I find it laughable that Allderidge is so self-congratulatory about asking questions "which would probably be most improper for historians to concern themselves with" (27) when, totally unquestioningly, she uses phrases like "no better than a beast" (27). What does "better" here mean? And in what way? At this stage in my argument, there should be a familiar pattern of association starting to emerge--namely, of the Other with the bestial. So far, we have seen women and animals, blacks and animals, Jews and animals, and now madpeople and animals linked. Perhaps it is a trivial coincidence, but I think we do well to bear in mind a position Peter Singer advances: he argues that

> the racist violates the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of his own race when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of those of another race. The sexist violates the principle of equality by favoring the interests of his own sex. Similarly, the speciesist allows the

> interests of his own species to override the greater interests of members of other species. The pattern is identical in each case. (9)

The pattern is indeed similar, and when we remember that animals are part of the natural world, we see that bestializing the Other implies a generalized environmental loathing, which I will go into in more detail in chapter 4. For the time being, it is sufficient to note merely that clinical discourses bestialize the mad in an attempt to reinforce conceptual separations of the mad from the human community.

iii. Pulp discourses

Apologue 2--March 1995, Edmonton

On a desperate search for my car in the West Edmonton Mall parking lot once, I noticed a man in a pick-up truck reading The National Enquirer. *He was obviously deeply involved with it, since I could see only the top of what must have been a cowboy hat. The front page broadcasted a story about a 98 year old woman in Akron (I think) who had given birth to twins. I felt more troubled by the Edmonton man than by the Akron woman. I had to wonder if he had read any good books lately, and whether he could tell me anything about anything that I consider important. I know that what he was reading has a very real appeal. Not long after this incident, CNN did a very sobre (bordering on tedious) report about invitro fertilization and discussed the pros and cons*

of "seniors" (CNN used that word) giving birth. I had to wonder if the man from the parking lot was watching. I was suddenly stricken with fear that The National Enquirer had written a worthy news article, and I felt a bit cheated that the pick-up truck man had gotten something I had haughtily scorned--so I sat and watched, waiting, blinking like domestic fowl, half-hoping for a chunk of verification. From what I could gather, no ninety-eight year old had recently (or ever) given birth.

Whether or not anyone believes the outrageous stories of pulp media is not my concern. The point here is that pulp reaches a broad constituency. Moreover, pulp often reflects a society's preoccupations. Broadside ballads are early modern England's equivalent to The National Enquirer in Canada and America. As Joy Wiltenburg points out, "illiterate as well as literate hearers were open to the appeal of these works," whose main contribution to early modern representations of madness "was to examine madness along its boundary with the normal round of social interaction . . . [through a series of] stylized portraits ranging from melodrama to social comedy" (102).

Wiltenburg notes the similarities among issues that the clinical and the popular media address (such as the causal relationships among love, familial tensions, and madness), but among the numerous significant differences between the popular and the more elite discourses, there is one that

Wiltenburg does not call much attention to. The ballads, more than any other discourse dealing with madness in the early modern period, make consistent and broad links between madness and drunkenness. The link between madness and drunkenness is a logical connection for popular media to make, I would think, since the effects of alcohol are a fairly common and easily recognized experience.

A ballad entitled "The Woeful Lamentation of William Purcas" is a somewhat characteristic representation of drunkenness as a form of temporary insanity that separates the person from the human community:

> Man is no man when he is drunke,
> for drinke doth reason sway.
> O, what's a drunkard then,
> of reason dispossest?
> As other creatures reasonlesse,
> he is a brutish beast. (11.159-64)

Reason, here, is the distinguishing feature of the human from the bestial Other, and alcohol is at the root of this kind of alterity. Of course, discussions about drunkenness as a form of insanity are not exclusive to the ballads. As we shall see below, drunkenness does come up in implicit relationships to madness in literature as well, but the point here is that the ballads explore the issue more deeply and offer it to a broader constituency.

iv. Literary discourses--In Middleton and Rowley's The

Changeling, Isabella's conception of madness, unquestioned by the play, is that the afflicted

> . . . act their fantasies in any shapes
> Suiting their present thoughts; if sad, they cry;
> If mirth be their conceit, they laugh again.
> Sometimes they imitate beasts and birds,
> Singing or howling, braying, barking; all
> As their wild fancies prompt 'em. (3.3.190-5)

Madness here is linked up with a lack of control (particularly of language) and with bestiality.

In Hamlet, the Gentleman who introduces Ophelia articulates a similar conception of madness: according to the Gentleman, Ophelia

> . . . hems, and beats her heart,
> Spurns enviously at straws, speaks things in doubt
> That carry but half sense. Her speech is nothing,
> Yet the unshaped use of it doth move
> The hearers to collection. They aim at it,
> And botch the words up to fit their own thoughts,
> Which, as her winks and nods and gestures yield them,
> Indeed would make one think that there might be thought
> Though nothing sure, yet much unhappily.
> (4.5.5-13)

Again, issues of voice and control are mobilized in the

production of madness in Hamlet.[15]

In King Lear, Edgar's view involves similar ideas about self-abandonment and lack of control: madness is the person "brought near to beast" (2.3.9), with dirty face and knotted hair (11.9-10),[16] broken syntax and senseless ravings, a subject ultimately deprived of itself,[17] a subject deprived of bodily definition and limits, with neither house nor clothes to redraw those definitions and limits. The mad here is naked, homeless, and abject: "un-/ accommodated man is no more but such a poor,/ bare forked animal" (3.4.104-6), Lear raves, "tearing off his clothes" (SD, 1.107). Indeed, the abundant images of bareness, exposure, vulnerability, homelessness, and lack of control associated with madness deftly identify madness as a class issue in this play.

Questions about control are also central to the definition of madness that The Duchess of Malfi arrives at.[18] Ferdinand gets himself into quite a dither over his sister, so much that even the Cardinal questions his passions: "Why do you make yourself so wild a tempest?" (2.5.16-7). Indeed, why? Ferdinand carries on with his raving madness, and Cardinal continues to question his brother on the vehemence of his passion:

> How idly shows this rage which carries you,
> As men conveyed by witches through the air,
> On violent whirlwinds! This intemperate noise

Fitly resembles deaf men's shrill discourse,
Who talk aloud thinking all other men
To have their imperfection. (11.49-54)

Ferdinand asks "Have you not my palsy?" Cardinal responds:

Yes--I can be angry
Without this rupture. There is not in nature
A thing that makes a man so deformed, so beastly,
As doth intemperate anger. (11.55-9)

This little interchange is very revealing. Cardinal's initial comments here link madness with women: Ferdinand's rage carries him "as men conveyed by witches" (1.48), and although not all witches were women, more were women than men. The interchange also raises the question of voice.

Theorizing

Apologue 3--December 1994-January 1995

I know a young woman (a mother of four) in northern Alberta who was recently subjected to electro-convulsive therapy (ECT). She had been a student of mine but had to drop after her Christmas treatments. She had been the top student in her class. I had coffee with her a few times after her treatments, and she was a different person than the one she had been before the treatments. She seemed less intelligent. She is a concert pianist and a painter. She is also financially dependent upon her emotionally abusive husband (as far as I could tell by her comments and the

consensus in the community). She often sees no way out of her situation and is also often suicidal. She feels that she has no voice and no place, nowhere to go but the hospital, and the hospital told her that she could only stay if she allowed them to give her ECT treatment. So, every now and then, she goes in and gets hundreds of thousands of synapses electrically neutralized. The question here is logical enough: why? Is she crazy? Is madness a useful term? What are the uses of madness? In northern Alberta, certainly, madness is a label or a tool that men and doctors use to silence or otherwise control disruptive, aberrant, or unruly natures or voices.

However we categorize madness, we must have, at this point, a set of working terms, and in any definition of madness, issues of silence and voice must take centre stage.

Silence is important not only as a sometimes presumed sign of madness but as a question in the very possibility of madness voicing itself. As Shoshana Felman urges, echoing Foucault, madness is "still prevented from speaking for itself, in a language of its own" ("Foucault/Derrida" 40).[19] Foucault's self-assigned task in Madness and Civilization is to give "the archaeology of that silence" (xi), to give voice, in other words, to a silence that somehow manifests or voices itself, despite its apparent muteness. But, as Jacques Derrida asks (35), might we not question whether or

not a history of silence is, in fact, possible; whether or not an archaeology (even of silence) isn't itself "an organised language . . . an order"; and whether or not madness can be anywhere but outside of language?

In a sophisticated and sometimes difficult way, Derrida argues that language is reason and that madness (the absence of reason) is necessarily outside of language: "madness is indeed, essentially and generally, silence, stifled speech" (54). The essence of madness here is silence. Madness, therefore, resists representation for Derrida.[20] For Foucault, on the other hand, literature ultimately presents the "authentic voice of madness" (Felman, "Foucault/Derrida" 48). If he is seriously attempting to trace the ideological origins of madness, then Foucault's position is clearly an impossible one. The authentic voice of madness, if it is to be found at all, is not to be found in literature. As for Derrida's equally impossible suggestion that madness cannot be represented, we might offer a friendly amendment: madness cannot be faithfully represented, especially in literature.

ISSUES OF REPRESENTATION and VOICE

To represent madness on the stage is a difficult thing. With the representation any category of alterity, we might expect distortion. Edward Said describes the problems of representation: "to represent someone or even something has now become an endeavour as complex and as problematic as an

asymptote, with consequences for certainty and decidability as fraught with difficulties as can be imagined" (206). As Shoshana Felman argues, representation, "to 'speak in the name of,' to 'speak for,' could thus mean . . . to appropriate and to silence" ("Women and Madness" 137). Deciding how to apprehend early modern dramatic representations of madness, too, is fraught with implications, since any reading strategy is itself a decision to engage a representational strategy. We should remember also that the characters in drama read the madness of others. In Twelfth Night, the Clown's reading strategy constructs a madness that isn't there--when Olivia asks him "Art thou mad" (5.1.294), he says "No, madam, I do but read madness" (1.295). Clearly, though, he does more than merely read what he calls madness: he tells Olivia that she "must allow *vox*" (11.296-7)--which is to say that he wants to read it an exaggeratedly campy style, a mad voice. His *reading*, then, is a *voicing* of madness, but he is clearly misrepresenting the voice of madness.

Literary representations of madness say less about madness than about conceptions of alterity. In a fictional world, characters may be mad. We have to accept that. But "to read these examples as faithful reproductions of observed phenomena in the real world" (Salkeld 34) is to assume that representation is reality. It is not. Moreover, the question of the madness of a character like

Hamlet, for instance, is irresolvable, since we have no real frame of reference with which to answer the question. We do not know what, precisely, is "madness" in the fictional world Hamlet inhabits. And the social setting is fictional, though places are real enough. The madness is likewise fictional, though the term is real enough.

As the history of Hamlet criticism shows, however, scholars insist on determining whether or not Hamlet is mad rather than on looking at the ways in which the "antic disposition" he assumes works for him. There is no real reason to assume, for example, that Hamlet's "antic disposition" is any less potent a form of madness than Ophelia's apparently less conscious, less controlled behaviours are.[21] Like Ophelia, Hamlet grapples with and, at one point, at least, seems to lose to "madness": the pressure of everything, not the least of which is Ophelia's tender affections for him, seems to have become too much for him, and he complains vaguely that "it hath made/ me mad" (3.1.148-9). While the antecedent of the third person pronoun here is vague, it is in keeping with the tenor of the play that "it" refers to the anticipated emotions attending a possible romantic relationship with Ophelia. If we simply have to take Hamlet at his word when he says "that I essentially am not in madness/ But mad in craft" (3.4.189-90), then we would perhaps do well to take seriously all of the apparent nonsense that the apparently

mad Ophelia speaks. Such has not been the critical tradition. One of the implications of producing such a reading that listens to Ophelia is that we will hear a voice that players and critics alike have ignored and silenced.

R.D. Laing, for instance, hearing no comprehensible voice from Ophelia, claims that

> in her madness, she is not a person. There is no integral selfhood expressed through her actions or utterances. Incomprehensible statements are said by nothing. She has already died. There is now a vacuum where there was once a person. (212, n.1)

The argument here is clear enough: the lack of a comprehensible voice results in the lack of a selfhood in Laing's view, which means that the absence of a comprehensible voice essentially constitutes madness. David Leverenz offers a different view: Ophelia is an amalgam of other people's voices, "all making sense, and none of them her own" (112), and her madness is the result more of noise than of emptiness and silence.[22]

Clearly, issues of speech and silence are central to this play, and it is the nature of the Other here to be silenced. "To be" means "to speak." It is the men who speak, who express their desires, and who indeed have difficulties not speaking.[23] Speech is the defining feature both of humanity and of men: "a beast . . . wants discourse of reason" (1.2.150), while men speak with reason. Reason

does not include emotions. It is both unmanly and unclean for a man to speak with unbridled emotion, as we see in Hamlet's complaints about his emotions: "I, the son of a dear father murder'd," he laments, ". . . / Must like a whore unpack my heart with words/ And fall a-cursing like a very drab,/ A scullion" (2.2.579-83).

Questions about voice and silence are also linked with madness in The Duchess of Malfi. In their stychomythiac, frenzied, misogynist admonitions to the Duchess, Ferdinand and the Cardinal hardly let their sister get a word in, and she finally has to blurt out her irritation: "Will you hear me?" (1.1.301). Ferdinand especially does not want to hear her and later tells her "Do not speak" (3.2.74) when she attempts to explain her marriage. Moreover, he insists that the Duchess and her husband (Ferdinand at this point does not know who the husband is) keep absolutely silent and not identify the Duchess' husband. Ferdinand tells her "If thou do love him, cut out thine own tongue/ Lest it bewray him" (3.2.108-9). But, of course, the Duchess of Malfi dramatizes the way that they will *not* hear her: she needn't cut out her tongue, since they have all but plugged their ears.

The problem is that the Duchess is strong-willed and tenacious. Her decision to remarry shows a determination and tenacity that Cariola, for instance, sees as "a fearful madness" (1.1.506). The Duchess knows what she wants.

She also knows her own mind and is not as easy to manipulate as the men around her would wish. The Duchess' response to "the wild consort of madmen" (4.2.1-2) is opposite to what Ferdinand had expected. The Duchess wants noise: "nothing but noise and folly," she says, "Can keep me in my right wits, whereas reason/ And silence make me stark mad" (11.5-7). She knows that she is "not mad" (4.2.24 & 26), and she expresses this knowledge twice. But Ferdinand wants to make (or believe) her mad.[24]

In The White Devil, voice and madness are again linked. When Cornelia is speaking against Flamineo and his sister Vittoria's behaviours, Bracciano attempts to silence her by hurling the label of madness at her: "Fie, fie, the woman's mad" (1.2.297), he says. The statement is short but ideologically loaded, and the specification of gender here is not gratuitous. This is the same Bracciano who later says that "Woman to man/ Is either a god or a wolf" (4.2.91-2). We may rest assured that a woman who talks is no god to Bracciano. Women talking are "women howling" (5.3.37), mad wolves to him.

Cornelia is not the only woman to express her right to speak: Vittoria does too and is met with a similar reaction, but by Francisco. Vittoria's self-expression is a bit different from Cornelia's: Vittoria expresses anger, and Francisco says "now by my birth you are a foolish, mad,/ And jealous woman" (2.1.264-5). Similarly, when she says that

the men are committing "a rape, a rape" of justice, Monticelso says "Fie she's mad" (3.2.275). Accusations of madness and mental deformity are again clearly a silencing strategy.

SIGNS OF MADNESS: DEFORMITIES

Madness is reconstituted in the Renaissance. In the Middle Ages, it "marked the intersection of the human and the transcendent" (Neely, "'Documents'" 317). At this time, demoniacal possession was a holistic experience, deforming body and mind: as Edgar Allison Peers reports,

> it was made to account not only for mental disease but for all kinds of physical deformations and imperfections, whether occurring alone, or, as is often the case, accompanying idiocy. (8)

The tradition resonates but is waning in the Renaissance. Exorcisms to cure madness are staged in Shakespeare--for instance, in Twelfth Night[25]--and the language of possession, as Salkeld notes, is also found in such plays as King Lear and The Comedy of Errors, but "in each case what [is] referred to in such language are cases of *spurious* possession. The spiritual potency of the terms has been 'emptied out', to use Greenblatt's phrase" (Salkeld 25--see also Greenblatt, "Exorcists" 119). But if the spiritual connection is subsiding, the corporeal is taking prominence.

The Dover Cliff scene in King Lear, one might argue, is an exorcism scene,[26] and it describes a powerful interest in

the body as the site of disorder. After allowing his deceived and blinded father to hurl himself off the imaginary cliff, Edgar swaps the mad Tom disguise for the disguise of a passer-by and in this disguise tells his father that he watched him fall and asks about the "thing" that parted from the old man "upon the crown o'th'cliff" (4.6.67-8). Edgar then goes on to explain the imaginary departure of the imaginary evil spirit:

> As I stood here below methought his eyes
> Were two full moons; he had a thousand noses,
> Horns whelk'd and wav'd like the enridged sea;
> It was some fiend; therefore, thou happy father,
> Think that the clearest Gods, who make them honours
> Of men's impossibilities, have preserved thee.
> (69-74)

This "exorcism" cures Edgar's "madness."[27] The imaginary deformed monster with lunatic eyes and a thousand noses is gone, and so is one layer of Edgar's marginality.[28]

Deformity is produced at numerous sites and in various terms in the English Renaissance. One thing seems relatively clear: there are intersections among the various marginalizing discourses: the terrain over which madness is mapped is colored in spots with the discourses of hybridity[29] and deformity, which themselves sketch a cultural landscape that privileges men. As Susan Schoon

Eberly points out, women are both implicitly and explicitly held responsible for monstrous births and deformed children.[30]

Deformities hobble and twitch all over the Renaissance stage. In The Changeling, it is Antonio in the comic subplot who first draws a real connection between madness and deformity. His honey-tongued flirtations with the young Isabella are less than successful, and the text suggests a reason: Antonio seems to embody a conflict between class and discourse, as suggested by Isabella's comment to him, "you become not your tongue/ When you speak from your clothes" (3.3.168-9). He is dressed like a "madman"--presumably in a uniform distributed to all the tenants of the institution in which he counterfeits his madness. He promises to change his appearance: "I shall behold my own deformity/ And dress myself up fairer" (3.3.183-4). He sees (or at least refers to) his mad attire as a "deformity."

Part of what is going on with the discrepancy between how Antonio talks and how he looks, then, has something to do with class. Madness is a deformity; it is also an exclusion from Isabella's class. Certainly by the time we have reached the end of the play, the metonymic implications of deformity are secured: Beatrice's deformity is a kind of madness, and, again, class is involved. Alsemero tells her that she is "all deformed" (5.3.77), and it is clear that

deformity is a highly charged ideological register--she is only deformed now because she doesn't fit in with the ideological biases of his class.

A large part of what this play deals with is the boundaries of discourse--courtly and bawdy--and, as Michael Scott has observed, the play investigates "two people of different classes--Beatrice and De Flores--breaking down the barriers of their respective discourses and seeing what follows as a result" (7). Moreover, "it is as ridiculous for her to think of having a relationship with De Flores as it is for Olivia to be in love with Malvolio in Shakespeare's Twelfth Night" (26). Thus it is also a transgressive desire that we see in Diaphanta, who is quite below Alsemero (in terms of class), yet she desires (and has sex with) him. Nevertheless, she implores him to "think but upon the distance that creation/ Set 'twixt thy blood and mine, and keep thee there" (3.4.130-1). What we have in this play, as Scott seems to suggest (32), is a radically unstable social household where people act out their transgressive fantasies, in spite of themselves at times.

Action and identity are important in this play. Beatrice, for example, is defined by her actions. De Flores makes this plain, saying, "Push, fly not to your birth, but settle you/ In what the act has made you; y'are no more now./. . . Y'are the deed's creature" (3.4.135-8). The similarity between De Flores' comment and Roy Porter's

observation (see Note 11) is noteworthy and may suggest that the tendency is to define identity on the basis of deeds in the early modern period, but one would clearly need more data than what is provided by Napier and De Flores to make such an hypothesis. It is certainly clear, though, that The Changeling problematizes an easy equation between actions and identities. Isabella, like Antonio, exploits the deformity/madness association by *dressing up*: trying to ward Antonio off, she comes in "dressed," according to the stage directions, "as a madwoman"--and it is the aspect of a "wild unshapen antic" (4.3.123) that she bears, according to Antonio. She, like Antonio before her, is only able to exploit this association of the outwardly physical (in this case, vestmentary) with the psychological because of the essentialist assumption that there is, in fact, a mad physical appearance.[31] Arthur Little discusses Beatrice's embodiment of madness--the "commingling of madness, disease, and sexuality" (27)--and argues that the "transshaping" of the mad female body through "the virginity test literally forces the woman to display her madness; the woman's reactions during the test are easily recognizable manifestations of hysteria" (33).[32]

Of course, it is in De Flores--"this ominous ill-fac'd fellow" (2.1.53)--whom we find perhaps the clearest link between deformity and mad alterity. In some ways, De Flores resembles Shakespeare's Iago. Both are veritable

psychopaths, capable, apparently, of the unfathomable evil. But De Flores is ugly, inside and out. His comment to Beatrice reveals a lot about his nature:

> If I enjoy thee not, thou ne'er enjoy'st;
> I'll blast the hopes and joys of marriage,
> I'll confess all; my life I rate nothing.
>
> (3.4.147-9)

It is significant, too, that De Flores is sexual passion gone awry--more so when we consider what goes on with sex in Twelfth Night.

In Twelfth Night, Antonio makes a link between "deformity" and the blemished mind: "In nature there's no blemish but the mind;/ None can be called deformed but the unkind" (3.4.379-80), he says. The association gains significance when the Officer identifies as mad the distraught Antonio, who loves and *adores* (2.1.47) Sebastian: "The man grows mad" (3.4.383), the Officer says. Duke Orsino also implies that Antonio is mad and tells him that his "words are madness" (5.1.98). While the metonymic interchangeability between madness and deformity is far from strong in this play (certainly less so than in The Changeling), we do, nevertheless, see a link between constructions of madness and sexual alterity (Antonio is a figure critically perceived as sexually Other).

We can certainly argue that madness and a muscular heterosexual manhood are largely incompatible in the early

modern period. This would certainly explain why someone like Macbeth is "quite unmanned" (3.4.74) by folly and why, though he may complain that his mind is "full of scorpions" (3.2.36), he will always buck up when asked "Are you a man" (3.4.59). The very clear implication here is that real men aren't mad--emasculated men often are. Such is certainly also the case in The Captain. Drunkenness is often associated with or identified as a kind of madness in broadside ballads, and Jacamo's drinking throws into question both his (heterosexual) masculinity and his mental control. His drinking makes him act with an audacity that he seems not to have when sobre: at one point, he goes on a kissing rampage in a drunken frenzy. In this kissing spree, he inadvertently kisses Frederick, Franck's brother, and though Jacamo promptly asserts a violent heterosexual aversion to the homosexual kiss, he has an ambivalent sexuality.[33] And he is less the tough, manly, and invulnerable captain than he would like to think he is. Like Ferdinand in The Duchess of Malfi, Jacamo lets his passions control him, though for different reasons (namely, because of alcohol). While he is a thoroughly undesirable figure, however, there is something pathetic, something deeply and movingly sad about his vulnerability and self-created alterity. For instance, he whines pathetically at one point to Fabritio that "You make a right foole of me/ To lead me up and down to visit women,/ And be abus'd and

laugh'd at" (3.3.46-8). He is debased when Clora, Franck, Fredericke, and a maid drop water on him and tell him it is urine. He is debased through the body. His manhood is deformed through his embarrassed and intoxicated body.[34] He is a thing that has been worn, torn, and scarred by wars, and he says that no woman would like him. He says that he has an ugly body and no morals.

The link between deformity and mental alterity is also implicit in Macbeth. Lady Macbeth, in a sense, seeks deformity. She seeks, as Carol Thomas Neely has noted, "a perversion of her own emotions and bodily functions" ("'Documents'" 328) when she rails on to spirits in her unsexing speech:

> Come, you spirits
> That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here,
> And fill me, from the crown to the toe, top-full
> Of direst cruelty! Make thick my blood,[35]
> Stop up th' access and passage to remorse,
> That no compunctious visitings of nature
> Shake my fell purpose, nor keep peace between
> Th' effect and it! Come to my woman's breasts,
> And take my milk for gall. (1.5.41-9)

Of course, to say that Lady Macbeth seeks deformity here is to assume that there is a proper form from which she seeks to deviate, and, as I note in chapter 2, there is an awkward essentialist premise at play here. Nevertheless, what is

clear enough is that deformity is as much a social construction as madness.

If we are looking for the social contingency of madness, perhaps nowhere is it more clear than in Twelfth Night. A lot of what we see in the play is conflict between various realities. The way reality is constructed, of course, determines the way madness is constructed, and when realities play off against each other, madness waits in the bleachers to walk the loser home. We can see such a conflict of perceived realities in the comedy of errors with the mistaken identities of Sebastian and Viola, and Sebastian subsequently wonders "are all the people mad?" (4.1.27). When, minutes later, the beautiful Olivia (whom he has just met) invites him (pantingly in the BBC production) home with her, he again is faced with the question of reality, and again, madness waits: "Either I am mad, or else this is a dream" (4.1.61), he says, wondering, no doubt, at his sudden, strange heterosexual luck. He decides that "'tis not madness" (4.3.4), "no madness" (1.10), but the "flood of fortune [does]/ So far exceed all instance, all discourse" (11.11-2)[36] that he is "ready" (1.13) to distrust his senses and his (or Olivia's) sanity (11.13-6). And distrust is very much an issue in this play. If the poor Malvolio had had a little more of it, perhaps he mightn't have been, to use Olivia's words, so "notoriously abused" (5.1.381). Indeed, much about the

world of Twelfth Night seems precarious and unstable. Madness itself is ill-understood, and definitions seem to be under interrogation: Olivia, for instance, speculates about whether or not "sad and merry madness equal be" (3.4.14).

SIGNS OF MADNESS: ASSUMPTIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS

Malvolio is a malcontent, and malcontents were a *type* about whom certain assumptions were made in the early modern period. Babb identifies two kinds of malcontents, the disgruntled and the seditious, and Malvolio certainly fits into the first category. This category defines people who

> were disappointed and disgruntled by their countrymen's failure to recognize and reward the talents and acquirements which they believed they had, and they were given to railing satirically at their unappreciative contemporaries. (77)

And since the malcontent is a melancholic type, it is hardly surprising that Malvolio is set up as a madman. What we witness with Malvolio, then, is an intensification of his position as Other. He moves from being simply unsociable and graceless to being perceived as dangerously mad.

Something very similar happens in Othello. The meanings that are immanent in the rhetoric of "black" and "white" and the racist epithets that are hurled around in the play contribute to the presentation of a prepackaged, an essential Othello, lasciviousness and jealousy coming as part of the black package. He is black and therefore

credulous, easily made jealous, and before long he "breaks out to savage madness" (4.1.66)--because he is black. He moves from one position of alterity to a more intense one.

Of course, Othello is one of many plays that associate madness and evil with race. The White Devil is another. The play gives us unpleasant associations with blackness, despite the title: we get "black lust" (3.1.7); "black deed" (5.3.251; 5.5.12; and 5.6.300); "black concatenation" (3.2.29); "black Fury" (5.6.227); "black storm" (5.6.248); and "black charnel" (5.6.270). Francisco says in defence of Vittoria "I do not think she hath a soul so black/ To act a deed so bloody" (3.2.183-4). Monticelso keeps a "black book" (4.1.33) in which he keeps "the names of all notorious offenders/ Lurking about the city" (4.1.31-2); he calls Lodovico "a foul black cloud" (4.3.99) and talks about "the black and melancholic yew tree" (4.3.120); Flamineo, in disguise as "Mulinassar, a Moor," says he loves Zanche, "that Moor, that witch" (5.1.153) and several times compares her to a dog; Marcello compares Zanche to "crows" (5.1.196); Zanche says that she disliked her blackness until she met Mulinassar (5.1.213); "eternal darkness," Vittoria explains, "was made for devils" (5.6.63-4)[37]--in short, much of the villainy and madness depend for their full effect in this play on the presence of black characters.

As Carolyn Prager notes, though, Zanche moves from a pathetic kind of alterity to a defiant one. While Zanche

hopes at one point to be washed white (5.3.260-2), Prager points out that "with her final breath, she declares herself an Ethiopian who will not be washed white" (178): "I am proud," Zanche announces, "[that] Death cannot alter my complexion,/ For I shall ne'er look pale" (5.6.229-31).

Madness in the Renaissance is an extremely complex topic. Four centuries later, it is no less so. Then and now, it is thoroughly imbricated in a set of widely divergent discursive practices that designate alterity. What I have tried to do in this chapter is to lift various parts of the patchwork quilt and to follow some of its seams in order to see how the various parts work. Peeping out almost everywhere are animals--some Jewish, some queer, some black, some mad, some First Nations, some women, some quiet, some noisy, some rich, and some poor. If the proper study of humanity is humanity, then such a study should not occur in a vacuum. People live in the world, and when that world is made ugly in processes that humanize reality and dehumanize people, then those acts of writing and reading become important. As I will show in the final chapter, eco-ethics and alterity need to be discussed together.

Postscript

While The Duchess of Malfi is replete with clinical terminology that describes various forms of madness, it is a mistake to assess the terms without proper reference to history. Lawrence Babb, for example, makes an argument in The Elizabethan Malady on the basis of what appears to be a historical blind spot. He reads Antonio's accusation that Bosola assumes an "out-/of-fashion melancholy" (2.1.85-6) as proof-positive that "the pose [of melancholy] had lost popularity when [the play] was written [i.e., 1613-14]" (83). This is very poor evidence, since the play is set in "*Anno Dom.* 1504" (2.3.57), at which time, according to Babb, melancholy had not yet even come into vogue. Babb claims that "the vogue of melancholy began to make its mark upon English literature about midway in the reign of Elizabeth" (73). Babb either imagines that Antonio could see into the future or that Webster's depiction of the temporal setting is anachronistically flawed. Neither position seems required by the contentious line. Rather, John Russell Brown's reading seems the more sensible here: his gloss for 11.85-6 explains that "Bosola's 'melancholy' is 'out-of-fashion' now because he has got preferment."

Another clinical term is the word "frenzy." Pescara tells Delio that Ferdinand is rumored to have "a frenzy" (5.1.59). Other terms for "frenzy" are "phrenzy" and "phrenitis." Babb summarizes Robert Burton's 1628

definition of the causes and nature of "frenzy": it is "an inflammation of the brain due to an invasion of choler" (36, n.110). Burton goes on at some length, though, defining the affliction and repeatedly asserts that it is "a continual madness" (Burton 121). Tommaso Garzoni's The Hospitall of Incurable Fooles (1600) defines the behavioural symptoms caused by frenzy: those suffering "swarue from al sense, in any thing they vtter, being inconstant, and so intricating themselues, that another Sphinx should haue work enough to explane their conceits, & Oedipus himself would sweate, to apprehend the meaning of their words" (C1[V]). Webster seems well aware of the term.

Yet another term the play uses is "lycanthropia" (5.2.6), and the lengthy definition the Doctor offers (11.8-21) is almost a *verbatim* reproduction of the definition Simon Goulart offers in Admirable and Memorable Histories Containing the Wonders of Our Time (1607).

Notes

[1]Duncan Salkeld suggests that in the various different constructions of madness in history, "differences may involve a question of power" (12), but I would argue more definitively that there are always questions of power involved in the production of madness. Since part of my project here is to look at how various configurations of power designate sites of alterity, it is important to recognize that the ideological function of essentialist and universalizing statements is often to obscure or cloak the workings of power.

[2]One thinks of Edward Geoffrey O'Donoghue's The Story of Bethlehem Hospital from its Foundation in 1247 (1914). This 427-page book is, one would have to agree with Patricia Allderidge, "practically unreadable" ("Bedlam" 17), partly because of its sing-song narrative tone but mostly because of its blithe disregard for the rules of good scholarship. Little is actually documented in The Story of Bethlehem Hospital (perhaps because the archives of the hospital were unavailable until May 1967), and what O'Donoghue offers, most critics would agree, are "fictionalized" accounts (Neely, "Recent Work" 782).

[3]I have borrowed my evidence in this paragraph liberally from Neely's research. (See "Recent Work" 779).

[4]I use the term "clinical" here as opposed to "medical" in roughly the sense that the two terms are used in the

field of psychology today. As Carol Thomas Neely has observed (Personal correspondence, 15 December 1995), though, "it is extremely difficult to make a distinction between 'clinical' and 'medical' in early modern medicine," and is perhaps even technically invalid; but I wish to draw a rough distinction between practices concerned with non-corporeal forms of intervention, which we might term "clinical" and procedures that work via the body, which we might term "medical". An early modern example of medical intervention thus would be blood-letting, and modern examples would be Prozac, electro-convulsive therapy (ECT), and brain surgery. The distinction seems an important one, since it applies to the early modern period, but it is not a distinction, as far as I can see, that many commentators on early modern psychology make.

[5]Pollock and Maitland cite statutory proclamations (pre-dating the Elizabethan period) about Jews:

> It is to be known that all the Jews wheresoever they be in the realm are under the liege wardship and protection of the king . . . [and that] the Jew can have nothing that is his own . . . for the Jews live not for themselves but for others, and so they acquire not for themselves but for others. (Pollock and Maitland I; 468)

[6]Writing in Latin is not, *per se*, *praeteritio*, though Schleiner seems to be arguing that it is. Moreover, there

is, in fact, very little "passing over" or "not saying" in this chapter, and Schleiner's argument seems a bit muddled to me. When Burton says "I will pass over X," his mention of X is clearly not a passing over. If a person says "I will refrain from telling you that it is raining," then "you" have been told.

[7]Siegel (1987) argues that PMS should be considered a complex syndrome and should be included in the DSM-IV. On the other side of the debate, Caplan, McCurdy, and Gans (1992) challenge the definition of PMS as psychiatric abnormality and claim that there is a lack of methodological rigour in research on and criteria for the diagnosis of PMS. Parlee (1992) maintains much the same position and argues for the exclusion of PMS from the DSM-IV, claiming that the level of abstraction in the rhetoric on the subject obscures the fact that the research is inadequate. The arguments against including PMS in the DSM-IV were defeated, and the DSM-IV has a section entitled "Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder" (715-18).

The debate on the subject was quite extensive, as a subject search through the CD PsycLIT Journal Articles over the past several years will show. I've offered merely a sampling of some of the material I am familiar with.

[8]The word "spirit" here is interesting, and it has been observed that Jorden is the first theorist to locate the brain as well as the uterus as a source of hysteria (see

also Veith 122-3 and Neely, "'Documents'" 320, n.16).

[9]Some other sources include Philip Barrough's The Method of Phisick, Conteining the Causes, Signes, and Cures of Inward Diseases (1590), Timothy Bright's A Treatise of Melancholie (1586), F.N. Coeffeteau's A Table of Humane Passions, With Their Causes and Effects (1621), André Du Laurens' A Discourse of the Preservation of the Sight: of Melancholike Diseases; of Rheumes, and of Old Age (1599), Tammaso Garzoni's The Hospitall of Incurable Fooles (1600), and Thomas Wright's The Passions of the Minde (1601).

[10]While the term "slavery" is more metaphorical than literal here, the whole question behind servitude and slavery is one of freedom. Hegel argues that the "essence of humanity is *freedom*" (Hegel 99). Freedom to choose partners is denied not only servants (male and female), but often women of all classes in Renaissance England. The Duchess of Malfi laments that

> The birds that live i'the field
> On the wild benefit of nature live
> Happier than we; for they may choose their mates,
> And carol their sweet pleasures to the spring.
> (3.5.18-21).

[11]Roy Porter, in a discussion about the work of Napier (and MacDonald), observes that many of Napier's terms "are adjectival . . . probably indicating that madness was conceived more in terms of deeds and demeanor than of

disease, or any permanent internal disposition" (22-3). Napier's practice, then, seems to have been to define identities on the basis of actions rather than on essentialist premises.

[12]Visual representations of the Tom O'Bedlam figure share startling similarities with depictions of New World First Nations figures. In Figure 1, we see that both wear a head-dress of sorts, both carry a staff and wear an arm band, both have bare legs, arms, and shoulders, and wear a kind of skirt, and both seem to inhabit a non-urban geography.

[13]Keith Thomas makes a similar comment: "most beastlike of all were those on the margins of human society," he claims, and he puts at the top of the list of marginalized people "the mad, who seemed to have been taken over by the wild beast within" (44). Michael MacDonald, in Mystical Bedlam (1981), observes that the mentally ill were thought to have become "reduced . . . to the level of dumb beasts" and that "the proverbial comparison of madmen and wild animals" expressed a notion "that was redolent with scientific, religious, and moral implications" (179). Foucault claims that "madness borrowed its face from the mask of the beast" (Madness 72). In The Duchess of Malfi, the Doctor defines Ferdinand's affliction in the final act as a sort of psychological bestialization, "lycanthropia," where the sufferers are "transformed into wolves" (5.2.10)

and go about howling and digging up corpses in graveyards. The doctor's definition is borrowed from Simon Goulart's Admirable and Memorable Histories Containing the Wonders of Our Time (1607; 386-7). The essential horror here, I would think, is with the transgression "backward" from human to nonhuman animal.

[14]To date, no critic has, to my knowledge, commented on the similarities in the visual representations of Tom O'Bedlam and early modern First Nations figures. Certainly neither O'Donoghue nor Honour draw any comparisons. With the O'Donoghue "Tom O'Bedlam" and the Inigo Jones "Indian Torchbearer" side by side, however, we can see startling correspondences.

[15]As for the eponymous tragic hero of the play, there is considerable disagreement, as we shall shortly see.

[16]Linda Woodbridge has identified a "'bad hair day' semiotics" (Personal correspondence, September 1995) involved in early modern representations of madness and depictions of raped women. In both cases, I would argue that the "'bad hair day' semiotics" has something to do with representing the Other through images of pollution, rot, and excess, which I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 4.

[17]Feigning madness, Edgar thus says "Edgar I nothing am" (2.3.21).

[18]The play uses numerous clinical terms. The Postscript to Chapter 3 (page 171 above) discusses some of these uses.

[19]Similarly, Lillian Feder reminds us that there is an "intrinsic distortion of experience . . . [in] imaginative transformations of observations of madness, as in much poetry, fiction, and drama." These representations of madness, she continues, "are consciously ordered versions" (7--emphasis added) of madness. We are--and we must remember this--not seeing madness at all; we are always seeing a representation of madness in literature.

[20]Duncan Salkeld summarizes Derrida nicely:

> The upshot of Derrida's remarks is that there is no madness in Shakespearean or Renaissance Drama. Nor, indeed, in any literature. All writing (and, therefore, speech) is inscribed with the logos of Western "Reason in general" and necessarily excludes madness itself from its discourse. (40)

[21]In a psychoanalytic reading, for example, Bynum and Neve, drawing a link between madness and suicide, argue that Hamlet's "To be or not to be" speech is too dispassionate an expostulation to be anything but insanity (295). He is, in their opinion, a sociopath.

[22]We will recall that in The Duchess of Malfi, Ferdinand attempts to torture his victim with the "hideous noise" (4.2.2) of madmen, but the Duchess seems to thrive on the very pressure that is supposed to break her:

> Nothing but noise and folly
> Can keep me in my right wits, whereas reason

And silence make me stark mad. (4.2.7-9)

The idea Ferdinand seems to be following is that discordance is distracting, that noise pollution is mental poison, that cacophony will rot the mind. What Leverenz describes as an insane cacophany Margaret Higonnet identifies a part of what she calls the Ophelia complex, a "suicidal solution . . . linked to dissolution of the self, fragmentation to flow. The abandoned woman drowns, as it were, in her own emotions" (71). For both Leverenz and Higonnet, then, Ophelia's troubles stem from some kind of excess of internal noise rather than deficiency.

[23]Hamlet complains piteously that he must hold his tongue about the "incestuous sheets" of Claudius and Gertrude (1.2.157-9). Overcome with impulsiveness, Hamlet later says that he will speak to the ghost of his father, "though hell itself should gape/ And bid me hold my peace" (1.2.245-6).

[24]In Ferdinand's machinations, we see a popular early modern expression of beliefs about madness. We see, for instance, a use of the mad for entertainment and for curing madness (or melancholy) itself. As the Servant explains,

> A great physician, when the Pope was sick
> Of a deep melancholy, presented him
> With several sorts of madmen, which wild object,
> Being full of change and sport, forc'd him to
> laugh,

And so th' imposthume broke. (4.2.39-43)

[25]Disguised as "Sir Topas the curate" (4.2.22), the Clown enters to enact an exorcism. He commands the "hyperbolical fiend" (1.26) to get out of Malvolio. All that the poor Malvolio can do is protest his sanity, which he does repeatedly (1.30, 1.41, 11.48-9, 1.91, 1.109-10, 1.118).

[26]Certainly Greenblatt seems to be making such an argument ("Exorcists" 118-9), though he suggests more than he actually says.

[27]We might also argue that Lear's madness is itself curative and redemptive. Woodbridge, for instance, argues that "Lear learns more in one night of madness than he had learned in eighty years of sanity" (Scythe 304) and that he is, to some extent, redeemed through his night of chaos. Such an argument, however, does not redeem madness. In the metaphor about "baptisms of fire," the effects are usually considered cleansing and good, but the fire itself does not become good. Similarly, the madness Lear suffers has good results, in a sense, but remains the *sine qua non* of his alterity.

[28]I am clearly in disagreement with Greenblatt's reading of Edgar's marginalization. Greenblatt argues that

> Shakespeare insists . . . upon his marginalization: Edgar becomes the possessed Poor Tom, the outcast with no possibility of working his way

> back toward the center. ("Exorcists" 117)

Of course Shakespeare insists on Edgar's marginalization, but it is equally clear by what follows in the play that Edgar does have every possibility for working his way back toward the center--and he does. It is not insignificant that he takes center-stage at the close of the play, regardless of what Greenblatt thinks.

[29]According to Susan Schoon Eberly,

> Hybridity describes a belief which postulated that human beings could, and frequently did, have sexual relations with non-human beings, relations which produced offspring. (60)

These pairings, which could be either with supernatural beings or with animals, would yield deformed births.

[30]Eberly points out that there are two general "theories of causation": the first is that "maternal impressions and responses were held to produce certain clearly identifiable, 'psychogenic' effects upon the unborn child" (59), and the second "held these disorders to be produced by supernatural intervention of some form or another" (60)--often a response to a sin of the parents, usually the mother. Eberly does not, however, make anything of the fact that the two general theories of causation largely blame women for deformities. Another problem with Eberly's comments is that they lack specificity, both of time and place. She describes her

review merely as "a very brief look at the reactions, through history, of Western Europeans" (59) to monstrous births.

[31]Clearly, the temptation here is to assign physical attributes to alterity. It happens today whenever one says that a person "looks mad." We hear the same kind of thing about sexualities: "He looks gay" or "She looks like a dyke," and so on. Of course, racial and gender alterity is manifest in physical appearance. It is difficult to hide the fact that one is a black woman, for example; it is easy, on the other hand, to hide the fact that one is gay or to be mistaken as insane.

[32]Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English cite "fits and fainting . . . hysterical loss of voice, loss of appetite, hysterical coughing or sneezing, and, of course, hysterical screaming, laughing, and crying" (40) as physical signs of hysteria, and although they are discussing nineteenth-century hysteria, much the same can be said of early modern hysteria.

[33]His courage, both with women and with issues of war and valour, are more in evidence when he is drunk. His violence toward Frederick is a homophobic response to an incident that he alone is responsible for. Of course, Jacamo was drunk, and kissing Frederick was surely a mistake. But some of the things Jacamo says are extremely suggestive. He explains,

I love a Souldier, and can lead him on,
And if he fight well I dare make him drunk:
This is my vertue, and if this will do
I'le scramble yet amongst 'em. (2.1.110-3)

He certainly seems to love soldiers more than he does women. Like Swetnam, he never dreams of women except when he is drunk (2.2.256-60).

[34]On the question of the relationship between embarrassment and the body, see Gail Kern Paster, The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern England (Ithaca, New York: Cornell UP, 1993).

[35]Lady Macbeth's supplication for "thick blood" resonates as a call for madness: as Babb explains, "thick blood is melancholic blood" (84).

[36]The Signet edition glosses "instance" as "precedent" and "discourse" as "reason."

[37]Of course, one might call this a kind of nocturnal alterity. There are other instances of it in the play. We learn, for instance, that "your melancholic hare/ Feed[s] after midnight" (3.3.82-3), and we see a linking of nighttime life with madness, lechery, and bestialism. When Flamineo ask Lodovico if he had "to live [like] a lousy creature . . . Like one/ that had forever forfeited the daylight" (3.3.116-7), we understand that night life is undesirable. Keith Thomas maintains that "it was bestial to work at night" (39) in early modern England. We might

note that the othering of nocturnicity is still an issue, since the business world is geared to people who live diurnally. Nocturnal people have fewer entertainment opportunities, their shopping choices are limited to expensive convenience stores, their jobs tend to be undesirable, and so on. Moreover, the cultural representations of villainy seem in many ways to be associated with night: the Batman movies occur almost entirely at night (and we might note that the eponymous hero is a bestial hybrid--half human, half bat--ideally suited to fight the bestial crimes of the seemingly always dark Gothic City), Christian mythology never mentions a nighttime in heaven, ghosts and vampires don't come up with the sun, and so on.

Chapter 4

Toward an Environmental Ethics in Early Modern Literature: The Other in Geographies of Plenitude

> . . . it is impossible to disentangle what the people of the past thought about plants and animals from what they thought about themselves.
>
> (Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World)

If we wish to analyse the mechanisms that designate sites of alterity, and, more importantly, if we wish, in executing such analyses, to work toward what Michael Ryan calls a "transformation of the categories of the thought processes that sustain and promote domination" (212), then a purely anthropocentric analysis will not be a very effective approach. Given that bestialization is at least one common denominator in the production of women, queers, Jews, blacks, First Nations people, and the mad as Others, then a theory of power that addresses what Keith Thomas calls "human ascendancy" over nature is clearly in order. In this chapter, I propose to make a case for an environmentalist approach to productions of early modern alterities and to work toward a theoretical model that will at least begin to deal with some of the eco-ethics and power issues involved in such productions.

Much of the work in feminist and post-colonial geography studies has dealt with productions of

cartographies,[1] for the most part as allegories of desire or as narratives of empire. What are singularly absent from such work are serious environmental discussions about the constructedness of nature, about what I will call eco-phobic literary representations of the environment, of worlds that are apart from (and therefore subject to) humanity.[2] This general critical blindspot results in sometimes shallow readings and in gaps in thinking. For instance, the general reading of Jan van der Straet's "America" is compulsively iconographic, insisting on the metaphoricity implicit in the meeting between the dressed

FIGURE 1--"America" (*c.* 1600),
an engraving by Jan van der Straet
Adapted from: Hume (Colonial Encounters xii)

European man and the nakedly sexual American woman (who is significantly set among a variety of roaming wild animals with a cannibal feast as a backdrop). Van der Straet's "America" was an El Dorado waiting for post-colonial critical discovery: the metaphors are blatant, and commenting on them seems almost an obligatory genuflexive maneuver; what is less automatic is an understanding of the system of values that the text bespeaks. If we assume that "America" maps an abstracted female body within a rubric of colonialist desire (whatever the vectors of that desire may be), then what that female body is abstracted with is surely important. If it is the land both ready for and inviting exploitation that the naked female body is abstracted with, then what we are really talking about is, obviously, a fantasy of environmental rape. If rape is more violence than sexuality, then the sexualization of colonial landscapes has less to do with allegorizing sexuality or desire than with visualizing power and violence. As rape implies misogyny, sexualized landscapes imply eco-phobia.

In mapping the mapping of this eco-phobia as it participates in designating sites/sights of alterity, I shall be looking primarily at three early modern discursive phenomena: 1] journeys out, 2] the literary production of plenitude, in which questions of environment, rot, disgust, and difference are integral, and 3] the literary commodification of people as resources that met numerous requirements.

JOURNEYS OUT

The world must be peopled.

(Shakespeare, Much Ado About Nothing)

European colonialism is a major preoccupation of Renaissance texts, as the many references in the literature to colonies, exploration, and wealth abroad attest to.[3] It was a time of great adventure--and of pillaging.

As I mention above (see chapter 1, pages 15-6 and 53, note 3), The Tempest is centrally involved in colonialist discourse and in fact is, according to Meredith Skura, "the first English example of [this discourse]" (69). As such, the play is a showcase of exotica, of a strange and brave new world, "full of noises/ Sounds and sweet airs . . . [and] a thousand twangling instruments" (3.2.133-5); a land chock-full of wild animals, "toads, beetles, bats" (1.2.342), "the nimble marmoset" (2.2.170), jays, and shellfish; a land where there "is everything advantageous to life" (2.1.48); a land "lush and lusty" (2.1.51); a land that fuels the utopian dreams of Gonzalo, for whom "Nature should bring forth,/ Of its own kind, all foison, all abundance,/ To feed [the] . . . people" (2.1.158-60); a land of fairies and monsters, nymphs and goblins; a wild land ready for taking and taming. In many ways, the land that The Tempest describes is similar to the "wonder cabinet," which Steven Mullaney describes in The Place of the Stage as

"a form of collection peculiar to the late Renaissance, characterized primarily by its encyclopedic appetite for the marvellous or the strange" (60-1). It is a land whose Otherness, difference, exoticism, and promise of wealth make it very fertile ground for the seeds of colonialist ambitions and fantasies.

It is a stolen land, too, that The Tempest describes, as Caliban relentlessly explains. Prospero was kind to Caliban and, currying his trust while drawing on his geographical knowledge,[4] Prospero betrayed this native inhabitant of the "brave new world" (the phrase originates with this play: 5.1.183): Caliban complains

> This island's mine, by Sycorax my mother,
> Which thou tak'st from me. When thou cam'st first,
> Thou strok'st me, and made much of me; would'st give me
> Water with berries in't; and teach me how
> To name the bigger light, and how the less,
> That burn by day and night: and then I lov'd thee,
> And show'd thee all the qualities o'th'isle,
> The fresh springs, brine-pits, barren place and fertile:
> Curs'd be that I did so! (1.2.333-41)

At another point in the play, Caliban again explains, this time to Trinculo and Stephano, that Prospero gypped him of

the island "by sorcery" (3.2.51), that "by his cunning [Prospero] hath cheated [Caliban] of the island" (3.2.41-2).

But the appropriation of the land is a part of the appropriation of Caliban. As Chris Tiffin and Alan Lawson explain in the introduction to De-Scribing Empire: Post-Colonialism and Textuality (1994), since "only empty spaces can be settled, . . . the space [of the colonized lands] had to be made empty by ignoring or dehumanizing the inhabitants" (5). It is a strategy that Caliban is aware of, and he laments that Prospero prevented him from raping Miranda: "I had," Caliban explains, "peopled else/ This isle with Calibans" (1.2.352-3). The intended rape is a fecundative resistance; it is also the most problematic and forcefully Othering form of resistance in the play. The whole venture fails, and Caliban "must obey [Prospero]: his Art is of such pow'r" (1.2.374). Caliban feels compelled to violence precisely because of Prospero's power. Caliban has no rights.

Like Caliban, the environment is without rights and is totally in the grip of Prospero, who calls up the tempest for his own little purposes. There is no telling what a man who re-makes the environment is capable of. The environment becomes at times beautiful and serene or hideous and deadly, depending on Prospero's needs. Tiffin's and Lawson's argument that colonialist discourse "alternately fetishized and feared its Others--both race and place" (5)

is pertinent to this play. Both race and place are subject to a politics of domination, demonization, and exploitation.

In a play such as Thomas Heywood's The Fair Maid of the West, Pt. 1, the entertainment is again clearly geared toward satisfying the hungers of an imperial constituency. As in The Tempest, the world is the resource, unclaimed and unlimited, that exists for the pleasure of the imperial masters. When Goodlack asks why one would want to "pillage" (1.2.8) on voyages, Spencer says that he does not want to pillage but to get honour, but he would do this, presumably, by finding wealth.[5] Clearly, what is under discussion here is the topic of colonialist exploitation--specifically, we have discursive fantasies of the quest for the "golden spoil" (1.1.10; 4.4.85), of an El Dorado--which, of course, often lead to the exploitation not only of the land but of the people who first inhabited it. The many references in this play to spoils suggest spoilage, especially when one of the Spaniards explains about how "Raleigh won and spoil'd [a town and fort]" (4.4.31). The spoilage here may be environmental or metaphorical--we are left to ponder.

The play is putatively a love story, but the subtext is about voyages out. What the play clearly reveals is that if one commits a crime at home, then the world serves as an open space in which to flee. Spencer is guilty of killing Carrol (though it was done in chivalric defense of Bess

against insults--mere insults--from Carrol). The criminal is sent "out there," away from the geography of "familiar, safe, protected boundaries"[6] to the geography of licentious Others. Somehow, home ground is sacred, and foreign soil is not. It is for this reason that Bess wants the body of the presumed-dead Spencer brought home. On Fayal (4.4.39-47), we see the same kind of essentializing of geographies in the contrast between church grounds (moralized and sacred) and fields (a fit tomb for an heretic). Spencer, who is not dead, is limited, in theory, in his fugitive voyage only by the horizon; Bess, on the other hand, is limited by the man who she and Goodlack presume dead and who she defines her existence by.

The play, then, charts the progress of two geographical voyages: Spencer's and Bess's. Spencer's voyage is a self-defensive exile; Bess's is a voyage of love (3.4.113-4). The man pursues journeys through vast, uncharted worlds; the woman pursues her man. "All the wealth the world contains" (4.2.54) is fair game for men, but Bess wants only her man. While Spencer does not seek to plunder untapped veins of the world's resources, the topic, since it is mentioned, is clearly under discussion in the play. We see this topic explicitly with the mighty King Mullisheg, the "glory of the Moors" (4.3.6) and a figure of black resistance, who, with his attendant Bashaw Alcade, seeks to abrogate the liberties that imperialists take, to stop, in other words, the

exploitations of "those Christians that reap profit by our land" (4.3.24). In a sense, the "Moor" becomes a voice for the land and is, in that way, associated with the land.

In charting the progress of the separate voyages of Bess and Spencer, the play registers both imperial and racial rivalries. The English and Spanish are at loggerheads, but the play asserts British superiority. (This superiority is called into question when Spencer is captured by the Spanish, but, as one British merchant claims, the Spanish took unfair advantage of Spencer, who is wounded.) The geographical Other, the Spanish in this case, is dislocated from the field of manhood when Spencer discursively locates manhood with chivalry and fair play. He tells a pirate that "to threaten men unarm'd" (4.1.15) is tantamount to walking over "a field of slaughter/ And kill them o'er that are already slain,/ And brag thy manhood" (11.16-8). As we have seen, to be anything but a man is to be Other in many early modern texts. As if in spite of himself, the Spanish Captain inadvertently sings the praises of the British: "Nothing can daunt them" (4.1.27), he says, and goes on to promise torture for Spencer.

But this nationalistic rivalry on the high seas changes to a racial rivalry when we are introduced to Mullisheg. It is a significant ideological statement that Bess paints her ship black and names it "the *Negro*" (4.2.83), since her so doing metaphorically identifies "the *Negro*" as an empty

vessel waiting to be filled and used. We will remember that Roughman's language identifies women as empty ships waiting to be filled (see 192, n.5 above). In other words, what The Fair Maid of the West, Pt. I gives us is a series of open spaces that are waiting to be used: we have "the *Negro*," we have Bess, the land (that Alcade and Mullisheg discuss), and "a wilderness of seas" (4.5.163) that the main characters sail.

When we land in Morocco we meet Mullisheg, who is presented as a man with an insatiable sexual appetite and proclaims "our god shall be our pleasure" (4.3.39). He expostulates about philandering, and Joffer asks "who else are worthy to be libertines/ But such as bear the sword" (4.3.35-6). It is not clear at this point whether the black Others here are talking about sexual pillaging and rape or about prostitution and the commodification of women. Certainly both topics--pillaging and commodification--apply both to women and the environment in this play. Whatever the case in the conversation of Mullisheg and Joffer, love does not seem to be the topic of conversation. Later, though, Mullisheg does tell Goodlack that "'Tis love, not force, must quench our desires" (5.1.28). King Mullisheg wants Bess.

Again, the British man triumphs over the geographical Other, and Bess becomes a representative of the aesthetic superiority of the British Empire. The soil itself is

better in England: Mullisheg explains "that English earth may well be term'd a heaven,/ That breeds such divine beauties" (5.1.43-4) as Bess. "A woman born in England" (5.1.42), she is a tantalizing sex object to the Moorish Mullisheg. But, as in most early modern drama, black and white do not mix well in this play. If it is ugly for a black man to kiss a white woman--"Must your black face be smooching my mistress's white lips/ with a Moorian? I would you had kissed her arse" (5.2.80-1)--then it is equally ugly for a black woman to kiss a white man in this play. The black Queen Tota, dehumanizing the white in the same way that the white dehumanizes the black, and the man the woman, says that she cannot love a white man's face: "How, that face?/ Thinkest thou I could love a monkey, a baboon" (Pt. 2, 1.1.151-2), she asks the white Roughman, who thinks she is courting him.

Part of the process designating alterity in this play, as in The Tempest, is bound up with the what John Gillies calls a "geography of difference," and part of that geographical imagination, to use Derek Gregory's phrase, relies on the production of disgust as a marker of difference.[7]

ABUNDANCE, EXCESS, AND ROT

It is a fine line that we draw between sweet and sickly sweet, or between sickly sweet and downright disgusting.

In 1987, I was given about a hundred pounds of tomatoes

from a friend whose ambitions in the garden had yielded results that far exceeded his expectations and mine. I gladly took the tomatoes and made several dozen containers of very tasty tomato sauce with lentils and red wine. I put all but one of the containers in the basement freezer, and prepared for years of great spaghetti. The freezer, unfortunately, was less than perfectly reliable, and when I got the next plastic tub out some months later, the sauce did not taste altogether good. I thought I could, perhaps, put up with the odd taste, but I was wrong. It was really quite vile. Neither the taste nor the smell were very different from the original taste and smell, but the difference was enough. The sauce was just a bit too sweet to stomach--sickly is the only word to describe it. The odd thing is that I always expect that sickly sweet taste now when I have spaghetti sauce, and I fear that I will never again be able to eat the stuff without the bad memory and the attendant disgust.

Things rot. When things rot, they become dirty, polluted. We see a lot of dirt and rot and pollution in early modern literature. What interests me are the ways that this filth is mobilized in the service of designating alterity and at the expense of sound environmental considerations.

Henry V offers a series of particularly clear images of rot. Henry threatens to wreak spoilage against the French

Other to gain their spoils; he threatens to pollute and corrupt to gain the town, to send "filthy and contagious clouds/ Of heady murder, spoil, and villainy" (1.32) if the Governor refuses to capitulate to his demands for surrender. He promises that these filthy and contagious clouds will "defile the locks of . . . shrill-shrieking daughters" (1.35).[8] He promises to spoil the women, and he promises to spoil the land. He will engender rot in France, and the stench of his dead victims will go "reeking up to heaven . . . the smell whereof shall breed a plague in France" (4.3.101-3). The "island of England breeds valiant creatures" (3.7.145), and this particular valiant creature will ensure that France breeds rot. Interestingly, both sides, at various times, conceptualize the Other in terms either of stagnation or of rot and corruption. The Constable of France, for instance, wonders where the English get their mettle, when, in his view, the English climate seems more likely to produce stagnation. He asks:

> Is not their climate foggy, raw, and dull,
> On whom, as in despite, the sun looks pale,
> Killing their fruit with frowns? Can sodden water,
> A drench for sur-reined jades, their barley broth,
> Decoct their cold blood to such valiant heat?
>
> (3.5.16-20)

Henry, on the other hand, claims that there is something in

the French air that is corrupt, something that blows vices into him (3.6.159-60). And for whatever reason, the English do lose their health in France and "are with sickness much enfeebled" (1.153). It is the English, though, who win and, in winning, ensure the decay of the French. Henry is as good as his word: he breeds rot in France. Burgundy complains that "this best garden of the world [France] . . . doth lie in heaps/ Corrupting in its own fertility" (5.2.36-40). He goes on at some length about fertile gardens and vineyards that have outgrown their capacity to maintain themselves and "grow to wildness" (1.55). So too have his people gone wild: they "grow like savages" (1.59), like the untended garden that rots in its own fertility. We witness here the essence of rot, filth, and difference.

Rot and filth are prerequisites for the production of disgust. Disgust is part of the process that designates alterities. We see productions of disgust not only in Henry V, of course. Hamlet is another fine example. Robert Wilson identifies a "thin drizzle of filth that rains constantly upon the fictional world of Hamlet" (Hydra's Breath *passim*)--a drizzle which I am more inclined to see as a torrential downpouring of rot and decay--and rightly argues that the text repeatedly, though not explicitly, conceptualizes disgust. This disgust grows out of rotten environments.

We know that "something is rotten in the state of Denmark" (1.4.90), and we know that the word "rotten" is metaphorical here, suggesting perhaps more about moral turpitude than about green issues. Except that the play consistently conceptualizes the disgusting **as** Nature, which is essentially disordered in this text.[9] Take, for instance, Hamlet's description of his world as "an unweeded garden/ That grows to seed; things rank and gross in nature/ Possess it merely" (1.2.135-7). In a play that conceptualizes human disorder in environmental terms, permanence is ugly, and "brevity is the soul of wit" (2.2.90) and beauty. The "violet in the youth of primy nature/ Forward, not permanent, sweet, not lasting" (1.3.7-8) is acceptable, good, and beautiful; gardens rankly overgrown in this play poison "the whole ear of Denmark" (1.5.36), and the "fat weed/ That roots itself in ease" (1.5.32-3) in this garden is Claudius, whose "offence is rank, it smells to heaven" (3.3.36). Even the sweet "rose of May" (4.5.157), Ophelia, becomes a site/sight of floral excess, bedecked with "fantastic garlands . . . / Of crow-flowers, nettles, daisies, and long purples" (4.7.167-8). Ophelia, "a document in madness" (4.5.176), is Other, and environmental excess in Hamlet is a finger pointing at alterity.

The metaphors Hamlet uses are very telling. Whenever he talks about alterity, his thoughts eventually devolve on

some form of rot. For instance, evil others, in his opinion, are differentiated from everyone else only

> By their o'ergrowth of some complexion,
> Oft breaking down the pales and forts of reason,
> Or by some habit, that too much o'erleavens
> The form of plausive manners . . . these men,
> Carrying, I say, the stamp of one defect,
> Being Nature's livery or Fortune's star,
> His virtues else, be they as pure as grace,
> As infinite as any man may undergo,
> Shall in the general censure take corruption
> From that particular fault. (1.4.27-36)

The problem **is not** "one defect" or "particular fault," since nobody is perfect; the problem is the "o'ergrowth" of such a "complexion." Excess (and eventually rot), then, is the problem, and it is defined with naturalistic imagery. For Hamlet, the social world is rotten to the core, and at a time in history "when the universal belief in analogy and correspondence made it normal to discern in the animal world a mirror image of human social and political organization" (Thomas 61), it is hardly surprising to hear Hamlet eco-phobically condemn the natural world as "but a foul and pestilent congregation of vapours" (2.2.302-3).[10] It is dirty and disgusting, like "the rank sweat of an enseamed bed,/ Stew'd in corruption" (3.4.92-3).[11] Hamlet is obsessed with rot, with "rank corruption, mining all within,

[that]/ Infects unseen" (3.4.150-1), with "the sun breed[ing] maggots in a dead dog" (2.2.181), and such issues. This is a man whose strong concerns with purifying his social world results in a discursive putrefying of the natural world. His world is filthy and rotting.

Dirt is, of course, as Mary Douglas tells us, a cultural thing: "it exists in the eye of the beholder" (2). We see this, for instance, when the black Queen Tota asks Clem in The Fair Maid of the West, Pt. 2 to compare England with Fez: Clem says that the two are essentially the same but holds England "to be the cleanlier" (1.1.72-3). What we are offered here is ostensibly cultural differentiation, finally of dietary habits, but it is less innocent than an objective anthropology, if there is such a thing. The dietary distinction cuts a line between races, Clem claiming that the British (the whites, in other words) "never sit down with such foul hands and faces" (1.1.75-6) as the blacks of Fez. A much more obvious and prevalent form of dietary disgust in the early modern period hovers, of course, about cannibalism.

The links between the discursive productions of cannibalism and eco-phobia, though important, are largely undiscussed in the large body of material about anthropophagy. Stephen Slemon's "Bones of Contention" comes close to discussing how what he calls "the discourse of cannibalism" (165) is significant to the discursive

production of a hostile environment. Slemon argues that the discourse of cannibalism "necessarily designates an absolute negation of 'civilized' self-fashioning in a place that is no place, and is always 'out there'" (*ibid.*). It is, Slemon notes, both the land and the people that threaten to consume the travellers (163). While Slemon is clearly aware of the spatial importance of the tropology and of the fact that colonialist discourse articulates a "managed *difference* in the field of 'nature'" through the discourse of cannibalism (165--emphases in original), the *significance* of environment as it is configured in the conceptualization of alterity here remains unattended. The articulation of a generalized environmental loathing and fear is the *precondition* that *enables* 1] the production of the cannibal Other as a part of the Otherworldly landscape, and 2] the appropriation and refiguring (or disfiguring) of that landscape.

The anagrammatic cannibal of The Tempest is a "thing of darkness" (5.1.275) that may, like the land, be possessed. Because he is off away from the home-space of the play, he is less a threat than the unwitting cannibal of Titus Andronicus, who (in inadvertently eating her own children in the "at home" of the fictional world of the play) presents a picture that is truly horrifying and disgusting. In Othello, "the Cannibals that each other eat/ The Anthropophagi" (1.3.159-60) are similarly dislocated from the

geography of the centre to a geography of difference, and they share no substantial dissimilarity from the "rough quarries, rocks, and hills whose heads touch heaven" (1.3.156) that form another part of the tale of marvels Othello uses to woo Desdemona.

Very little has changed in the discourse of cannibalism in the past four hundred years. A recent article in Time (01 May 1995), reports that "human fetus soup" (12) has become something of a delicacy in Shenzhen.[12] The report is disturbing to me, less because of the alleged dietary trend than because of what seems a renewed anti-Asian trend in the U.S. (one has only to think of the anti-import messages in advertisements for American cars). Cannibalism, Slemon is correct in pointing out, is something that happens "out there" in an exotic geography, and one might further note that relatively little discursive attention is given to cannibalism at home. There are, of course, exceptions, and some work has recently been done with the question of sacramental communion.[13] Most of the work with cannibalism, however, takes a post-colonialist approach that largely ignores interrelationships between environmental disregard and colonialism.[14]

While the environment in which the cannibal resides may be tamed, the cannibal Other is immanently dirty and disgusting, polluted from the inside with dietary filth.[15] Often, it would seem, filth, of some kind or another, is a

precondition for alterity. As Stephen Greenblatt argues in "Filthy Rites,"

> the very conception that a culture is alien rests upon the perceived difference of that culture from one's own behavioural codes, and it is precisely at the points of perceived difference that the individual is conditioned, as a founding principle of personal and group identity, to experience disgust. (61)[16]

The disgust grows from the perception of dirt or worse yet, of pollution. As Mary Douglas explains, "the polluting person is always in the wrong" (114).

As with definitions of madness, definitions of pollution are a tricky business, laden with ideology. Douglas defines the polluting person as one who crosses clearly defined "lines of structure, cosmic or social" and adds that

> he has developed some wrong condition or simply crossed some line which should not have been crossed and this displacement unleashes danger for someone. (*ibid.*)

The use of the male pronoun here is unfortunate since more women are perceived or constructed as sources of pollution than men in early modern drama.[17] If pollution is primarily the transgression of culturally significant boundaries, bodily orifices being one such set of boundaries, then it is

easy to see why women are constituted as a site of pollution. As Woodbridge explains, "women have more orifices than men to start with, which may be why the female body offers the more frequent image of society endangered" (Scythe 52). Leonard Tennenhouse urges much the same position, claiming that early modern tragedy "defines the female body as a source of pollution . . . [and he argues that] any sign of permeability automatically endangers the community" (117-8). The female rape victim becomes a site of pollution (as her tousled hair perhaps signifies), and the woman with her own sexuality is also a site of pollution (and a threat to the patriarchal hegemony). But the tradition that seeks to identify women as a source of pollution is not merely concerned with what goes in but with what comes out of the body as well. Thus, women who speak out of order become sites of pollution as do menstruating women.[18] But there is something missing in all of this: if the "pollution" here is a trope that tickles out questions about the environment and Nature, and if Nature is feminized, then what kind of correlative studies can we do with discourses that write the environment and those that write women and alterity?

COMMODIFIED LANDSCAPES: PEOPLE, PLACE, AND PROPERTY

Commodification, as a part of Othering processes, occurs at numerous sites, both in the early modern period and today. We are probably all familiar with what Gillian

Rose identifies as a "complex discursive transcoding between Woman and Nature" (88), if not in theoretical terms, then in the untheorized terms of our daily experience. We have all heard terms like "Mother Earth," "womb of the earth,"[19] and "virgin lands." While there are some gender-neutral metaphors that compare the earth to the body (for example, the image of the bowels of the earth is one), the majority of the metaphors for nature are feminine.

Annette Kolodny offers one of the early eco-feminist discussions of the relationship between representations of women and the New World environment. The experience of the American landscape, she argues,

> is variously expressed through an entire range of images, each of which details one of the many elements of that experience, including eroticism, penetration, raping, embrace, enclosure, and nurture, to cite only a few. (150)

Her discussions about the representation and conceptualization of the New World in feminine terms remains valid, even though the theoretical terminology has changed over the years.[20] In conceptual terms, there is a kind of equation between women and the land; in material terms, women are raped and butchered like the land;[21] in terms of Elizabethan drama, women are, as Woodbridge scrupulously points out, at times portrayed "as food, or as animals, or as marketable commodities" (Women 262).[22] Of course, food and animals

are commodities, just as much as gold and rare metals are.

With the expansion of the medieval and early modern feudal economies into market-industrial economies, as William Leiss *et al* explain in a review of Marx's discussion about the growth of commodity fetishism,[23] "more and more elements of both the natural environment and human qualities are drawn into the orbit of exchanged things, into the realm of commodities," and that this "process of converting [natural and human qualities into commodities] constitutes the *very essence* [of the expanding economies]" (273--emphasis added). A fundamental principle governing both the designation of alterities and the "development" of "virgin land" is the production of the hypervisibly available object. The production of these objects meets felt needs.

Portia, in The Merchant of Venice, is a hypervisibly (though not unproblematically) available object that meets the textual requirements for a compulsively expressive heterosexuality. She is linked with an irresolvably binaristic mineral world, at one and the same time being the lead and the gold, in the position of a passive object waiting to be chosen by the right man.[24] The implicit equation of the woman with the mineral world is significant: minerals and women serve as objects of exchange between men. What I am interested in here in early modern discourses, particularly in the Elizabethan period, is less the gender-

neutral metaphor linking the body politic with the body human[25] than the gender-specific equations of the female body with discursive productions of the environment.

The conflation of the female body with the geographical body is blatantly apparent in the many maps of the period that cartographically inscribe women (see Figure 2). If the New World Other is a part of the world that is objectified, commodified, and inventoried, so too is the Old World Other. There is nothing innocent about the gendering of early modern maps. As lands are divided up, so are women's bodies (I discuss this issue in greater detail in chapter 1). Objectification, Carol Adams observes,

> permits the oppressor to view another being as an object. The oppressor then violates this being by object-like treatment. e.g., rape of women that denies women freedom by saying no, or the butchering of animals that converts animals from living breathing beings into dead objects. This process allows fragmentation, or brutal dismemberment, and finally consumption. (47)

As Patricia Parker has maintained, the discursive fragmentation of the female body enables the expression of a "lexicon of merchandising" (130), that "the 'inventory' of parts becomes a way of taking possession," and that the woman in question becomes a "gendered sign of . . .

A.

FIGURE 2:
Portraits of Elizabeth[26]

All adapted from: Strong (114, 126)

B.

C.

territory to be conquered and occupied" (131).[27] In Twelfth Night, Olivia itemizes herself and says that she shall be

> inventoried, and every particle and utensil labelled to my will: as, item, two lips, indifferent red; item, two gray eyes, with lids to them; item, one neck, one chin, and so forth. (1.5.246-9)

Although her tone is ironic and dry, she does play out a familiar theme--namely, the discursive division of the female body as a passively available (and butcherable) object.

If the similarities in the discourses that produce women and animals are to be addressed; if the discursive transcodings of animals with women is important; if the bestialization of women is significant to a literary community that eats animals; then meat is a feminist issue.[28] And since meat is also an environmental issue, then the environment is a feminist issue. Eco-phobic inscriptions rage in the Renaissance like the devouring flames in the twentieth-century Amazonian rainforests. Perhaps the two are unrelated. Perhaps the generalized environmental loathing implied in the bestialization of Europe's Others has no relation to current literary theories about dispossession, or about sexual dissidence, or about gender trouble, or about post-colonialism, but I would argue

otherwise. The assimilation of the world to a totalizing discourse happens not merely in social terms but in environmental terms as well, and the two are discussed more fruitfully together than separately.[29] What I have attempted in this chapter is to open a space for dialogue about a theory of power that can address a politics of domination that includes discussions of the environment. Conceptualizations of the environment are very much a part of early modern and modern processes that designate sites of alterity.

Notes

[1]See, for example, Graham Huggan, "Decolonizing the map: Post-colonialism, poststructuralism and the cartographic connection," Ariel 20 (1989): 115-31; J.B. Harley, "Deconstructing the map," Writing Worlds: Discourse, Text and Metaphor in the Representation of Landscape, Eds. Trevor J. Barnes and James S. Duncan (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) 231-47; and Richard Helgerson, "The Land Speaks: Cartography, Chorography, and Subversion in Renaissance England," Representing the English Renaissance, Ed. Stephen Greenblatt (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: U of California P, 1988) 327-61. I suggest other examples in Chapter 1, note 9, page 57.

[2]I will use the term "eco-phobia" to denote fear and loathing of the environment in much the same way that the term "homophobia" denotes fear and loathing of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.

[3]As the titles to many early modern plays warrant (Eastward Ho! and Westward Ho! are two good examples), journeys have, by the early modern period, become a topic of considerable common interest. What differentiates the wanderlust of early modern Europe from the journeyings of prior historical periods is the kind of globality that it imagines. The Old World has arrived at the New. The numerous mentioning of the Bermudas (e.g., in The Tempest, 1.2.229; The Duchess of Malfi, 3.2.266; and Bartholomew

Fair, 2.6.72-3, to name a few instances) also suggests an early modern preoccupation with the New World.

[4]The importance of the native guide registers several times in this play. Caliban reminds Prospero of his service as a guide (1.2.339-40), and he also promises to be such a guide for Trinculo: "I'll show thee every fertile inch o'th'island" (2.2.148). Caliban also serves Prospero in acquiring the amenities of life, and Prospero is well aware of this service: "we cannot miss him," Prospero says, explaining that Caliban "does make our fire,/ Fetch in our wood, and serves in offices/ That profit us" (1.2.313-5). For a discussion of the native guide, see also Kay Shaffer, "Captivity narratives and the idea of 'nation,'" in Captured Lives, Ed. K. Darian-Smith (London: Robert Menzies Centre for Australian Studies, University of London, 1993).

[5]The whole notion of ill-gotten goods (including land and people) is important in this play. In the second act, we learn that Roughman will have Bess, "easily or not" (2.1.9), and we might see in this a parallel to the "honourable versus pillaging" dichotomy of imperialist quests for wealth set up by the play. The parallel is part of a larger linking that the text accomplishes between women and geographies of difference. The maritime imagery of Roughman, for example, rife with sexual innuendo, implicitly links women with exploration: "I must know what burden this vessel is. I shall not bear/ with her till she bear with

me, and till then I cannot report/ her for a good woman of carriage" (2.1.19-21), Roughman says. The overlap of maritime imagery and sexual innuendo clearly suggests a conceptual link between geography and gender.

[6]I borrow my phrasing here from Biddy Martin and Chandra Talpade Mohanty's "Feminist Politics: What's Home Got to Do with It?," Feminist Studies/Critical Studies, Ed. Teresa de Lauretis (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1986): 191-210. While Martin and Mohanty discuss "being home and not being home" (196) more as subjective experiences of belonging and not belonging, mental universes, than of geographical "home" and colonial *terra incognita*, my use of the "home/not home" modality is more chorographic.

[7]Robert Wilson argues in The Hydra's Breath: Imagining Disgust (forthcoming) that "disgust . . . serves as a term to mark difference . . . [and] seems always to be a question of boundaries" (*passim*). Part of my project here will be to look at the ways in which geographical boundaries function in the drawing of lines of disgust and alterity.

[8]It is clearly a mentality that conceptualizes the environment in feminine terms and the feminine in environmental terms that we see displayed here. Henry identifies women both as environmental commodities and as spoils of war. Before the gates of Harfleur, Henry demands the surrender of the Governor and threatens that one of consequences of his refusal will be that his "pure maidens

[will] fall into the hand/ Of hot and forcing violation" (3.3.20-1). Another consquence Henry threatens is that the women and children will be cut down when the King and his train start "mowing like grass/ [The] fresh fair virgins and . . . flow'ring infants" (3.3.13-4). There is no real distinction between the Other and the environment here.

[9]Early in Purity and Danger, Mary Douglas makes a similar point in arguing that "dirt is essentially disorder" (2).

[10]Correspondences between the natural and social worlds are indeed abundant in early modern literature, from the disorderly and carnivalesque world of the witches in Macbeth, with their "fog and filthy air" (1.1.11), to the proclamations of Ulysses in Troilus and Cressida, where we are given the rhetorical question asking

> . . . when the planets
> In evil mixture to disorder wander,
> What plagues, and what portents, what mutiny,
> What raging of the sea, shaking of earth,
> Commotion in the winds, frights, changes, horrors,
> Divert and crack, rend and deracinate
> The unity and married calm of states
> Quite from their fixture? (1.3.94-101)

In his next breath, Ulysses gives the answer:

> O, when this degree is shaked,
> Which is the ladder of all high designs,

The enterprise is sick. (11.101-3)

Disorder in the natural world is disorder in the social world. In addition, the many references to disease in Troilus and Cressida suggest a kind of bodily rot and pollution, a physical dirtiness that is debilitating.

[11]The enseamed bed here is Gertrude's, and it is so disgusting, rotten, and dirty to Hamlet because it flies in the face of the kind of order that Hamlet would have wished to have seen maintained.

[12]I am indebted to Vernon McCarthy for bringing this article to my attention.

[13]Perhaps the most substantial of these is Maggie Kilgour's, From Communion to Cannibalism: An Anatomy of Metaphors of Incorporation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1990), which looks at the symbolic cannibalism of communion.

[14]For discussions about relationships between colonialist discourse and the discourse of cannibalism, see Philip P. Boucher, Cannibal Encounters: Europeans and Island Caribs, 1492-1763 (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins, 1992); Peter Hulme, "Columbus and the Cannibals: A Study of the Reports of Anthropophagy in the Journal of Christopher Columbus," Ibero-Amerikanisches Archiv 4 (1978): 115-39; Richard B. Moore, "Carib 'Cannibalism': A Study in Anthropological Stereotyping," Caribbean Studies 13 (1973): 117-35; and Stephen Orgel, "Shakespeare and the Cannibals," Cannibals, Witches, and Divorce: Estranging

the Renaissance, Ed. Marjorie Garber (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1985) 40-66. For an early modern "documentary" statement about cannibalism, see M. E. Montaigne, "On Cannibals," Montaigne: Essays (New York: Penguin, 1958) 105-19.

[15]The production of the Other as dirty probably explains the currency of the proverb in the Renaissance about washing an Ethiop white. For a detailed discussion of this proverb in early modern texts, see also Carolyn Prager, "'If I be Devil': English Renaissance Response to the Proverbial and Ecumenical Ethiopian," Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 17. 2 (Fall 1987): 257-79.

[16]Of course, Greenblatt's thesis is a bit problematic, since in the drawing of any boundary, as Derek Gregory has argued (via Derrida, about whom Gregory is talking), "each side folds over and implicates the other in its constitution" (72). John Carlos Rowe argues much the same position, claiming that "the 'margin' is always already constituted by its exclusion, by a powerful act of cultural repression" (155). Peter Hulme argues along the same deconstructive lines in pointing out that the

> boundaries of community are often created by accusing those outside the boundary of the very practice on which the integrity of that community is founded. (Colonial Encounters 85)

The Other can never really, then, be absolutely outside or

Other to the discursive hegemony that seeks to produce it. As Richard Bernstein has proposed,

> at the heart of what we take to be familiar, native, at home--where we think we can find our center--lurk (is concealed and repressed) what is unfamiliar, strange and uncanny. (174)

[17]Leonard Tennenhouse discusses women as sources of pollution in Power on Display (New York and London: Methuen, 1986) 117-22. While intriguing, especially for its treatment of issues about dismemberment as enactments of disciplinary responses to perceived or constructed sources pollution, Tennenhouse's analysis is entirely anthropocentric and has effectively no comment about the significance of the ways in which the environment is conceptualized, both implicitly and explicitly, in the early modern metaphors of pollution.

[18]For an extensive analysis of the history of menstruation as it is discursively produced in (for the most part Western) history, see Janice Delaney, Mary Jane Lupton, and Emily Toth, The Curse: A Cultural History of Menstruation (New York: Signet, 1976).

[19]This particular phrase occurs in Hamlet (1.1.140). We also find the word "womb" in The Winter's Tale, where it is used as a verb in association with the earth: the "earth wombs" (4.4.483), or encloses, in Florizel's usage.

[20]See her The Lay of the Land: Metaphor as Experience and History in American Life and Letters (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1975).

[21]Metaphorical equations between rape and exploitation constitute a huge and sprawling topic, only a fraction of which I am concerned with here. Numerous early modern texts equate military conquest with rape--Titus Andronicus, Lucrece, and Henry V are just a few--but this topic has been discussed extensively by other critics. See, for example, Linda Woodbridge's The Scythe of Saturn: Shakespeare and Magical Thinking (Urbana and Chicago: U of Illinois P, 1994) especially Chapter 1; and Heather Dubrow's Captive Victors: Narrative Poems and Sonnets (Ithaca and London: Cornell UP, 1987) especially Chapter 2. My concern is less with military than environmental invasion. Relationships among issues of rape and men's control of property undergird Marion Wynne-Davies' discussions in "'The Swallowing Womb': Consumed and Consuming Women in Titus Andronicus," The Matter of Difference: Materialist Feminist Criticism of Shakespeare, Ed. Valerie Wayne (Ithaca, New York: Cornell UP, 1991) 129-51, as well as some of the portions of non-literary texts such as Susan Brownmiller's Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New York: Bantam, 1975). As I discuss below, the mentality that sees women as environmental commodities is one that does not blanch at prospects of violence--either to women or the environment.

[22]For each item in this list, Woodbridge provides, in footnotes, extensive examples from Elizabethan texts (see Women 268-70).

[23]See also Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1954): 43-144 ("Part 1: Commodities and Money").

[24]Bassanio is unlike the other suitors (among them, a "tawny Moor" [2.1.SD]--who, in the stunningly racist economy of the text is the dullest of the suitors and therefore chooses gold--and the Prince of Arragon, apparently not black, but a foreigner nonetheless whose intellect allows him only to choose the wrong silver casket). Bassanio is a good home-grown sort of fellow, and, yes, he correctly chooses lead, the *summum bonum* in the inverted hierarchy. Despite appearances, though, Bassanio does choose gold. He chooses Portia, whose "sunny locks/ Hang on her temples like a golden fleece" (1.1.174-5)--and, of course, it is her gold that he is after.

While Portia actively resists her role as passive object waiting to be chosen, the scripted ideal remains essentially intact. The sense at the end of the play is that her transgressions will be *forgiven* and that she will behave herself according to the ideals that she has so clearly challenged.

[25]For an in-depth discussion about this issues, see David George Hale, The Body Politic: A Political Metaphor in

Renaissance Literature (The Hague and Paris: Monton, 1971) especially "The Age of Elizabeth," 69-107.

[26]In plate A (artist unknown, *c.* 1592), which is often referred to as the "Ditchley Portrait," Elizabeth appears on top of a map of England; in plate B (John Case, *Sphaera Civitatis*, 1588), Elizabeth embraces "a pre-Copernican universe" (Strong 126); in plate C (artist unknown, "Europa," 1598), Elizabeth appears as a map. As Roy Strong explains,

> her right arm is made up of Italy; her left of England and Scotland, her feet are planted in Poland. To the left of her, the Armada is defeated; to the right, a triple-headed Pope rides away in a boat rowed by clergy and escorted by a fleet of ships, all of which are numbered and allude to papal allies. (114)

Each plate is reproduced from Roy Strong's Portraits of Queen Elizabeth I (Oxford: OUP, 1963).

[27]Nancy Vickers has done a lot of work with the *blazon* and the question of discursive dismemberment. See, for example, her "'The blazon of sweet beauty's best': Shakespeare's Lucrece," in Shakespeare and the Question of Theory Eds. Patricia Parker and Geoffrey Hartman (New York and London: Metheun, 1985): 95-115; "'This Heraldry in Lucrece' Face,'" in The Female Body in Western Culture: Contemporary Perspectives Ed. Susan Rubin Suleiman (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard UP, 1986): 209-22; and

"Diana Described: Scattered Woman and Scattered Rhyme," in Critical Inquiry 8 (1981): 265-79.

[28]I am indebted for my thinking here to Hilda McKenzie, with whom I have had many intellectually profitable conversations about this topic. See also her "Meat and Misogyny," Open Road 20 (Fall 1986): 10-12.

[29]My views here are largely inspired by Jim Cheney's provocative "Postmodern Environmental Ethics: Ethics as Bioregional Narrative" Environmental Ethics 11 (Summer 1989): 117-34, especially 120. I have also found the debate that this article sparked useful in helping me to develop my ideas--for a contestatory response to Cheney, see Peter Quigley's "Rethinking Resistance: Environmentalism, Literature, and Poststructural Theory," Environmental Ethics 14. 2 (Winter 1992): 291-306.

Conclusion

Many of the mechanisms designating alterity in the early modern period have, in diverse forms, become our inheritance. Dismemberments and other varieties of torture are disciplinary demonstrations of power that are unique neither to early modern England nor to the various discourses that both produce and reproduce the period. Fear of subversion, of rebellion, or even of *utterances* by subordinate classes always plagues dominant ideologies, and, as Raymond Williams has argued, "hegemony is always an active process" (115), is always in the course of articulating and fashioning itself through acts that seek to contain (though sometimes paradoxically end up producing, one might add) what he calls "emergent" cultural features.[1]

If, for instance, the genital torture of sexual dissidents in early modern Europe advertises the dominant heterosexual orthodoxy, it also participates in producing the self-same emergent community that it seeks to silence. Yet, at the same time that power is articulated through the early modern body, the very processes of such power are often occluded in their enunciation. If Titus Andronicus critiques the unambivalent gestures of containment enacted in the text (the slicing out of the raped Lavinia's tongue and the lopping off of her hands), it is the *acts* of dismemberment, rather than the ideology behind these acts that are under review. Dismemberment of early modern

Others remains culturally acceptable in Titus Andronicus--there would, we may rest assured, be no hoopla if Tamora were to have *her* tongue and hands removed. But that was then, and this is now, and the cultural acceptability of dismemberment seems a thing of a distant and hazy past.

If we think about it, though, we see soon enough that the dismemberment of women or gays, for instance, is a culturally accepted conceptual practice in North American society. Pornography, one could easily argue, thrives on body parts.[2] One might also argue that we live in a society numb to the mutilation of women by men, but if a woman were to cut off a part (a penis, for instance) of even an abusive man, the case would make international news and become a veritable media circus.[3] If every dismembered woman made such headlines, there would be no space for any other news.

We find a lot of butchery in the early modern period. What we say about this fact is as important as what it says about us. In Chapter 1, I have tried to show that it is through the body that power is articulated, that discipline and silence are issues that pass through the body, and, in the process, I have tried to draw contemporary parallels to early modern examples.

But if part of what alterity involves in the Renaissance is silence, so too is silence involved in contemporary examples, though it is a point that I have,

until now, only implied. It would certainly be interesting to make an inventory of the types and functions of silence in the two periods, since there *have* been considerable social advances that have allowed voice to groups that in the early modern period were relegated to positions of relative silence or, alternatively, were more or less confined to communicating within "coded" discourses.[4]

It is no coincidence that we find questions of silence attached to issues of race, sexuality, gender, and subordinated classes in general.[5] As Chapter 1 shows how the body performs among these issues, Chapter 2 reveals how, in each category, *silence* functions as a key player in productions of alterity. Of course, silence and imposition are not always coinciding, since silence is as much a type of *resistance*, at times, as cross-dressing, the practice of witchcraft, or even suicide sometimes is. As wide-ranging as my treatment of silence may be, though, there is still something quite important missing--namely, a discussion of the silences of those who do not write. It would be a fruitful expansion of my topic to look at who owns and operates the means of communication in the early modern period.[6]

As we see in Chapter 3, though, honest attempts to review the past are complicated, difficult, and mostly tedious. Prying at "hairline verbal fractures to get an inside look at something . . . beneath most historians'

notice" (Veeser 5) is one thing; it is quite another thing to wade through court records, reams of pulp broadsides, sermons, clinical and medical records, and personal correspondences of the early modern period (all the while keeping an eye on the over-arching political structures of the time). Theorizing about New Historicism is easier than practicing it, which probably explains why there is so much of the former and so little of the latter. A look at the ownership and operation of the means of communication, as it relates to the production of alterities in the early modern period, would be a gargantuan task. I found that with the question of the relationship between madness and alterity, however, a New Historicist praxis is indispensable. Chapter 3 is my modest attempt at producing a New Historicist reading of the functions of early modern "madness" in productions of alterities. One of the conclusions we might most readily draw from the discussion is that the field of mental and psychological difference is as "useful" (and unstable) in the modern period as in the early modern. Madness continues to be deployed as a means of Othering and silencing. Sometimes it seems that there is nothing new in the world.

I began this project with an epigraph from Dostoevsky about old subjects and new ideas, and so it seemed appropriate to end with a novel beginning. Very little of the work in the field of environmental ethics has trickled

into literary theory, and even less into discussions about Shakespeare and his contemporaries. Questions about ecophobia are a logical extension of processes that so often use the animal and natural world in designating alterities. What I have tried to do in Chapter 4 is to raise the question of "the environment" in a way that would begin to connect old issues and new, while also drawing connections among the various systems of domination I have been reviewing. One daunting consequence of the theoretical maneuver I perform, though, is that alterity becomes more an interdisciplinary field than one might initially have thought. Recent work in the field of geography, in postcolonial studies, in theories of disgust and rot, and in the animal rights movement start to take on added significance. New connections start to form, and making connections is mostly what this project was all about.

Notes

[1]Williams defines "dominant," "residual," and "emergent" in chapter 8 of Marxism and Literature (1977). The "residual," he argues,

> has been effectively formed in the past, but is still active in the cultural process, not only and often not at all as an element of the past, but as an effective element of the present. (122)

His definition of "emergent" cultural patterns describes the

> new meanings and values, new practices, new relationships and kinds of relationship . . . continually being created. (123)

Emergent cultural practices are oppositional.

[2]Of course, men also appear in pornography, and the same kinds of anatomizations apply. And, if we assume that the bulk of pornography--male or female--is for men, then the cultural effects in both cases are similar. Both the gay bar scene and the gay ghetto in general are as guilty of anatomizing men as the heterosexual male community, in general, is of anatomizing women.

[3]I am, of course, thinking of the recent case against Lorena Bobbitt.

[4]Coded discourses, of course, represent a genre of resistance that continues within groups that in fact do have authorized voices. "Camp" springs to mind. In her discussion of Camp in Against Interpretation (1961), Susan

Sontag lists fifty-eight characteristics of "Camp," though she does not actually identify Camp as *serious* resistance. Of course, as she explains, "the whole point of Camp is to dethrone the serious" (288). But Camp is, she rightly notes, "something of a private code, a badge of identity even" (275), and I think that whether intentional or not, the type of transgressive challenge that Camp poses to straight culture is comparable to the kinds of subversion posed to imperialist cultures by "slave languages." Yiddish and Jamaican Creole, for instance, each, in their own way, switch and subvert linguistic codes in attempts to maintain a kind of cultural independence and identity. Similarly, Camp subverts dominant linguistic and cultural categories as it asserts its own aestheticism. Camp is resistance.

[5]While the issue of class is clearly important in my various discussions, I have been less interested in performing classical Marxist readings that look at economic differences than I have been in looking at class in terms of social and ideological differences. Certainly, the social and the economic do overlap, to some degree, and there is room for expansion in my analyses. One might, for example, consider the ways in which Othello's social and economic status as a general mitigates against his status as a black man in a white community. Clearly, class is important in this play, and, no doubt, much of Iago's depravity and

malevolence grows out of his recognition both of his class position and of the unfairness of class differences and dynamics in general. Class differences also feature prominently in Twelfth Night. In Vested Interests: Cross-dressing and Cultural Anxiety (1993), Marjorie Garber identifies Malvolio's cross-dressing as a class issue: what he crosses, she argues, "is a boundary of rank rather than of gender. His desire is clearly for upward mobility" (36). Economic class difference enables the cruel abuse of and insensitivity toward Malvolio. His friends (Sir Toby Belch, Sir Andrew Aguecheek, and Maria) comprise a structural and generic counterpart to the main characters and action. In short, there is room for analysis of the role and function of economic class in the production of alterities, not only in Othello and Twelfth Night, but probably in all of the works that I discuss.

[6]Although all of the primary materials I use in this dissertation are, as far as I know, white and male-authored (or they are anonymous), there were, of course, women (and non-whites, I would imagine) writing in the early modern period. The fact that so few were published or canonized says a lot about early modern hierarchized social relations and about the policing of the technologies of communication. In his introduction to Marx and Engels on the Means of Communication (1980), Yves de la Haye succinctly articulates the importance of access to the modes of communication: he

argues that

> "communication" as a social activity takes in the ensemble of social forms through which social relations are expressed, materialized, and modified. "Communication" establishes the framework, the limits, and the implications of these social relations, whether it be a question of nations, classes, markets or empires. (55)

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